1. ' Dispute between the parties viz. Market Committee, Mandl Farooqabad, petitioner and Abdul Rashid, respondent No,2 herein relates to Killas Nos,23 and 24 of Square No,3 situate in village Naukhar, Tehsil and District Sheikhupura. It is an admitted position that State land measuring 110 Kanals and 12 Marlas situate in village Naukhar was purchased in auction by respondent No,2. It appears that 38 Kanals of land out of area purchased by respondent No,2 in auction was found to be under Abadi, graveyard, school and mosque and, therefore, on his application, the Board of Revenue, Punjab granted 38 Kanals of State land comprising Killas Nos,23 and 24 of Square No,3 and Killas Nos,3 and 6 of Square No,6 situated in the same village as alternate land in lieu of the area found under Abadi etc. This was vide memo. No, 800-86/1625-CS-VI, Board of Revenue, Punjab, Lahore dated 8th July, 1986. The Board of Revenue later leased out Killas Nos,23 and 24 of Square No,3 measuring 15 Kanals and 15 Marlas to the petitioner-Committee for the establishment of the Feeder Market. On coming to know of the lease of the land in dispute in favour of the petitioner Market Committee, respondent No,2 agitated the matter before the Board of Revenue who vide order dated 20-5-1991 cancelled the orders whereby the land in dispute was leased out to the petitioner-committee holding that the land in dispute already stood granted to Abdul Rashid, respondent No,2. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner approached this Court through this Constitutional petition. .2. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. It is not denied by the learned counsel for the petitioner that 38 Kanals of land including the Killa numbers in dispute were granted to respondent No,2 on 8-7-1986 as alternate land in lieu of his equivalent area having been found under Abadi and graveyard etc. That being so, the land in dispute was not available for being leased out to the petitioner-Committee. Confronted with this position, learned counsel for the petitioner sought to argue that the grant of the land in dispute to respondent No,2 as an alternate land itself was illegal.
2. His precise submission was that this being a case of an exchange, only the Collector was competent to sanction it whereas the grant/exchange of the land in dispute in favour of respondent No,2 was allowed by the Board of Revenue. In support of his submission, learned counsel relied upon section 17 of the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912 which reads as under:-- "17. Exchange.--Subject to any orders that he may receive from the Commissioner, the Collector may allow any tenant to exchange the whole or any part of his tenancy for other land in the colony and the land so taken in exchange shall, in the absence of any special condition to the contrary recorded in writing by the Collector, be deemed to be held on the same conditions and subject to the same obligations as the surrendered land was held."
3. ' The provision afore quoted on its plain language empowers the Collector to allow exchanges of lands in the case of the tenants but respondent No,2 who had purchased the land in auction in the year 1971 (in lieu whereof the land in dispute was granted to him vide impugned order dated 8-7- 1986) could not be said to be a tenant for the purposes of the provisions in question. That being so, the provision invoked by the learned counsel for the petitioner has no application to the instant case. Learned counsel could not refer to any other provision of law to support his contention that the Board of Revenue ws not competent to grant the alternate land to respondent No,2. The impugned order dated 8-7-1986 whereby the Board of Revenue granted the land in dispute to respondent No,2 in lieu of the land purchased by him in auction is thus not shown to suffer from any legal infirmity. Even otherwise, the said impugned order being just and fair in the facts and circumstances of the case does not call for any interference in writ jurisdiction.
3. Before closing, I would like to observe that on some previous date, learned counsel for the petitioner sought to assail the order of the Board of Revenue dated 20-5-1991 (Annex. C) on the ground that it was passed at the back of the petitioner. He has not pressed this point today presumably for the reason that the official representing the Board of Revenue present with record has stated that the impugned order was passed on the judicial side after hearing the petitioner- Committee through its counsel.
4. ' In view of what has been said above, I find no merit in this petition which is hereby dismissed but with no order as to costs.