1. ' By this appeal, the appellant/tenant has impugned the order passed by the Rent Controller on 14- 11-1991 in Rent Case No,744 of 1987.
2. ' Briefly the facts are that the respondent is the owner/landlady of double storied Bungalow constructed on Plot No,D-205 KDA Scheme No,1-A, Karachi. The first floor of the said Bungalow is in occupation of the present appellant as tenant and consists of one drawing/dining room, three bedrooms, three bath-rooms, one family lounge and a kitchen, hereinafter referred to as the case premises. The respondent sought ejectment of the present appellant on the ground that the respondent, who was living in Dubai at that time wanted to come back to Pakistan alongwith her two grown-up daughters, namely, Ismat Jalil aged 18 years, Sadaf Jalil, aged 15 years and minor son Imran Jalil, aged 6 years with the intention to provide the proper education and upbringing for her children.
3. ' The opponent/appellant filed the written statement wherein it was contended that the landlady does not require the premises in good faith for her personal need as her practice had been to get her property 'vacated from the tenants and to re-let the same on higher rent. It was alleged that in 1986 the landlady had got the ground floor of the said Bungalow vacated which was again re-let by her. It is also denied in the written statement that landlady had the said children.
4. ' On the has is of the above pleadings of the parties only one issue was settled i.e: "Whether the applicant requires case premises in good faith for her and her children."
5. ' The landlady examined her brother/Attorney, who produced the photostat copies of the Power of Attorney. He was cross-examined by the other side. The present appellant examined her father/Attorney and closed her side. The learned Rent Controller after hearing the arguments of the Advocates for the parties was pleased to pass the impugned order directing the ejectment of the present appellant. Being aggrieved, the appellant has preferred this appeal.
6. ' I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. The learned counsel for the appellant has assailed the impugned order on the following grounds:--
(i) That the Rent Controller has not taken into consideration the case-law cited at the bar by the appellant's Advocate.
(ii) The Rent Controller has not considered the fact that the burden is on the landlady to prove her good faith; and that no ejectment on the ground of personal requirement can be granted where good faith is not proved.
(iii) The Rent Controller had taken into consideration the case-law which does not apply to the present case.
7. ' Taking up the first plea raised by the learned counsel for the appellant, suffice it to say that the impugned order shows that as many as 13 judgments of superior Courts cited by the learned counsel for the appellant have been mentioned in the order. Of course, the Rent Controller has not discussed each case individually or distinguished the same. However, the fact that the said cases are mentioned in the order shows that the Rent Controller has referred to the same. As against this, the Rent Controller has also mentioned the case-law cited by the other side and has based his order on the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and this Court in different cases. It cannot be said that the Rent Controller has simply ignored the case-law cited by the learned counsel for the appellant.
8. ' Taking up the second ground raised by the learned counsel for the appellant it may be observed that there is no cavil about the principle that a landlord, who comes to the Court seeking ejectment of tenant on the ground of personal requirement should show the presence of element of good, faith. In the present case it is not disputed that the landlady is a Pakistani national residing abroad.
9. The said landlady in her rent case for ejectment has very specifically stated that she requires the premises for her residence as she intends to come back to Pakistan for the purposes of education of her grownup daughters and minor son. Her Attorney has been examined who has supported the contentions of the landlady made in the application filed for ejectment and has stated that she wants to come back to Pakistan for proper education and upbringing, of her children according to her family culture, custom and tradition so that she could get suitable match for her grown up daughteRs, One of her daughters is 18 years of age while the other is 15 years of age as shown in the application at the relevant time and obviously they have attained and are attaining marriageable age. Therefore, it cannot be said that the landlady has filed the rent case with mala fide intentions. Good faith means bona fides which should show reasonableness of the requirement of landlady. A As against this mala fides would mean that the case has been brought with some ulterior or collateral purposes. Here, the very facts on the face of it speak of the good faith of the landlady. In the case of Firdous Begum v. M/s. Siraj & Brothers (1988 CLC 802) it is held by Haider Ali Pirzada, J., that where in ordinary circumstances an owner of his rented premises had asserted that he requires the premises for his own use and occupation, the Rent Controller must start with the presumtpion that claim of requirement of premises by a landlord for his personal use and occupation was true and mere statement of tenant that case of landlord was false would not be sufficient. In the case of Sardar Khan v. Riaz Ahmed (1986 SCM R 1981) it was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the choice rests with the landlord in selecting the premsies for his personal requirement. Also in the case of Haroon Kassim v. Azam Suleman Madha (PLD 1990 SC 394) it was held as under:-- "It is by now the settled law that if the landlord possesses more than one house in the same urban area, the choice as to the house in which he would like to live in, is surely a matter within his prerogative and discretion and the law does not give either to the tenant or the Rent Controller the power to determine where the landlord should personally reside (Sabu Mal v. Kika Ram alias Heman Das, 1973 SCM R 185)."
10. ' In the case of Ahmedun-Nisa and others v. Mst. Parveen Siraj (1985 SCM R 2012), it was held that even the landlord/landlady, who resides permanently abroad to visist Pakistan occasionally was entitled to apply for ejectment on ground of personal use. Also in the case of Bashir Ahmed v.
11. Muhammad Shafi (1989 SCM R 538) it was held that landlord is best judge of his need. It was held in this case that regarding status also, primary consideration is choice about the need and comforts of the landlord; and that the Court can only interfere in this field when the claim of the landlord is visibly extraordinary. Lastly reference may be made to the, case of Mst. Musarrat Ahmeen v.
12. Muhammad Mubeen (1986 CLC 2033). This case is on all fours with the present case as in this case also the landlady being a Pakistani national was residing abroad and wanted to come back to Pakistan for proper education and upbringing of her children according to their own culture, custom and tradition so that she might be able to get the suitable match for her daughters of growing age. It was also held in this case that the landlord was not required to enter into witness- box to prove his bona fide requirement; and that proof of bona fide requirement or the exmaination of landlady entirely depended upon the nature of her requirement. In view of the above case-law, in the present case, the landlady through her Attorney has proved her bona fide requirement and good faith. The Attorney has stated that the landlady who will be residing in Pakistan with her grown-up daughters and minor son would feel more secure on the first floor rather than the ground floor.
13. ' The objections which were raised by the learned counsel for the appellant are to the extent that in the first instance, as claimed by her in the written statement she had denied the fact that the landlady had the said three children. It may be observed that the Attorney of the landlady has not been cross-examined on this point and, therefore, the statement of the Attorney goes unchallenged and amounts to an admission. The learned counsel for the Appellant has then submitted that the landlady did not produce any document to show that she wanted to shift to Pakistan. In my view, there is no need for the landlady to produce any such document when it is stated on oath that she wants to shift to Pakistan for the reasons mentioned above. The appellant has also not brought any evidence on record to show that the present respondent was in occupation of any other premises in the same area. Of course, it has come in evidence that she/her husband own one flat at Clifton but the Attorney of the respondent has stated that this flat is already in occupation of other tenants. From these facts and circumstances, I am of the view that the landlady had established her requirement, for personal need in good faith.
14. ' Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed with costs and the order of the Rent Controller is maintained.
15. ' Above are the reasons for the short order announced in Court on 11th October, 1992.