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1993 CLC 1067

JAN MUHAMMAD and others vs GOVERNMENT OF N.W.F.P. and others

Citation1993 CLC 1067
CourtPeshawar High Court
Case No.Writ Petition No, 5 of 1988
Date1989-10-31
Judge(s)Muhammad Bashir Jehangiri
ResultPetition dismissed

' This petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, calls in question the order dated 25-6-1988 passed by the learned Deputy Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, D.I. Khan.

2. The case has a chequered history. The background of the case, briefly stated, is that Noor Muhammad, predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners, was allotted agricultural land and house No,C/35, bearing Khasra No,873/63 and situated in village Diwala, Tehsil and District D.I. Khan, in satisfaction of his claim vide R.L.II. Upon the application of the predecessor-in-interest of respondents 4/1 to 4/7, the disputed house was deleted from the R.L. II of Noor Muhammad, predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners, by the order dated 27-12-1963 of the Assistant Rehabilitation Commissioner, Feeling aggrieved, Noor Muhammad filed an appeal which was also rejected on 17-1-1965 by the Additional Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, D.I. Khan. It was held, inter alia, that "as the site of the disputed house was neither used for aggricultural purposes nor for purposes subservient to agriculture, it does not fall within the definition of 'lands' as defined in para. 2(3) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 and cannot be allotted against a claim for agricultural land". On a revision filed by Noor Muhammad, the Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, D.I. Khan remanded the case by his order dated 29th July, 1965 to the Additional Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner for a fresh decision in order to determine the question whether the house in dispute was "a tenant hutment, built for the advancement of the agricultural land or was a part and parcel of the village Abadi or not". By order dated 27-9-1965, the learned Additional Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner held that the property was a residential house adjacent to the village Abadi and a part and parcel thereof, not being used for any purpose subservient to agricultural land. He also held the finding that the property could not be transferred to either of the contesting parties and therefore, directed its disposal by public auction. The revision petition filed by Noor Muhammad to the Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner (Lands), D.I. Khan, against the aforesaid order was also dismissed on 12-3-1966.

3. Syed Muhammad Ramzan Shah, the predecessor-in-interest of respondents Nos,4/1 to 4/7, challenged the aforesaid order by filing Writ Petition No, 300/66. Noor Muhammad also filed Constitutional Petition No,582/66 calling in question the entire proceedings, taken against him by the functionaries of the Settlement and Rehabilitation Department.

4. These two petitions were heard by Late G. Safdar Shah, J., Chief . Justice of this Court (as His Lordship then was), and held the view that the allotment of the disputed property in favour of Noor Muhammad was not liable to be cancelled as it was part of the agricultural land transferred to him as claimant. The writ petition of Syed Muhammad Ramzan Shah was dismissed while that of Noor Muhammad was accepted in the above terms.

5. Syed Muhammad Ramzan Shah was not satisfied with the fate of his Constitutional petition and, therefore, he filed an appeal before the august Supreme Court. The august Supreme Court, by its order dated 20th of May, 1985, while accepting the appeal against the judgment dated 4th of December, 1972, passed in Writ Petition No, 300/66 of this Court and setting aside the order allowing Writ Petition No,582/66, maintained the order of 12th of March, 1966 passed by the Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, D.I. Khan, and directed the Notified Officer under the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act, 1975 (XIV of 1975) to consider the entitlement of Syed Muhammad Ramzan Shah, appellant therein for the transfer of the disputed house after affording an opportunity of being heard to Noor Muhammad, the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners herein.

6. On receipt of the file, the learned Deputy Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, D.I. Khan, by his order dated 25-6-1988, transferred the disputed house to respondents 4/1 to 4/7 on payment of Rs,2,538. Hence his petition.

7. Mr. Sanaullah Khan Gandapur, the learned counsel for the petitioners who has argued the case at some length, urged that the building/house in dispute is a valuable property worth more than Rs,10,000 which in no case, could be transferred to any local and referred to the order of the Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, D.I. Khan, dated 12-3-1966. Reliance, in this context, was placed on Umar Din v. Government of West Pakistan (PLD 1969 Lah. 743). The learned counsel maintained that in compliance with the directions of the Honourable Supreme Court, respondent No,3 (Deputy Rehabilitation Commissioner, D.I. Khan), ought to have, but had not, correctly determined the entitlement of respondents 4/1 to 4/7, because receipt No,397 dated 7-10-1972, on which reliance had been placed, related to a shop while the other documents placed on the file were neither proved nor were admissible in evidence. It was also argued on behalf of the petitioners that respondent No,3 in violation of the provisions of Settlement Schemes Nos,VII and VIII illegally transferred the house in dispute to respondents 4/1 to 4/7 on a very nominal price. It was lastly urged on behalf of the petitioners that respondent No,2, (Additional Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, D.I. Khan) had erred to decline to interfere in the impugned order of respondent No,3 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

8. In the case of Umer Din cited above, the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the Settlement Authorities had no authority or jurisdiction to issue notices to the petitioner under Settlement Scheme No,VIII, was conceded by a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court and held "that the Chief Settlement Commissioner had in exercise of his powers included these villages in the second category of classification of area and, therefore, the lower Settlement Authorities had illegally disregarded his instruction in not transferring the properties in dispute to the petitioners therein in accordance with their entitlement." It would thus be noticed that this precedent, cited at the bar, is not attracted to the facts of the present case, because claim of the petitioners herein to the transfer of the disputed house has been disallowed by the Supreme Court in the judgment dated 20th of May, 1985, referred to above. This order has, therefore, attained finality.

9. Malik Muhammad Aslam Khan assisted by Sheikh Abdul Aziz, counsel for the 'respondent on the other hand, on the authority of Muhammad Akbar v. Adalat Khan (1985 SCMR 169), contended that the house in dispute which was in occupation of the predecessor-in-interest of respondents 4/1 to 4/7 since before 1961, therefore, stood automatically transferred to him by operation of law, in that the Settlement Scheme No,VII made no distinction between the local and a displaced person in regard to such transfer. The impugned order of respondent No,2 (Additional Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner (Lands), D.I. Khan) declining to interfere with the impugned order of respondent No,3 by way of revision was defended on the authority of Muhammad Younis v.

Muhammad Younis Khan (1981 SCMR 899), wherein it was held that under section 2 of the Evacuee Properties and Displaced persons Laws (Repeal) Ordinance, 1974, no revision was competent before him. In this context, reference may also be made to: (1) Headmaster Muslim High School No,1 Rawalpindi v. Asghari Khanum (1984 SCMR 332) and (2) S.M. Yousuf v. Deputy Settlement Commissioner (C.C./Authorised Officer) (1987 MLD 524).

10. Respectfully following the dictum of the august Supreme Court in the case of Muhammad Younis I would uphold the impugned order of respondent No,2 that the revision petition before him against the order of respondent No,3 was not maintainable and that the order of respondent No,2 declining to entertain the revision petition is unexceptionable.

11. The grievance. Of the petitioners in substance was that the disputed house could not have been legally transferred to the answering respondents and that, in any case, it could only be legally disposed of by a public auction under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation)

Act, 1958. This argument, I am afraid, is not tenable, because the petitioners herein are not "aggrieved person" within the contemplation of Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. If an authority on the point is needed reference can be made to (1), Mst. Noor Jehan Begum v. Doctor Abdul Samad (1987 SCMR 1577) and (2) Mst. Resham Jan v. Assistant Settlement Commissioner Lands (PLD 1979 Pesh. 75). In the precedent case of Mst. Noor Jahan Begum, their Lordship of the Supreme Court have held that Doctor Abdul Samad, respondent therein, had no locus standi to challenge the transfer in favour of the petitioneRs, Relying on Nisar Ahmad and others v. Additional Secretary, Food and Agriculture (1987 SCMR 389), the final conclusion was expressed in these words:-- "Clearly, it is a sine qua non for invoking the writ, jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 that the petitioner should be an aggrieved person. He must, therefore, establish a direct or indirect injury to himself and substantial interest in the subject-matter of the proceedings. The stand of the petitioners throughout has been that they were tenants paying rent to the Evacuee Trust Board and never claimed the transfer of the-property and indeed in law they were not so entitled. The writ petition was, therefore, rightly dismissed by the High Court and no ground for interference exists."

12. Respectfully following the dictum of the Honourable Supreme Court reproduced above, I hold that the petitioners having been found disentitled to the transfer of the disputed house by the judgment dated 20th of May, 1985, are not "aggrieved persons" within the meanings of Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, just because it should have been disposed of by a public auction under the provisions of Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation)

Act, 1958. In point of fact after the judgment of the Supreme Court with relation to the disentitlement of the petitioners herein to the transfer of the property in dispute, the matter remained purely between the entitled party, namely, respondents 4/1 to 4/7 herein on the one hand, and the Settlement Authorities on the other. The impugned order passed by the Notified Officer under the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act, 1975) (XIV of 1975)

(respondent No,3), as would be noticed in the discussion that follows, was passed by him with lawful authority. Even if it had been passed without lawful authority, yet it could not be called in question under Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court, because the petitioners lack locus standi to file a Constitutional petition being not an "aggrieved-party".

13. In exercise of the powers conferred by clause (b) of section 10 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958, the Central Government had provided the manner for disposal of buildings in rural areas each below Rs,10,000 in value under Settlement Scheme No,VII which had come into force on the 17th of April, 1961. This Scheme is now generally called as Old Scheme No,VII. The salient features of this Scheme are that for the purposes of disposal of rural building the area in which such buildings were situated were classified in the following three categories:- Ai) First category.............

(n) Second Category ---Towns (not declared urban and village the population of which is 3,000 or more according to the census of 1951 and other towns, villages or areas urban or rural) included in this category by the Chief Settlement Commissioner from time to time.

(iii) Third category.--The remaining areas."

14. Clause (2) of Chapter V of Old Scheme No,VII lays down the following manner for disposal of rural buildings:-- 5(1) Rural buildings.........

(2) Subject to the conditions prescribed below and the instructions issued by the Cheif Settlement Commissioner from time to time, rural buildings in the second category areas shall be disposed on in the following manner:--

(a) A Pakka rural building which has been in the occupation of an allottee of agricultural land in the same estate since before Ist January 1961 shall be deemed to have been transferred to such person free of charge with effect from that date.

(b) A Pakka rural building which has been in occupation of a displaced person (other than allottee of agricultural land) since before Ist January 1961, and such displaced person has left a house or a shop of the value of less than Rs,10,000 in a rural area now forming part of or occupied by India and gives an affidavit to this effect, shall, in case he applied in that behalf, be transferred to him free of charge.

(c) A Pakka rural building other than that occupied under (a) and (b) above which has been in the occupation of a dispalced person or a local since before Ist January, 1961, in case he applied in that behalf, be transferred to such displaced person or local on payment of the price determined according to the assessm ent formula.

15. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners halfheartedly attempted to argue that the property in dispute was to be disposed of under Old Scheme No,VII and that the petitioners were entitled to the transfer of the disputed house because it fell under category (a) ante. This contention has no substance, because the disputed house admittedly has not been in the occupation of the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners since before the target date specified in categories (a) and (b) above. Even if it is conceded that Old Settlement Scheme No,VII was attracted to the case in hand, still the case would be covered by the category of area falling under sub-clause (c) of clause 5(2) of Chapter V thereof. It has been held by the respondent No,3 and it is the case of the answering respondents herein throughout that their predecessor-in-interest being local was in occupation of the disputed house since before 1st January, 1961, and that he had made various applications for transfer thereof on payment of the price determined according to the assessm ent formula. In the alternative, the case of the answering respondents is fully covered under clause 7(i)(c) of the Revised Settlement Scheme No,VII, which is in pari materia with Clause 5(2)(c) of the Old Settlement Scheme No,VII, has come into force with effect from 16th April, 1966.

This clause, for the sake of reference, is reproduced below:-- "A Pakka residential or business or a building site which is in the occupation of a displaced person or a local, will if he applies in this behalf, be transferred to him on payment of the price determined in accordance with the assessm ent formula prescribed by the Chief Settlement Commissioner.

' The perusal of the impugned order of respondent No,3 would confirm that he had transferred the disputed house to respondents 4/1 to 4/7 on payment of the price strictly determined in accordance with the assessm ent formula prescribed by the Chief Settlement Commissioner.

16. The above provision of Old Settlement Scheme No,VII as well as the revision Settlement Scheme No,VII lend, ample support to the argument of the learned counsel for the answering respondents that respondent No,3 as the Notified Officer, had in exercise of his powers under the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act, 1975, transferred the disputed house in favour of the answering respondents with lawful authority and, therefore, no exception could possibly be taken not only to his order but also to the orders passed by respondent No,2 declining to interfere with the said impugned order in his revisional jurisdiction.

17. As a sequel to what has been observed above, this writ petition has no substance and is accordingly dismissed. The parties are, however, left to bear their own costs.

Cited by 11 cases

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