' Brief facts of the case are that the petitioner, Lambardar of Chak No,186/RB, Tehsil and District Faisalabad, was allotted State land on lease under Pedigree Livestock Breeding Scheme on 3-4- 1971. This allotment of the petitioner was challenged by respondent No,3 Abdul Rehman son of Ghulam Muhammad by filing an appeal before the Commissioner who accepted it on the ground that the land being situated within the prescribed limits could not have been allotted to the petitioner. The Commissioner cancelled the allotment of the petitioner and directed that he be allotted some other land not falling within the prescribed limits. This order was assailed by the petitioner by filing a revision which was dismissed by the Member, Board of Revenue on 8-9-1971.
Thereafter the petitioner invoked writ jurisdiction of the Lahore High Court in Writ Petition No,1207 of 1971, decided on 11-6-1991.
2. It was adverted before the Lahore High Court that the Notification No,1838-71/1721-CB, dated 12-5- 1971 did not contain any ban on allotment of State land situated within one mile of the municipal limits in the cases of lambardars and on that ground the Honourable Court was pleased to direct that the revision filed by the petitioner shall be deemed to be pending before the Board of Revenue and shall be decided afresh. It is therefore, useful to reproduce the relevant portion of the aforesaid notification:-- "9. Situation of the grant.--The tenancy shall be carved out of the available Baqaya State land situated in the same Revenue Estate of which the grant of a lambardar. If sufficient Baqaya State land is not available, Charagah land may be utilized for this purpose after leaving out a minimum of 39 acres of Charagah. In case sufficient Baqaya and Charagah land is not available in the same revenue estate, available State land in an adjoining Revenue Estate, having common boundaries with it may be allotted subject to the same order of precedence in Baqaya and Charagah. No tenancy shall be granted beyond these limits provided that--- ' area within 5 miles running along and on the outer side of the outer limits of the Corporation of the city of Lahore;
(ii) two miles running along and on the outer side of the outer limits of a first class municipality; and
(iii) one mile running along and on the outer side of the outer limits of any other municipality. ' shall not be allotted under these conditions, but the Lambardars whose Revenue Estates fall within these limits shall be entitled to get land subject to availability in the estates falling outside but adjoining these limits."
3. The learned counsel for the petitioner in the written arguments submitted that the land in dispute did not fall within the prescribed limits of any municipality because Chak Jhumra was a Town Committee. The words "municipal limits" mentioned in the notification dated 23-11-1963 were substituted subsequently by the word "municipality" in the notification 12-5 1971. The locus standi of the respondent was also not considered in the impugned order. It was therefore prayed that the impugned order passed by the Commissioner may be set aside and allotment in favour of the petitioner restored.
4. The learned counsel for the respondent maintained in rebuttal that the petitioner was not entitled to allotment of land within the prohibited zone and even under notification dated 12-5-1971.
It was prayed that the revision petition may be dismissed.
5. I have considered the arguments and perused the case record. The main plank of the petitioner's case is that the suit land was not situated within the limits of municipality whether first class or otherwise as Chak Jhumra at that time was a Town Committee. Its allotment therefore could not have been cancelled by the learned Commissioner.
6. Notification No,1838-71/1721-SC, dated 12-5-1971, the relevant portion of which has already been reproduced above, does not define the term `municipality'. It is therefore necessary to look into various notifications on the subject. In the Notification No,Col-7/1-1/58, dated 3-5-1960, outlining statement of conditions for grant of State land for breeding pedigree livestock, no such restriction was contained. However, the position was subsequently clarified by the Notification dated 25-6- 1960, stating, inter alia, that no such allotment will be made within the area of one mile "running along and on the outer side of the outer limits of any other town". Another notification, dated 23-11- 1963, also confirmed the position stated above. From these notifications it is evident that the words 'Town Committee' have not been used but 'any other town'. Chak Jhumra being a town was hit by this notification and the order of allotment made to the petitioner was therefore struck down by the learned Commissioner vide the impugned order. The Lahore High Court's order however specifically mentions the notification dated 12-5-1971 and its applicability to the petitioner's case.
The petitioner's allotment was processed and finalized by the DC/Collector, Lyallpur on 10-2-1971 i.e. 3 months before the issue of this notification and therefore its benefit, if any, could not have been given by him to the petitioner in advance. No mention of this notification has been made in the impugned order or for that matter in the order dated 8-9-1971 passed by my learned predecessor because the petitioner's allotment was not made under it. Indeed no reference has been made to this particular notification in the grounds of revision or appeal as the case may be, by the petitioner. However, in the light of the Lahore High Court's order it is to be determined whether its benefits can be passed on to the petitioner.
7. As has been stated above there is no reference to a Town or a Town Committee in the Notification dated 12-5-1971 which covers the Corporation of City of Lahore, first class municipality or 'any other municipality'. The phraseology 'any other municipality' if taken together with 'first class municipality' is broad enough to suggest that there are more than two classes of municipalities i.e. first class and others. Otherwise had the intent been, restrictive, then words 'second class municipality' would have been used instead of 'any other municipality'. The word 'municipality' has however not been defined either in these notifications or in the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act or the allied legislation i.e. the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act, the Punjab Tenancy Act and in the rules framed thereunder. Its meanings have therefore to be determined from its general useage. The term `municipality' has been defined in the various dictionaries as follows:---
(i) Chamber's Twentieth Century Dictionary (New Edition 1973). "a self-governing town; a district governed like a city, a free town."
(ii) The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles (3rd Edition 1959): "a town, city, or district possessed of privileges of local Government."
(iii) Webster's New World Dictionary of the American Language (Second College Edition. 1970): "a city, town, etc. having its own incorporated Government for local affairs."
(iv) Webster's Dictionary Library (1980): "a legally incorporated association of inhabitants of a prescribed area for local Government or other public purpose."
(v) The Reader's Digest Great Encylopoedic Dictionary (First Edition 1964): "town, district, having local self-Government."
(vi) black's Law Dictionary (6th Edition 1990): "A legally incorporated or duly authorised association of inhabitants of limited area for local Governmental or other public purposes. A body politic created by the incorporation of the people of prescribed locality invested with subordinate powers of legislation to assist in the civil Government of the state and to regulate and administer local and internal affairs of the community A city, borough, town, township or village
8. Thus the unequivocal consensus is that any town or city vested with Local Government powers is covered by the term 'municipality'. A 'Town Committee' would therefore be clearly included in the general term `municipality'. The construction of the particular provision of the notification itself, as seen in the earlier part of the foregoing paragraph, does not leave any doubt about its intent and scope. Chak Jhumra was admittedly a Town Committee at that time and will therefore fall within the scope and operation of the notification dated 12-5-1971. The suit land which happened to be only 5 furlongs from the outer limits of Chak Jhumra Town Committee, as held by the learned Commissioner in para. 3 of the impugned order, could not have been allotted to the petitioner.
9. The point of locus standi of the respondent Abdul Rehman was not raised before the learned Commissioner and has also not been touched upon in the grounds of the instant revision petition and hence cannot be raised in the arguments now. However, suffice it to say that the suit land was on lease with the respondent which was cancelled somewhat prematurely without any notice to or hearing him, by the learned Collector on 10-2-1971. Admittedly this land was on lease with the respondent up to Rabi 1971. However, its possession was forcibly taken from him on 21-5-1971 during the subsistence of a stay order issued by the learned Commissioner. The respondent was thus an aggrieved party; hence his locus standi in the instant case.
10. The upshot of the foregoing discussion is that there is no force in the revision petition which is dismissed with costs.