' The respondent filed an ejectment application against the appellant on the ground of reconstruction of the premises and on the ground of default in the payment of rent for the period commencing from August, 1988 to December, 1988. The petition was filed in June, 1989. The learned trial Court passed rent order on 26-11-1989 whereby the appellant was directed to deposit a sum of Rs,8,000 as arrears of rent at the admitted rate of Rs,500 p.m. for a period of 16 months. The appellant had been already depositing rent for a considerable time in his Miscellaneous Rent Case No,106 of 1989. He therefore in compliance with the order of learned Rent Controller, withdrew the rent from his Miscellaneous Rent case and duly deposited it in the ejectment petition and thereafter kept on depositing the rent in the ejectment case up to 4th April 1990 when rent for the months of March, April and May, 1990 was deposited in advance. However, thereafter the appellant again proceeded to deposit the rent in his old Miscellaneous Rent Case No,106 of 1989. When the respondent applied on 6-11-1990 for withdrawal of the rent he learnt that rent was not being deposited in the ejectment case since 4th April 1990. She therefore moved an application on 12-11- 1990 under section 16(2) of the Ordinance for striking off the defence of the appellant. The appellant filed objections dated 2-12-1990 in which he categorically denied that there had been any default since 4th April, 1990. Subsequently, the appellant conceded the default and vide application dated 11-2-1991 he prayed the learned Rent Controller for permission to file further objections or counter- affidavit and explained that due to inadvertence he had deposited the rent of certain months in his Miscellaneous Rent Case No,106 of 1989 instead of in the ejectment case. He was, however, not allowed to file further objections or counter-affidavit and this application was rejected. After hearing the application under section 16(2) of the Ordinante, learned Rent Controller granted the same and vide order dated 25-2-1991 struck off the defence of the appellant. In doing so he relied upon the judgment reported as Kabiruddin Lalani and others v. Zafar Ishaq Ansari 1987 CLC (Karachi) 1984. Instead of filing an appeal against this order, the appellant preferred a review application on 10th April 1991 in which he pleaded that it was due to sheer inadvertence that rent f6r a few months was deposited in the Miscellaneous Rent case instead of in the ejectment case.
Learned Rent Controller was, however, pleased to dismiss the review application vide order dated 15th March, 1992 after holding that the Rent Controller had no powers of review. Thereafter the present appeal was filed by the appellant on 5th May, 1992.
2. I have heard the appellant in person and learned counsel of the respondent.
3. There is no denying the fact that the review is not provided under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 and therefore learned Rent Controller had no jurisdiction to entertain such application. As such period of limitation shall not run from 15th March, 1992 when the review application was dismissed. It shall run from 25th February 1991 when the defence of the appellant was struck off. Since the appeal was filed on 5th May, 1992, i.e. after one year and three months of the said order, it is hopelessly barred by time. In this regard learned counsel of the respondent has relied on the judgment in the case of Najaf Khan v. Dr. Tajammul Hussain 1987 CLC (Karachi) 1971. I find that this judgment applies to the present case on all fours. Last para. of the judgment is relevant for our purposes and is reproduced below:-- "The appellant's contention is that by filing the review application he can get benefit of that order.
In my view this cannot be sustained on the simple ground that since section 5 of the Limitation Act has not been extended to the rent cases, it will also not apply to the appeals and the applications arising from such cases. It can also not be made applicable by deeming the application to which it relates to have been made under some provisions of the Civil Procedure Code. In fact it is clear from section 20 of the Ordinance that provisions of C.P.C. except those mentioned in the said section are not applicable in the rent cases. As such review application purported to have been filed was strictly speaking not maintainable. The appellant had remedy against the final order whereby the defence was struck off. He could have taken all these pleas in the first rent appeal rather than filing review application as the order under section 16(2) was final order within the meaning of section 21 of the Ordinance. Since no appeal has been filed against the final order the appellant cannot seek remedy against the review order. Even here is non-compliance of the tentative rent order in the review order. The review application though dated 25-5-1986 was presented before the Rent Controller on 11-7-1986. It was filed under section 16(2) of the Ordinance.
There is no such provision under section 16(2) for review. The application was also presented about three months after the passing of order under section 16(2) of the Ordinance. For the reasons stated above the appeal against the final order is hopelessly barred by limitation and there is non- compliance with tentative rent order even though order was reviewed. Appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs."
' In this connection the reference may also be mace to the judgment in the case of Affan Jan Mirza v. Mrs. Nazneen Essa reported as 1989 CLC (Karachi) 1934 which clearly observes that appeal and review being creation of statute itself, cannot be exercised by Rent Controller either under inherent powers or under section 20 of West Pakistan General Clauses Act, 1956. This being the position it only follows that an order passed on such incompetent review application cannot be made the basis to compute the period of limitation for the filing of the appeal.
' No law or any reported judgment to the contrary has been cited before me by the appellant. I therefore, uphold the contention of learned counsel of the respondent that the appeal is barred by time. It is dismissed accordingly.