' SAAD SAOOD JAN, J.---This is an appeal by special leave from the judgment dated 8-11-1987 of the Lahore High Court whereby the revision petition of the appellant was dismissed. It arises in the following circumstances.
2. By a registered deed dated 1-9-1980 one Rehmat Khan sold 9 Kanals and 8 Marlas of agricultural land situate in village Bhukran of Tehsil Daska to the respondent. In the sale-deed the price of the land was mentioned as Rs,1,28,250. On 30-6-1981 the appellant filed a suit for pre-emption claiming that as collateral of Rehmat Khan he had a preferential right to acquire the land. He alleged that the price actually fixed and paid by the respondent to Rehmat Khan was Rs,20,000 and that a higher amount had been shown in the sale-deed to discourage exercise of the right of pre- emption. By its judgment dated 29-1-1983 the trial Court decreed the suit holding that the price mentioned in the sale-deed was fixed in good faith and actually paid by the respondent.
Accordingly, it called upon the appellant to deposit Rs,1,28,250 in the Court till 7-3-1987 failing which his suit would stand dismissed.
3. From the judgment of the trial Court the appellant filed an appeal in the District Court on 26-2- 1983. In the appeal he challenged the fmding of the trial Court on the issue of purchase amount alone. While admitting the appeal to regular hearing an Additional District Judge suspended the direction given by the trial Court with regard to the deposit of the purchase amount. The appeal was ultimately dismissed on 16-7-1984. However, while dismissing the appeal the learned Additional District Judge did not extend the time for depositing the purchase amount. From the judgment of the learned Additional District Judge the appellant filed a revision petition in the High Court. In the High Court, too, he asked for the suspension of the direction with regard to the deposit of the purchase amount. By an order dated 16-8-1984 a learned Single Judge in the High Court directed the appellant to deposit Rs,20,000 in Court and to furnish security in respect of the rest of the purchase amount. The appellant duly complied with this direction.
4. The revision petition came up for hearing before the High Court on 5-6-1985. On that day an objection was taken on behalf of the respondent that on account of the pecuniary limitation on the appellate jurisdiction of the District Court the first appeal should have been preferred in the High Court. The appellant did not dispute the validity of the objection; instead the learned counsel appearing for him stated that he would make an application for conversion of the revision petition into either a regular second appeal or a regular first appeal and for that purpose he sought a short adjournment. The learned Single Judge allowed the adjournment and made the following order:-- "The petitioner has deposited only Rs,20,000 towards the decretal amout in addition to `Zar-e- Panjum'. The status quo order had the effect of stay of the deposit of the remaining decretal amount. As the stay order has been recalled, he shall have to deposit the remaining decretal amount in the trial Court. Let the needful be done within one month in terms of the judgment of the trial Court."
' The appellant did not make any application for the conversion of the revision petition into either a regular second appeal or a regular first appeal; instead he allowed the revision petition to be disposed of as such. The learned Single Judge who heard the revision petition found that the finding of the trial Court and the First Appellate Court on the question of the price paid by the vendee to the vendor was neither erroneous nor unreasonable. The appellant then asked for extension in time for making the deposit. This prayer was rejected by the learned Single Judge with the following observations:-- " The petitioner is not entitled to any indulgence as despite the order dated 5-6-1985, petitioner failed to deposit pre-emption money in accordance with the decree of the trial Court and in exercise of revisional jurisdiction it will not be appropriate to allow the petitioner further time to deposit the requisite pre-emption money."
' From the judgment of the learned Single Judge the appellant has come in appeal to this Court.
5. In support of this appeal it is contended that the learned Single Judge ought to have extended the time for depositing the purchase money. In support of this contention reliance is being placed on a judgment of this Court reported as Ghulam Haider v. Mst. Raj Bharri (PLD 1988 SC 20).
6. The law with regard to the extension in time in circumstances similar to those in this appeal has been laid down by a judgment of this Court reported as Bhai Khan v. Allah Bakhsh (1986 SCM R 849). It was ruled:-- "From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that the proposition that the appellate Court has power to extend time is not disputed by the High Court. All that it has held (sic) this will be exercised in fit and suitable cases and that the present case was not such a case. The submission of the appellant, however, is that in view of this Court's judgment in Khurshid Akbar v. Mian Manzur Ahmad (1982 SCM R 824) the appellate Court is bound while dismissing the pre-emptor-appellant's appeal to grant 'reasonable time' to him to deposit the balance of the pre-emption amount in every case. We do not agree and we may clarify that although normally the appellate Court should grant `reasonable time' to the pre-emptor in cases of this kind while dismissing his appeal but it can, in exceptional cases, such as the present, refuse to exercise its direction in his favour."
In this case the appellant was given a specific direction by the High Court to deposit the purchase amount within one month. Even though he knew that his revision petition before the High Court was not competent he did not avail of this opportunity. We are therefore in agreement with the High Court that this is one of the exceptional cases where the appellant does not deserve any indulgence. The case of Ghulam Haider v. Mst. Raj Bharri, ibid, is clearly distinguishable as in this case the deposit was made within the time granted by the Court. The appellant took a serious risk in not taking advantage of the extension given to him by the High Court on 5-6-1985. He has therefore to blame himself alone that he is now unable to derive any benefit from the decree passed in his favour by the trial Court. The appeal is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.