1. ' WALI MUHAMMAD KHAN, J.---Mst. Bibi Fatima, appellant herein, has called in question the judgment dated 26-6-1989 passed by a learned Division Bench of the Peshawar High Court, whereby the Writ Petition No,28 of 1982 filed by Abdul Karim Khan, respondent 1 herein, was accepted and the order of the Chairman, Federal Land Commission, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad, respondent No,5 herein; and that of the Chairman, Tribunal Land Disputes, Dir, Swat, and Chitral, respondent No,6 herein; were declared to be without jurisdiction, lawful authority and of no legal effect, and that they were not covered by the relevant provision of the statute. The leave granting order is as follows:-- "The case of the petitioner is that her father Nisab Khan gifted an area measuring 7 Jareebs in village Toryalada (Ayun) Tehsil and District Chitral in favour of her husband Nasir-ud-Din vide gift deed dated 29-1-1940. It was verified by the.Judicial Council, the highest judicial forum in the defunct-State of Chitral, vide a report submitted to the Ruler of the State on 10-2-1940. Petitioner's step-brother Muzaffar Hussain challenged the gift deed before the Ruler of the State who rejected the same vide order dated 25-2-1940. However, a forged deed was prepared in which the land was stated to have been gifted by the petitioners's father Nisab Khan to petitioner's father-in-law, namely, Amir Muhammad who is further stated to have sold the land. In proceedings before the relevant administrative authorities, claim of the petitioner was accepted. But on the writ petition of the respondent No,1, the orders were set aside on the ground that the relevant Regulation, i.e,, Settlement of Disputes of Immovable Property (Chitral) Regulation III of 1974 as amended by Regulation II of 1976 was not applicable to the facts of the case.
2. ' Contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that para. (ii) of clause (2) of the said Regulation read with the explanation to the clause of section 3 of the said Regulation was fully applicable as the other party to the dispute was K.B. Dilaram Khan, a descendant of the Mehtar being a son.
3. ' To consider the contention leave is granted."
4. ' The facts of the case, in nut-shell, are that Nisab Khan, father of the appellant, was ownei of the disputed land who gifted the same in favour of Nasir-ud-Din son of Amir Muhammad, his son-in- law engaged to his minor daughter, namely, Mst. Bibi Fatima appellant. The said deed was placed before the Ruler who marked it to the Judicial Council under Riwaj for investigation and they after proper inquiry reported the genuineness of the deed to the then Ruler who accepted the same.
5. Muzaffar Hussain son of the donor from another wife objected to the deed but with no success vide order of the Ruler dated 25-2-1940.
6. ' K. B. Dilaram Khan was the Prime Minister of the Chitral State who allegedly took forcible possession of the suit land somwhere in 1945-46. On the merger of the State with the Province of N.-W.F.P. In 1969, a Commission known as Dir, Swat, Chitral Land Disputes Inquiry Commission was constituted for inquiry into the land disputes between the claimants and the ex-Rulers or their heirs.
7. The appellants being aggrieved of the illegal possession of the disputed land by K.B. Dilaram Khan preferred a claim before the Commission in which Haider Zaman Khan, respondent herein, then acting as the attorney of K.B. Dilaram Khan filed written statement alleging therein that Amir Muhammad, father of the donee, was a defaulter of State dues and that the then Ruler after confiscating the suit land from him transferred the same to K.B. Dilaram Khan (his father) through gift deed dated 14-5-1944. While the matter was sub judice before the Commission, K.B. Dilaram Khan. Intended to sell the suit land in favour of Abdul Karim Khan respondent and on coming to know of it, the appellant besides serving them with registered notices also secured a stay order from the Deputy Commissioner vide order dated, 23-1-1973 and 30-4-1973. The Commission after inquiry into the matter and recording evidence of the parties gave its verdict in favour of the appellant and directed restoration of possession to her. K.B. Dilaram Khan and his transferee Abdul Karim Khan filed a joint appeal before the Addl. Deputy Commissioner under Regulation III of 1974 in which they resiled from their earlier stand of confiscation of property from Amir Muhammad and the consequent gift in his favour and invented a different story of the sale of the suit land by Amir Muhammad to hiin on 29-4-1944 vide a sale-deed attested by the then Ruler. The appeal was accepted vide order dated 24-1-1976 by A.D.C. And the recommendations of the Commission were set aside. The appeal filed against it before the Provincial Government also failed vide order dated 12-2-1976. The appellant therefore approached the Federal Land Commission with a revision 'petition which was accepted vide order dated 25-7-1976 and the orders of the lower forums were set aside with the result that the recommendations of the Inquiry Commission stood confirmed and order of restoration of possession to the appellant revived. Abdul Karim Khan, respondent, the vendee of the suit land from K.B. Dilaram Khan filed a review petition before Mr. Justice (Recd.)
8. Qaisar Khan who had been appointed by the President of Pakistan by the Presidential Order XII of 1980 to exercise the powers of review of the Federal Government. This was also rejected vide order dated 17-12-1981 through an elaborate judgment discussing the merits of the case and taking note of the contradictory stand taken by K.B. Dilaram Khan. Still not satisfied, Abdul Karim Khan respondent filed writ petition before the High Court which was accepted through the impugned order. Hence the instant appeal through leave of the Court.
9. ' We have heard Qazi Muhammad Anwar, Advocate, for the appellant; Mr. M. Sardar Khan, Advocate, for respondent 1; Mr. Hidayatullah Khan, Advocate, for respondent 5; and have perused the record of the case.
10. ' The grounds which prevailed with the learned High Court in setting at naught the finding of the special forums, respondents 5 and 6 herein, were that the dispute did not fall within the ambit of clause (2) of section 3 of Settlement of Disputes of Immovable Property (Chitral) Regulation III of 1974 as amended by Regulatin II of 1976 and, as such, the orders of respondents 5 and 6 were without jurisdiction and also because they being the revisional Court had exceeded their jurisdiction in upsetting the fmding of facts of the lower forum viz., the Additional Deputy Commissioner and the Provincial Government. It is, therefore, advisable to reproduce the aforementioned provision of law verbatim:-- ' Section 3.
11. "Definitions.---In this Regulation, unless the context otherwise requires,--
(1) 'Commission' means the Dir and Swat Land Disputes Enquiry Commission appointed by the Provincial Government under its Notification No,10/5-HSLG-II(TA), dated the 13th November, 1971;
(2) 'dispute' means a dispute relating to the ownership of, or any right or interest in, any immovable property in the former State of Chitral to which any of the following are parties and which did not exist earlier than the first day of January, 1930, namely:-
(i) the tenants and the ex-Mehtar of the former State of Chitral; or
(ii) claimant landlords and the ex-Mehtar of the former State of Chitral; or
(iii) landlords and tenant; and is a dispute---
(a) which had been inquired into by the Commission and in respect of which it had submitted its report; including a dispute in respect of which the Commission had withheld its findings because of a direction issued by the Provincial Government;
(b) which was not inquired into by the Commission because of a directive issued by the Provincial Government;
(c) which, not being a dispute referred to in paragraph (b), was not inquired into by the Commission; or
(d) which may be raised after the commencement of this Regulatin by an individual who could not raise it before the Commission earlier.
12. ' Explanation.---For the purpose of this clause, 'ex-Mehtar' includes all persons who have been Mehtars of the former State of Chitral after the year 1930 and their descendants."
13. ' We have carefully considered the above-quoted provision of law in the light of the reasons advanced in the impugned judgment of the High Court but fail to understand as to how the instant dispute is not covered under the statute referred to above. The dispute obviously related to the ownership of and right and interest in immovable property in the former State of Chitral. The parties IAIA to the dispute are Mst. Bibi Fatima, appellant, on the one hand and KB. Dilaram Khan Mehtarjo on the other. The former claimed title to the suit land being successor-in-interest of the original owner, namely, Nisab Khan, while the latter asserted ownerhip in the suit land, initially, on the strength of gift made by Mehtar Chitral in his favour, in respect of the suit land after it was confiscated by him from Amir Muhammad on account of his default in the payment of 'State dues and subsequently on account of its purchase from the said Amir Muhammad. The respective contentions of the parties were properly gone into by the Land Inquiry Commission as well as the respondents 5 and 6 and they held the appellant owner of the suit property and entitled to its possession. Sub-clauses (i) and (iii) are obviously not attracted because they relate to disputes wherein one of the parties must be a tenant and in the instant case neither party claimed tenancy rights. Sub-clause (ii) no doubt mentions claimant landlords as one of the party but reading it in conjunction with clause (2) of section 3 make it amply clear that it includes claimant owners as the word 'landlords' here is used in the general sense viz., owners of land and not in the terminology as per definition of Tenancy Laws where landlords connote the persons under whom other persons hold lands as tenants because the other sub-clauses (i) and (iii) specifically cater for tenants and landlords. The primary object of the Regulation is settlement of disputes between the Rulers and the persons previously ruled by them including tenants as well as other persons claiming ownership or any right or interest in any immovable property. Consequently, the persons claiming ownership in any land had the right to approach the Inquiry Commission for determination of their dipsute with Mehtar or his descendants. There is no independent sub-clause providing specifically for disputes between claimants owners and the ex-Mehtar and if they are excluded from sub- clause (ii) the entire scheme of the Regulation will become redundant.
14. ' This Court in the case of Hasham Khan v. The State (PLD 1991 SC 567) held as follows:-- "The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the language employed by the draftsman under section 11 is inartistic and does not express the true intention of the law-maker.
15. According to him, the real intention of the law-maker was to make a person guilty under section 11 to be punishable for an imprisonment extending to life as is the case in section 10(3) of the Ordinance and the word "extending" has been inadvertently omitted in the provision. To us also this appears to be the case and we also feel that the real intention of the law-maker is not reflected in the actual text of the provision. But the question is whether we can supply this omission?
16. ' The Supreme Court in exercise of its ordinary jurisdiction has had occasion to deal with this question on more than one occasion and has ruled that even though the Court cannot normally give any meaning to a provision other than that which the words used therein by the draftsman carry (however drastic or inconvenient the result may be) but the Court nevertheless in order to avoid injustice can give effect to the true and patent intention of the law-maker by supplying an omission (see Muhammad Amir Khan v. Controller of Estate Duty PLD 1961 SC 119 and Muhammad Ismail v. The State PLD 1969 SC 241)."
17. Following the above dictum, we declare that in sub-clause (ii) claimants landlords include claimant owners.
18. ' According to Regulation H of 1976, ex-Mehtar includes all persons who have been Mehtars of the former State of Chitral after the year 1930 and their descendants. The moot question requiring determination, therefore, is whether K.B. Dilaram Khan is the descendant of Mehtar or not. The learned High Court has avoided giving any positive finding as to whether K.B. Dilaram Khan was the descendant of Ex-Mehtar or not. Both the learned counsel appearing for the parties candidly conceded that K.B. Dilaram Khan was "Mehtarjo" i.e,, male issue of Mehtar but not from a legally- wedded wife of the family. K.B. Dilaram Khan is all along described as Mehtarjo in the documents annexed to the paper book. He was specifically shown as the son of late Amanul Mulk, Mehtar of Chitral in the review petition filed before Mr. Justice (Retd.) Qaisar Khan Tribunal and was shown as such in the writ petition as well as petition/appeal before this Court. It is nobody's case that he was not the son of late Amanul Mulk, Mehtar Chitral. The sole question therefore, is whether he is included in the category of descendants of Mehtar or not. According to the Oxford English Dictionary 'descendant' is one who "descends or is descended. From an ancestor; issue, and offspring in any degree near or remote of persons." This connotation brings him within the definition of `descendant' of late Amanul Mulk, Mehtar Chitral. Thus the instant dispute was fully covered under section 3 of the Regulation ibid and the Enquiry Commission as well as respondents 5 and 6 had the jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the dispute and their orders are neither coram non judice nor without lawful authority.
19. ' As regards the revisional powers of respondents 5 and 6, suffice it to say, that they had the statutory powers to revise the orders of the lower forums. We have gone through their judgments impugned before the High Court and could not find any illegality in the jurisdiction exercised by them.
20. ' Resultantly, we allow this appeal, set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and by dismissing the writ petition, restore the orders of respondents 5 and 6. There is no order as to costs.