1. ' First appeal by the judgment-debtor was against an order passed on 24-10-1992 by the Executing Court by which it accepted the draft of conveyance-deed and appointed its Reader to complete its execution and finalize its registration under the Registration Act, 1908. Appeal arises from the facts and circumstances enumerated below: ' Agricultural land measuring 13 Kanals, 10 Marlas situate in village Shumali Chak No, 45-Alit Sargodha belonged to Major Hamid Ali Khan (hereinafter referred to as appellant). On 12-12-1972, he entered into a contract for its sale with Mian Muhammad Anwar (hereinafter referred to as respondent) for a consideration of Rs,2,05,000. A part of the sale price was paid as earnest money to the owner of the land. Balance was payable at the time of finalization of the sale. As the owner of the land did not abide by his contract for sale, promisee instituted a suit for specific performance of the contract in his favour. Suit was instituted, in a local Civil Court, on 28-2-1973. Appellant contested the suit. On 22-3-1980, trial Court decreed specific performance of the contract for sale in favour of the respondent, upon payment of balance sale-price uptil 20-4-1980. Purchase price was deposited in time fixed in the decree of the trial Court. Appellant preferred an appeal from the decree of the trial Court. His appeal was registered as R.FA. No,75 of 1980 in this Court. On 3-7-1988, a Division Bench dismissed the appeal and upheld the judgment made by the trial Court. In C.P.S.LA. No,119 of 1988, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal from the judgment of the High Court on 24-6-1990. Thus, first round of litigation ended in favour of the respondent.
2. ' On 29-7-1990, respondent applied to execute the decree for completion of the sale of the land in his favour. Appellant objected to the execution of the decree under section 47 of Civil P.C. His objection was turned down, on 29-1-1991, by the Executing Court. He preferred an appeal from the decision in the High Court. His appeal. FA.O. No, 54 of 1991 was withdrawn from the Court on 3-6- 1991, with certain observations. On 6-6-1991, appellant instituted a suit under section 35 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, for cancellation of agreement to sell and the decree passed in the suit for specific performance. On 29-3-1992, trial Court dismissed the suit- on merits. Thereupon, an appeal R.F.A. No,140 of 1992 was preferred before a Division Bench of this Court. It was admitted on 24-10-1992. However, there was no order for stay in the appeal. It was agreed that there was no bar imposed by the Division Bench for hearing of the present appeal on its merits.
3. ' Original execution file was before me. It showed that on 24-4-1991, appellant was absent and order for taking ex parte proceedings was made against him. It was observed in the order that the sale shall be completed and conveyance deed registered through the Reader to the Court.
4. Thereafter, Executing Court adjourned the case to 14-5-1991 for filing of the draft conveyance deed.
5. The order passed on 30-5-1991 showed that the draft conveyance deed was submitted in Court which then ordered for despatch of it through a registered letter to the appellant alongwith a notice for filing of objections by him. Matter was adjourned to 13-6-1991 for this purpose. From the order passed on the adjourned hearing, it was evident that the postal receipt and acknowledgment due were placed on file of the Court to show that draft conveyance deed was actually despatched to the appellant and since the appellant had not appeared to object, the trial Court directed for writing of the sale-deed upon stamp-paper and for filing it, on 4-7-1991. Upon this date of hearing, appellant submitted an application for setting aside of an order for taking of ex parte proceedings against him. Upon this event, the matter was adjourned for several dates of hearing. Meanwhile, the appellant participated in the proceedings. In the course of hearing, a non- party namely Malik Manzoor Hayat also filed an objection petition. On 16-6-1992, his objection petition was dismissed with the consequence that proceedings against reverted to the original track for preparation of the sale-deed and its registration. Eventually, Executing Court passed the impugned order which led to the filing of the present appeal by the appellant.
6. ' At the outset, it may be observed that as yet only a draft of the proposed sale-deed was prepared and was available on the file of the Executing Court. There was no order from the trial Court for approval of the draft or alteration in it. However, it was part of record.
7. ' On behalf of the appellant, it was urged that Rule 34(3) of Order XXI, Civil P.C. was imperative and without a prior notice to and allowing of an opportunity to the appellant to file objections to the proposed draft conveyance-deed the Court could not have ordered execution of the sale-deed and its registration by the Reader. In support, learned counsel referred to P. Venkanna Chetti and another v. B. Apparao Naidu AIR 1959 Andh. Pra.
666. On the above sub-rule, the Court observed:--- "It is seen from Order XXI, Rule 34(3) that where the judgment-debtor objects to the draft and his objections are reduced to writing, the Court has to make an order approving or altering the draft, as it thinks fit. This implies the consideration of the objections filed by the judgment-debtor. An order which does not take into account the objections raised on behalf of the judgment-debtor cannot be deemed to be a legal or valid one. The provisions requiring the Court to make an order approving or altering the draft---which by necessary implication involves the consideration of the objections---being a mandatory one, non-compliance with the provision vitiates the order."
8. ' Learned counsel also referred to Sashimohan Debnath and another v. Monomohan Debnath and others AIR 1971 Assam and Nagaland 118. The judgment in the report dealt with Order 21, Rule 34(1) and (3), Civil P.C. Its headnote runs:--- "Where the decree is for execution of a document, the draft of document should be in conformity with the terms of the decree. The executing Court can scrutinize the terms of the decree in order to find whether the draft has gone beyond the terms of the decree, but it has no jurisdiction to pass an order altering the draft except for bringing it in conformity with the terms of the decree.
9. ' Thus, where the decree for specific performance of an agreement to sell certain land does not contain any direction for possession of the land, the Court cannot order alteration in the draft sale- deed to include a direction for possession."
10. ' As against it, learned counsel for the respondent heavily relied upon Kundanlal Nandishore v.
11. Ramcharan Deokaran AIR 1949 Nag. 370, and the text of Rules 32, 34 of Order XXI, C.P.C. Learned counsel argued that the draft sale-deed was in conformity with the decree passed in the suit for specific performance and did not travel beyond it. Learned counsel also argued that in execution of decree for specific performance of a contract for sale of the land, the Court had inherent jurisdiction to give delivery of the possession of the land to the decree-holder.
12. Rule 32 of Order XXI expressly deals with decrees for specific performance, restitution of conjugal rights and injunction and provides various modes and steps for their execution. Under sub-rule (5), the Court executing the decree for specfic performance and injunction can direct the act to be done, so far as practicable by the decree-holder or some other person appointed by it at the expense of the judgment-debtor. There is a considerable body of case-law that under sub-rule (5), possession of the property could be delivered to the decree-holder in the suit for specific performance. Plain reading of the rule showed that it gave sufficient powers to the Court to execute the specified decrees in the mode and manner indicated in it. Rule 34 gave the mode and manner for execution of the decrees regarding execution of document or endorsement of negotiable instrument. In Raja Birendra Nath Ray Bahadur v. Puma Chand Nahata and others AIR 1938 Cal. 767, it was held that a decree for execution of document could be passed in any suit and nor merely in a suit for specific performance. Therefore, the scope of Rule 34 was wider than Rule 32 of Order XXI.
13. Execution of document under Rule 32 or 34 produced similar result as if it was executed by the party itself. Sub-rule (5) of Rule 32 expowered the Court to have the sale completed and registered in terms of the decree passed in the suit for specific performance. It was an independent and self- contained provision of law empowering the Court to complete the sale in terms of the decree passed by it. In my view, therefore, the Court may not have to fall on Rule 34 for supplementing its power to complete the sale. As said by me, Rule 32 with its sub-rules gave sufficient powers to the Court to have the task completed either by the decree-holder or by a person appointed by it, at the expense of judgment-debtor. Blanks, if any could be filled inby the Court by making necessary directions. In Kundanlal Nandkishor v. Ramcharan Deokaran AIR 1949 Nag. 370, it was held that:--- "Rule 32 of Order 21 confers the power on the Court. Rule 34 merely sets out the procedure to be followed when the power sought to be exercised is execution of a document. The actual power is conferred under sub-rule (5) of Rule 32. That runs as follows:--- `Where a decree for the specific performance of a contract has not been obeyed, the Court may, in lieu of or in addition to all or any of the processes aforesaid, direct that the act required to be done may be done so far as practicable by the decree-holder or some other person appointed by the Court ' This confers the power.
14. The Court has power there to direct the execution of a sale-deed either by the decree-holder or some other person appointed by the Court. The manner in which that power is to be carried out is set out in Rule 34."
15. ' Whether, Rule 34 was independent and stood by itself to cater for the decrees of specified kinds or was supplemental to Rule 32, more particularly sub-rule (5), in absence of required assistance, I may not like to firmly comment on. However, I do hold an impression that the decree for specific performance squarely dealt with in rule 32 was required to be executed within its own parameters.
16. However, even if my above reading of Rule 32 was incorrect and the correct view was that the decree for specific performance was required to be executed in the mode and manner provided in Rule 34, the appellant may not have a bright hope for success. I have looked at the draft sale- deed. It is in accordance with the decree of the trial Court which was upheld up to the Supreme Court. Upon flimsy pretexts, the appellant was delaying the doomsday. Executing Court gave him sufficient time and opportunity. But he avoided to avail of it and yet 'complained of defect of hearing and lack of opportunity to file objections to the proposed draft sale-deed. In order to cut short further delay, I asked Qazi Zahid Hassan, Advocate as to what were the precise objections to the proposed draft sale-deed. Only objection, he could point out was that there could be no recital of possession in the draft sale-deed and as to the rest, he said that he did not know and could give the nature of precise objections after proper consultation with the appellant. From the posture adopted at the hearing and the proposal for settlement upon payment of adequate compensation, I could guess that delay was the sole objection to coerce a possible concession from the respondent to surrender to the beck and call of the appellant. Upon review of record, no point of substance for interference was discovered. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed with costs.
17. ' Records be returned to the Executing Court to complete the task soon.