' MAMOON KAZI, J.---This appeal has called in question the judgment passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court dated 13-5-1982, dismissing the objections filed by the appellant and directing that the award given by the sole arbitrator in the case may be made rule of the Court.
2. As is evident from the judgment of the learned Single Judge, learned counsel for the appellant had raised three objections before the learned Judge viz. (i) that the award was beyond time, (ii) that no evidence had been recorded by the sole arbitrator, and (iii) that reference in award had been given by the arbitrator in contravention of bye-law No,VIII(d) and XI of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Karachi. The learned Judge was, however, not impressed by any of the aforesaid grounds. As to the first objection he held that the time could be extended for giving the award or even after the award had been given by the arbitrators; consequently, the learned Judge extended the time for giving the award till 24-4-1979. The learned Judge was also not impressed by the second objection because he found sufficient material to indicate that evidence had been recorded by the sole arbitrator. The learned Judge was also not impressed by the contention that the award had been given in contravention of the said bye-laws of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Reference in this respect was also made to bye-law XI which provides for 15 days' time for the arbitrator to give an award after the last hearing in the case. The learned Judge, has firstly observed that the provisions of bye-law XI did not appear to be mandatory but only directory and secondly he had already exercised its discretion by extending the date of award till 24-4-1979.
Consequently, all the objections were overruled by the Single Judge.
3. The main contentions of Mr. Khalid Latif, learned counsel for the appellant before us have been, firstly, that there was no arbitration agreement between the appellant and the respondents and since the appellant was only an agent of the foreign suppliers, therefore, the award given by the arbitrator was ab initio void and illegal and secondly bye- law XI, reference to which has earlier been made, provides for a period of 15 days, which was mandatory and the award which was admittedly given beyond the said period was, therefore, invalid.
4. So far as the first contention of Mr. Khalid Latif is concerned, we would like to point out that this ground has been raised on behalf of the appellant for the first time as the same was not raised before the learned Single Judge as is evident from the impugned judgment. Before the learned Single Judge only three grounds were raised on behalf of the appellants by their learned counsel, reference to which has already been made in this judgment. Mr. Khalid Latif has argued that the ground had been taken by the appellant in its objections filed before the learned Single Judge but we would like to point out in this regard that merely because the objection was taken in writing did not oblige the learned Judge to refer to the same in his judgment if the same was not pressed by the appellant's counsel at the time of the arguments. As we have pointed out earlier this objection was not raised by the learned counsel at the time of the arguments, we would, therefore, not permit him to raise the same ground before us for the first time. Mr. Khalid argued that the ground had been taken by him before the learned Judge but the same does not find mention in the judgment. We cannot accept this contention of the learned counsel because nothing can be spelled out from the impugned judgment that the ground had been raised before the learned Single Judge. We have no doubt in our mind that if a ground had been raised before the learned Single Judge the same would have found mention in the impugned judgment. On the other hand, as we have pointed out earlier, the judgment shows that Mr. Khalid raised only three grounds, which have been fully discussed by the learned Single Judge in his judgment. Consequently, the first contention of Mr. Khalid Latif cannot be accepted.
5. Turning to the second contention of the learned counsel, it has been argued that the award has been given in violation of bye-law XI, reference to which has earlier been made in this judgment.
The same bye-law provides that "the award shall be rendered promptly and not later than 15 days from the last hearing or if oral hearing is waived then from the date of transmitting the final statement and proof to the Arbitrator.
6. Mr. Khalid Latif has placed reliance in this regard upon M/s. Universal Corporation V. M/s. S.A. Rauf & Co. PLD 1953 Sindh 18. In this case bye-law XXXIX of the Cotton Association provided for a period of 14 days within which award could be given by the arbitrator or arbitrators appointed by the parties. In this case award given beyond such period was held to be invalid by the learned Single Judge of the erstwhile Chief Court of Sindh. Similar view was taken in another case decided by the High Court of Dacca reported as M/s. Badri Narayan Agarwalla v. M/s. Pak. Jute Balers Ltd., Dacca PLD 1966 Dacca 262.
7. We would like to point out in this regard that the Arbitration Act itself fixes a period of 4 months within which an award has to be given by the arbitrator after entering upon a reference but the Court has unfettered discretion under section 28 to extend the period of limitation. Such power can be exercised by the Court even after an award has been given by the arbitrator. In M/s. M.M.
Ispahani Ltd v. M/s. Pakistan Trading Company Ltd. PLD 1966 Dacca 54 while referring to the provisions of section 28 of the Arbitration Act, it was observed by learned Single Judge of Dacca High Court that "The above provision authorises the Court to extend the time whether an award has been passed or not, and in the former case extension of time by the Court tantamounts to acceptance of the award after condonation of delay and in the latter case extension of time when an award has not been made authorises the arbitrator to make an award within the extended time". Similar observations were made by the High Court of Calcutta in AIR 1957 Cal.
658. We are consequently of the view that if an award is given by the arbitrator beyond the period of limitation either prescribed by the Arbitration Act itself or any rules or bye-laws or agreement by which the parties may be governed, the same can be extended by the Court either before or after giving of the award. In the present case, the learned Single Judge, who dealt with the case while invoking such powers extended the period of award till 24-2-1979. Consequently, the technical objection taken by Mr. Khalid Latif in case lost its force when time was extended by the learned Single Judge in this case. In any case Bye-law No,XI, although provides for a period of 15 days for the arbitrator to give his award after the last hearing in the case has taken place but as is further indicated by the bye-laws of Chambers of Commerce and Industry no provision has been made therein for the consequences which may follow in case the arbitrator fails to give an award within the period of limitation prescribed by bye-law XI. Such provisions are to be treated as merely directory. Consequently, we find ourselves in full agreement with the learned Single Judge that the provisions of bye-law XI are merely directory and not mandatory. In any case, any discussion on the point would hardly be of any significance since, as pointed out earlier, time was extended by the learned Single Judge till 24-4-1979.
8. In the result both the contentions raised by Mr. Khalid Latif have no force. We, therefore, dismiss this appeal. The parties are, however, left with their own costs.