' This R.SA. has arisen under the following facts and circumstances:---
(1) Iftikhar son of Nisar Ahmad who was the owner of the suit property situated in village Alamgir, Tehsil and District Multan, sold the same in favour of the appellants. Nawab Muhammad Khan, respondent, filed a suit to pre-empt the aforementioned sale on the ground that he is Khatadar and, therefore possesses superior right of pre-emption. This suit has been contested by the defendants on the ground that they are tenants of the land in question, therefore, they have superior right of pre-emption qua the pre-emptor, therefore, this suit is liable to be dismissed.
' On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, learned trial Court framed the following issues:-- ' Whether the suit has been incorrectly valued for the purposes of court-fee and jurisdiction? If so, what is its effect? O.P.P.
' Whether the plaintiff possesses superior right of pre-emption qua the defendants? O.P.P.
' Whether the plaintiff is estopped to bring the present suit?
' Whether the sum of Rs.4,340 has been fixed in good faith or actually paid as sale price?
' What was the market value of pre-empted property at the time of said transaction?
' Whether the defendants have effected improvements upon the said property? If so, of what value and with what effect? OPD ' Are the defendants entitled to get district council fee in case suit is decreed in plaintiffs' favour?
' Relief. ' and after recording of evidence, vide judgment and decree dated 3-2-1976 decreed the suit in favour of the respondent on payment of Rs.4,340 as the pre emption money. This judgment and decree was challenged by the appellants in regular first appeal before the District Court, Multan.
Learned Additional District Judge, Multan has dismissed the appeal vide judgment and decree dated 16-2-1978 on the ground that sale took place in the year 1971 and the right of pre-emption was conferred to the tenants in the year 1972, therefore, as at the time of sale vendees did not possess a superior right of pre-emption therefore, they cannot resist his claim by any improvements of their status during the pendency of the suit by virtue of amendment in the law, as they were owners in possession in 1972. This judgment and decree are challenged in this regular second appeal.
2. Learned counsel for the appellants has contended that the vendees could improve their status prior to the institution of the suit and as they held the land as tenants in the year 1971, they shall be deemed to have improved their status prior to the institution of the suit which was filed on 29-9- 1972 under the provisions of Land Reforms Regulation, 1972, therefore, the suit was liable to be dismissed, hence the impugned judgment and decree are illegal.
3. As against the above arguments of the learned counsel for the appellants, learned counsel for the respondent has argued that after the land in question was purchased by the appellants in the year 1971, they ceased to be 'tenants and therefore, in the year 1972 when by virtue of provision of Land Reforms Regulation, 1972, right of pre-emption was conferred upon the tenants, status of vendees being as that of owners, it cannot be said that the provisions of M.L.R. 1972 were retrospective and hence will enure for the benefit of a tenant who had purchased the land on 22- 9-1971 when the tenant did not have a superior right of pre-emption. Learned counsel has argued that in view of the above the suit has rightly been decreed and the appeal has no merit hence is liable to be dismissed.
4. I have considered the arguments addressed by the learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the record. Admittedly the sale in this case took place on 16-7-1971. The suit was instituted on 22-9-1972. Land Reforms Regulation, 1972 in pursuance whereof the right of pre- emption was conferred upon the tenant was enforced on 11th of March, 1972 much after the date of sale.. Consequently, at the time of enforcement of Land Reforms Regulation, 1972 (MLR 1972), status of the appellants was not as that of tenants but was as that of owners. Therefore, they could not get any benefit due to the conferment of right of pre-emption upon the tenant as held in cases of Fateh Muhammad v. Rajany Khan and another 1982 CLC 2049(1) and Elahi Bakhsh and 2 others v.
Mst. Balqees Begum and 4 others 1992 SCMR 2443. In case of Elahi Bakhsh and 2 others, it has been held as under:-- "The next argument of learned counsel for appellants before us is that the appellants being tenant of the pre-empted land had a superior right of pre-emption in view of para. 25 of the Land Reforms Regulation. According to appellants' own showing the land in suit was sold to appellant on 24-1- 1972 and mutation was attested on 16-2-1972. It is, therefore, quite clear that the right of the appellants as tenant cam.; to an end upon sale of the land in January, 1972, when he became owner of the suit land. Under para. 25 of the land Reforms Regulation, 1972, the right of pre-emption was created in favour of persons who were occupying the land as tenants as and from Kharif 1972.
The appellants having acquired the title in the suit land in their favour before Kharif of 1972, could not assert the right of pre-emption on the basis of their status as tenant in respect of pre-empted land. In the case of Malik Pir Bakhsh v. Ali Muhammad 1992 SCMR 1031 this Court repelled the similar arguments as follows:-- ' The first question whether a tenant who had ceased to be a tenant before Kharif, 1972, by becoming an owner of his erstwhile tenancy, could invoke his erstwhile tenancy for matching, challenging or defeating the right of a pre-emptor on the date of sale was considered by this Court of Fazal Khan and another v. Ghulam Rabbani PLD 1983 SC 265 and answered as hereunder:-- ' The petition of the vendee/defendant is, however, different in that the law permits in his case any improvement that takes place before the institution of the suit. But, in the present case the question is whether any improvement in the rights of the appellants had taken place before the institution of the suit on 2-7-1972. They rely on the right of pre emption created in favour of the sitting tenants on the land comprised in their tenancies, and this right became vested expressly with effect from Kharif 1972 andnot retrospectively from any prior date. Plainly, therefore, the right of pre-emption created by this provision of law was available only to persons who were tenants on the date of the enforcement of this law or in the future. The learned Single Judge has held, that since on the vesting of the ownership rights in them, their status as tenants came to an end, they ceased to be tenants with effect from the date of sale viz. 12-7-1971 and, therefore, on the date of the coming into force of the provisions of Articles 25(3) of the Land Reforms Regulation they were no longer tenants so as to be vested with the right of pre-emption created thereunder. The question of improvement in the status of the appellants, therefore, does not arise since no superior rights were created in their favour under the provisions invoked by them. Once they became owners they could not claim any right as tenants as their rights as tenants would be extinguished by merging of the interests of tenants into ownership rights."
5. Resultantly, this R.SA. has no force. The same is dismissed with no order as to costs.