1. ' In anticipation of the appellant's counsel appearing, I have heard Mr. Abbas Ali, for the respondent.
2. The eviction was sought on the grounds of default and personal requirement of the appellant- landlady. She failed on both the grounds before the learned Controller.
3. ' Possibly the finding on the question of default by the learned Controller may have been sustainable. However, on the question of personal requirement of the landlady herself and her children, who, according to her, were grown-up and required independent accommodation, the learned Controller has found that because the landlady was putting up with her husband, where the accommodation owned by such husband was sufficient, she was disentitled to claim eviction from the disputed property. Mr. Abbas Ali has also pointed out that at the time of the landlady's examination in January, 1989 her son was 16 years of age and her daughter only 14 years. This was established through the relevant birth certificates.
4. ' It is an admitted position that the tenancy commenced in the year 1977 and the tenant had already been in the premises for 11 years when in 1988 the eviction proceedings were instituted.
5. Naturally if the landlady, inter alia, wanted to accommodate her children she could easily anticipate that proceedings for eviction, which would have passed through various stages, were ordinarily likely to consume time. Clearly the children were growing up and expanding needs of the family could be visualised. Mr. Abbas Ali says that the pleadings are wanting in these details. But then the outlines of personal requirement can be elaborated in evidence. That seems to have been done.
6. ' Before the learned Controller, in order to support the proposition that a landlady could genuinely require a premises for her own use in spite of her residing in accommodation owned by her husband as also the inter-action between pleadings and proof was cited the decision of this Court in Syed Hamid Hussain v. Humeera, 1986 CLC 1873, where a learned Judge made the following comprehensive observations:--- 'However, the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant was that since the grounds taken by respondent in support of the plea of personal requirement in her affidavit-in-evidence are not enumerated in the ejectment application, they are to be ignored as afterthought. This argument has been rightly rejected by the learned Rent Controller on the strength of Supreme Court authority reported as Malik Nisar Muhammad and another v. Abdul Rauf 1972 SCM R 561 wherein it was held: `In the application for ejectment the respondent was not required to spell out all the evidence or factors in support of his personal requirement, and these things had to be stated only during the course of evidence.'
7. ' Apart from above, it is admitted that the respondent/landlady is presently living with her husband in his house. The appellant has failed to show that excepting the disputed house the respondent owns any other house anywhere. Since she expressed her desire that she needs the disputed house for her own use particularly when she does not own any other house, her demand for vacation of the disputed house cannot be frustrated on the ground that she is putting up with her husband with whom she is in ordinary course expected to reside. In a case like this, the view taken by the Supreme Court is that despite the fact that the wife has sufficient accommodation in her husband's house, she is free to live in her own house and can get her house vacated for her own use if the same is in occupation of the tenant."
8. ' Reliance in the cited case was placed on the Supreme Court dictum in Muhammad Abdul Rauf v.
9. Mehmooda Begum 1985 SCM R 1960, from which the following excerpt was vital to the dispute agitated before the learned Controller:--- "As pointed out above Rent Controller's decision proceeds on the ground that since the respondent/landlady was living with her husband in his house which had better accommodation than in the disputed premises, her plea for personal requirement must be held to be mala fide. The process of reasoning and the inference drawn by the learned Rent Controller is palpably erroneous and unsustainable. From the bare fact that the respondent was living with her husband in a house owned by him no such inference could logically be drawn. It is well recognised that under the law of the land a wife can independently hold property and there is no embargo in law against her assertion of the right to live in her own house. The embargo contained in subsection (2) of section 14 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, which disentitles a landlord to avail the benefit of subsection (1) of the said section stipulates that the landlord must be in occupation of the building owned by him in any locality. It was not ,denied by the learned counsel that the house in which the respondent is at present living belonged to her husband and she did not own the same. The question of better accommodation in such a house was, therefore, wholly irrelevant and did not in fact react upon her right to occupy her own house. No other circumstances were pointed out by the learned counsel which in any way detract from respondent's assertion that she needed her house for her own occupation. In the absence of any other circumstances reflecting adversely upon her claim to occupy her own accommodation, the inference that her claim was mala fide is purely conjectural. It was submitted by the learned counsel that normally a wife lives with her husband who is bound to provide her with maintenance and shelter. But in this case if the wife has chosen to demand the right to occupy her own house, it cannot be rejected on mere general notions."
10. ' The learned Controller distinguished the case of Syed Hamid Hussain in a context, which really was not material. Besides, he did not refer to the above Supreme Court enunciation expressly made mention of in Re: Syed Hamid Hussain at all. True the Supreme Court decision related to a need in relation to section 14 of the Ordinance but, in the broader approach finding favour, the ingredients of good faith as well as personal requirement were considered, which are expressly applicable to section 15(2)((vii) under which the current proceedings were brought.
11. ' Mr. Abbas Ali has referred me to some other case-law which was also cited before the learned Controller. It appears to me, however, that such has little bearing on the controversy in hand. There was nothing on record to show that the claim of the landlady was mala fide, as has been held by the learned Controller. She, in spite of being a lady, entered the witness-box and offered herself for cross-examination. Wherever necessary she, forthrightly, conceded to anything which was correct or truthful. Nothing in her evidence was false.
12. ' Furthermore, as regards case-law, pertaining to tenanted premises, some of which was cited before the learned Controller and has been cited here too, the principle seems to be that sufficiency of tenanted accommodation in the occupation of a landlord is not relevant where the landlord in good faith proposes to move from such a tenant-hold to his own property. Such considerations, as to sufficiency of requirement, were also duly highlighted in the Supreme Court, while deciding the case of Muhammad Abdul Rauf above.
13. ' In spite of a strong likelihood that the learned Controller may have been wrong in deciding the issue of personal requirement, I am, in deference to Yusuf v. Rabia, 1985 SCM R 1066 and Abdul Qadir v. Nasiruddin, PLD 1993 Kar. 216, constrained to dismiss this appeal because the appellant has not appeared either personally or through counsel. The above observations have been made for two reasons: firstly, in the event an application for restoration is made and granted, the salient features which are involved in these proceedings would already be available on record for due examination. This would save public time, which in anticipation of the appellant appearing, she ultimately failing, has been consumed today. Secondly and alternatively, in the event the landlady wants to file a fresh application on the basis of her requirements prevailing as of now, the findings in the impugned order would stand somewhat blunted. Of course, the current state of the requirement could also be taken note of at this stage had the landlady been represented today.
14. ' With these observations, which, would only be tentative and not binding at a later stage in these proceedings or before the learned Controller, if he is approached again, this appeal is dismissed.