KHALIL-UR-REHMAN RAMDAY, J.--The petitioner seeks bail in case FIR No. 32 registered at P.S. Daulat Gate of District Multan on 8-2-1991 with respect to the alleged commission of offences punishable under Articles 3 and 4 of Order IV of 1979 on the allegation that in pursuance of a raid conducted as a result of the secret information received by the complainant-inspector, 100 grams of HEROIN was recovered from the possession of the petitioner who was found sitting-at the door of his house for the purposes of selling the same.
2. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the only persons who allegedly witnessed the recovery in question were police officials and no person from the public was associated with the same; that even these witnesses were not witnesses to any alleged sale on the part of the petitioner which takes his case outside the purview of at least Article 3; that only one gram of HEROIN had been sent for Chemical Examination which could make the petitioner culpable only for the said quantity of HEROIN which made the offence alleged against him as a bailable offence and finally that despite a lapse of almost seven months, the trial against him had not even commenced.
3. It has been repeatedly held that members of the police force were competent witnesses under the law and the prosecution case could not be thrown out only because public witnesses had not come forward to support the same. Reluctance of members of the public in offering themselves as witnesses in such like matters is by now, & judicially recognized fact.
4. There is no legal mandate that the entire quantity of narcotics recovered from a person must be sent for Chemical Examination or that an accused person, if found guilty of possession or sale of such narcotics, would be liable only to the extent of the quantity which was sent for Chemical Examination, as long as it could be established that the quantity sent for Chemical Examination had been taken out from the narcotics allegedly recovered.
5. Grant of bail on account of delay in the commencement or the conclusion of trials is now statutorily regulated and it is only the delay mentioned in the third proviso to section 497(1), Cr.P.C, which can entitle an accused person to his release on bail on such ground. Admittedly, the delay in the present case has not ripened into the delay envisaged by law for the purpose.
6. Consequently, I find no merit in this petition which is accordingly dismissed.