1. ' MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLAH, CJ-This appeal through leave of the Court by a tenant in an Urban Rent Restriction matter is directed against the judgment dated 6-3-1985 of the Lahore High Court; whereby the appellant's Constitutional Writ Petition was dismissed. The proceedings before the learned Rent Controller for the eviction of the appellant, ended by a finding on the relationship of landlord and tenant, against the landlord/respondent; accordingly, his eviction application filed against the appellant was dismissed. On the landlord's appeal the Rent Controller's decision on the issue of relationship was reversed. The same was found in favour of the respondent with the result that the case was remanded for deciding it on merits after affording the parties adequate opportunities to produce their respective evidence. The appellant challenged this appellate decision before the High Court in its Constitutional writ jurisdiction but without any success. The learned Judge in the High Court after noticing the rule in faqir Muhammad and others v.
2. Muhammad Ismail and others (PLD 1983 SC 451) held as follows:-- "It is not disputed that the learned Additional District Judge being the appellate authority under the Rent Restriction Ordinance had the necessary jurisdiction in the matter. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also not been able to point out that the findings of the learned Additional District Judge are based on no evidence or suffer from any misreading of evidence."
3. Leave to appeal was granted to examine the point; whether the judgment of the appellate Court was not passed on misreading of evidence and that being so whether it was not obligatory on the High Court to set aside the remand order. It was held by this Court in well-known case of Ibrahim v Muhammad Hussain (PLD 1961 SC 119) that fragrmentary decisions on a purely preliminary point while main controversy about the liability of the tenant still is left to be determined in a fresh round of litigation, were most inconvenient, tending to delay administration of justice. That was also a case of a decision on the preliminary point of relationship of landlord and tenant. In that case the Rent Controller had decided the issue of relationship of landlord and tenant in favour of the landlord. The tenant challenged this decision in first and second appeals which were dismissed. He then brough the matter before the Supreme Court but without any success. It was ruled that an affirmative decision against the tenant on the issue of relationship of landlord and tenant could not be made subject-matter of further challenge in the higher forum--various reasons including one already noticed that the main controversy regarding ejectment still pending, fragmentary decisions on ancillary questions not only caused inconvenience to parties but also delayed the administration of justice. The difference in the said case and the present case is only this much that while the issue of relationship of landlord and tenant was decided against the tenant by the Rent Controller in the said case, in the present case it has been decided by the appellate Court and the case is pending before the Rent Controller as was in the case of Ibrahim for further proceedings on main issues. This difference is not of any consequence because the result remains the same; namely, that the issue of relationship having been decided against the tenant the eviction application has still to be decided on merits. In that decision it is not known as to who would succeed.
4. ' Another distinction sought to be made by the learned counsel is that the High Court in this case was examining the question in its writ jurisdiction. This also will not make any difference in so far as the result of the present appeal is concerned. The principle on which the Supreme Court did not permit "fragmentary decision" remains the same and would apply with full force to the proceedings (discretionary) in the High Court also. Moreover in writ jurisdiction factual aspects cannot be examined in such details as it can be done in appellate jurisdiction.
5. ' For the above-stated reasons alone the Constitutional Writ Petition should have been dismissed, therefore, there is no merit in this appeal. It needs to be observed that the High Court did not go deep into the merits of the controversy regarding the relationship on account of another principle, vis-a-vis, the scope of writ jurisdiction. Be that as it may, if and when the appellant is ordered to be finally evicted, on the principles laid down in the case of Ibrahim he will be at liberty to raise issue of relationship before the High Court if otherwise entertainable in its jurisdiction. There shall be no order as to costs.