The learned counsel contends that the fact that the case has been com--mitted to the Court of Session, cannot stand in the way of granting bail to the petitioners. He cited Muhammad Ayub v.
Muhammad Yaqub (PLD 1966 SC 1003), Maqbool Ahmad v. Anwar (PLD 1967 Lah. 364), Nadara v Jamait khan (PLD 1968 SC 310) and Nisar Ahmad v, State (PLD 1971 SC 174). It was also contended that Tufail petitioner was present in the Court of Additional Commissioner (Revenue), Lahore, on the date of occurrence and the Investigating Officer came to the finding that the petitioner was not present at the spot at the time of occurrence that the petitioners were alleged to have tired slots but it was nowhere recorded in the evidence that they had fired shots at the deceased or the complainant.
2. It has been held in Nisar Ahmad v. The State that accused can pray for his bail even after his commitment if he could show that his commitment was not based on reasonable grounds. It has been laid down in Nadara v. Jamait Khan that ordinarily framing of charge furnishes ground for belief that the accused has been guilty of such an offence, nevertheless, person committed may be allowed bail in an exceptional case if evidence prima facie makes out that such reasonable grounds do not appear. It was laid down in Maqbool Ahmad v. Anwar that framing of charge against accused is not tantamount to fielding that the accused is guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life.
3. The enquiry was held against the petitioners. Tufail petitioner did not lead any evidence in defence before the Committing Magistrate to establish that he was present in the Court of Additional Commissioner (Revenue), Lahore, at the time of the alleged occurrence. The occurrence had taken place at about 6-30 a.m. In the month of November. The Court hours were from 9-00 a.m. To 4-00 p.m. The spot of occurrence was stated to be 16 miles from Lahore. There is no evidence to the effect that a person could not reach the Court of Additional Commissioner after the occurrence. There is no evidence to this effect also at what time Tufail petitioner was present in the Court of Additional Commissioner (Revenue), Lahore. Both the petitioners were armed with guns and they had fired shots. Anwar and Nawab P. Ws. Have deposed against the petitioners. Both these witnesses stated that the petitioners and others got up all of a sudden from a sugar--cane field. Tufail petitioner raised lalkara that he would take revenge for the murder and secret information. The two petitioners fired one gun shot each. Thereafter, the co-accused reached armed with spear and Maqbool with toka. Maqbool inflicted toka blows to the deceased. The Committing Magistrate found a prima facie case against the petitioners and his co-aeeus--e3 under section 202/34, P. P. C. And committed the petitioner and the co. Accused to the Court of Session. In view of the evidence on record, there are reasonable grounds to believe that the petitioners are guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life. It has been held in PLD 1971 SC 174 that the argument that section 34 was not attracted in the case to make accused constructively liable for murder involved appraisal of entire prosecution evidence which could not safely be undertaken by the High Court hearing the bail application. It has been held in Manzoor Khan v. Kamir and 4 others (1972 SCMR 207) that ordinarily order of commitment satisfies conditions laid down in section 497, Cr. P. C. For disallowing bail. It was held in Ashfaq Ahmad Sheikh v. The State (1973 SCMR 212) that when an accused is committed to the Court of Session to stand trial, he is not ordinarily entitled to bail under section 497, Cr. P. C. As it cannot be said that no reasonable ground appears to believe that he was not guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life. It has been laid down in Muhammad Nawaz and another v. Mst.
Sakina and another (1971 SCMR 374) that finding of Committing Magistrate that prima facie case exists warranting committal to the Court of Session is sufficient to indicate existence of reasonable ground for believing that the accused was guilty of having committed offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life.
4. For the reasons stated above, I do not find any reasonable ground for allowing bail to the petitioners. The petition is dismissed.