' This petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, assails the judgment of the learned Additional District Judge, Gujranwala, dated 5-11-1991, whereby the appeal filed by the petitioners under section 15 of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, against the order of the Rent Controller dated 13-3-1988, was dismissed as being not maintainable.
2. It is not necessary to go into the details; suffice it to say that an order under section 13 of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, was obtained by respondent No,3 against Bashir Ahmad son of Karim Bakhsh, whereafter he applied for execution of the order of eviction. During the pendency of the execution proceedings, an objection petition was filed by the petitioners, which was dismissed by the Rent Controller on 13-3-1988. Against that order, an appeal was filed by the petitioners, which was dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge, Gujranwala, as being not maintainable.
3. Mr.. Karamat Nazir Bhandari, Advocate, learned counsel for the petitioners has relied upon section 15 of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, to contend that any order passed by a Rent Controller which finally disposes of an application can be appealed against and the view taken by the appellate Court that the order in question is interlocutory is not sustainable.
4. Learned counsel for respondent No,3, on the other hand, has supproted the impugned order.
5. There is considerable merit in the contention raised by learned counsel for the petitioneRs, Section 15 of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 as amended by Punjab Ordinance IX of 1979, which provides for appeals against orders passed by the Rent Controller to the extent it is relevant to the present controversy is reproduced hereunder:-- "15. Appeal.--(1) Any party aggrieved by an order of the Controller fmally disposing of an application made under the Ordinance may, within thirty days of the date of such order, prefer an appeal in writing to the District Judge having jurisdiction over the area where the building or rented land in relation to which the order is passed, is situated: ' Provided that no appeal shall lie against an order made by a Controller under subsection (6) of section 13 determining approximately the amount of rent due or the rate of rent and directing the tenant to deposit all the rent due: ' Provided further that no appeal shall lie from an interlocutory order passed by the Controller."
6. A plain reading of this provision shows that a right vests in an aggrieved party to challenge any order of the Rent Controller by way of an appeal before the District Judge. This is however, subject to certain conditions, firstly, that the order should be such which has finally disposed of an application made to the Rent Controller under the Ordinance; secondly, that the order should not be interlocutory in nature and thirdly, that it should not be an order for deposit of rent under section 13 (6) of the Ordinance.
7. In contradistinction thereto, section 15 of the Ordinance prior to its amendments by Punjab Ordinance IX of 1979 provided for appeals only against certain specified orders viz. Those under sections 4, 10, 12 and 13 of the Ordinance. The amendment had the effect of widening the scope of section 15 and it was no longer necessary for an order to be appealable that it must fall under sections 4, 10, 12 and 13. Any order passed by the Rent Controller subject to the two provisos which finally disposes of an application under the Ordinance was made appealable.
8. In the present case, by virtue of the order which was appealed against by the petitioners before the Additional District Judge, on the objection petition filed by them, petition had been finally disposed of under section 17 of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959. Every order made by the Controller under the Ordinance is to be executed as if it was a decree of the Civil Court. By now it is well settled that a person, who is not a party to the ejectment petition may by filing an objection petition object to the execution order before the Rent Controller, who has jurisdiction in law to decide such objections (See Muhammad Yasin v. Sheikh Ghulam Murtaza and another (PLD 1988 SC 163). It follows, therefore, that the final disposal by way of dismissal of an application objecting to the execution of the order of ejectment, would be appealable under section 15 thereof.
9. The Additional District Judge while coming to the conclusion that the aforesaid order was not appealable appears to have relied upon the second proviso to section 15 (1) which bars the filing of an appeal against interlocutory ordeRs, Unfortunately, the Additional District Judge fell in error in holding that the order before him was interlocutory and not final in nature. He completely omitted to consider that so far as the petitioners were concerned, the order of the Rent Controller was final and not interim as the rights inter se the petitioners and respondent No,3 stood conclusively adjudicated upon and there was nothing left to be decided further. The mere fact that the execution application was not disposed of while dismissing the objection petition would not detract from the finality of the order qua the rights of the petitioners nor could the same be considered interim or interlocutory in nature. Section 15 of the Ordinance does not state that for an order to qualify as an appealable order must have disposed of the entire matter pending before the Rent Controller. If the order is determinative, finally and conclusively, of rights of the parties, it cannot be considered as an interlocutory order so as to fall within the mischief of proviso to section 15 (1) of the Ordinance.
' For the reasons stated above, this petition is allowed, the judgment of the learned Additional District Judge dated 5-11-1991 is declared to be without lawful authority and of no legal effect, with the result that the appeal filed by the petitioners shall be deemed to be pending before him and shall be decided afresh in accordance with law.