1. ' ABDUL QADEER CHAUDHRY, J.---This judgment would dispose of these, two matters as common point of law is involved in both of them.
2. ' Constitution Appeal No. 5 of 1990 ' The facts of this case are that the appellants are employed in the respondent Corporation which was established under the Companies Act, 1913. The employees of the Corporation formed a Trade Union under the title of National Radio and Telecommunication Corporation Employees and Workers' Union which was registered under the provisions of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 (hereinafter referred to as the Ordinance), on 29-4-1970. On 13-9-1983, the respondents applied to the Labour Court for the cancellation of registration of the aforesaid Union as the same was barred under section 1(3)(a) of the Ordinance. The Labour Court, Peshawar by order dated 19-2-1984 after recording the evidence came to the conclusion that the respondent-Corporation was covered by section 1(3)(a) of the Ordinance as it was an installation connected with and incidental to the Armed Forces of Pakistan. As such, the registration of the Union of the appellants was cancelled.
3. The appeal preferred by the appellants before the Labour Appellate Tribunal was dismissed. The appellants then approached the High Court in a Constitution petition which was also dismissed on 17-12-1989. The petition for leave to appeal filed by the appellants before this Court was dismissed on the ground of limitation. The appellants then filed a Constitution petition under Art.184(3) of the Constitution for the enforcement of fundamental rights. The peition was admitted to regular hearing.
4. ' Constitution Petition No. 6 of 1992 ' The facts are that the appellants claimed to be office-bearers of a Trade Union called Cantonment Board Sanitation Class IV Staff Union, Wah Cantonment. The appellants applied for registration of their Trade Union. The Registrar of Trade Unions refused to register the aforesaid Trade Union in view of judgment of this Court in Rehmat Gill v. Quetta Cantonment Board (PLD 1983 SC 133). The appellants then filed a petition under Article 184(3) of the Constitution for enforcement of fundamental rights as envisaged under Art. 17(1) of the Constitution.
5. ' We have heard the learned counsel for the parties. The appellants have not assailed the finding of the High Court that the establishments are connected with or incidental to the Armed Forces of Pakistan. This Court in Rehmat Gills's case has observed as follows:-- "The contention of the appellants is that Cantonment Board is not an installation or establishment nor services connected with Armed Forces and service therein cannot, for that reason qualify for exemption. It is true that the Cantonment Board is not an installation but it. Is difficult to accept that it is not concerned with services connected with defence. The management and administration of the Cantonment vests in the Cantonment Boards. The Cantonments themselves being the quarters of the Armed Forces, their management and upkeep is necessarily a service which is directly concerned with the Armed Forces, and only incidentally with civilian population residing in Cantonments. The employees of the Cantonment Board are, therefore, excluded from the application of Industrial Relations Ordinance. The impugned judgment of the High Court correctly decided the legal question involved in the Constitutional petitions."
6. ' A similar view was taken in Canteen Stores Department Employees Welfare Union v. Canteen Stores Department (1983 SCMR 1101); and The Controller Stationery and Forms, Government of Pakistan v. The Registrar, Trade Union, Sindh and others (PLO 1991 SC 353).
7. ' The learned counsel for the appellants stated that they have a right to form a Trade Union and this right is guaranteed by Article 17(1) of the Constitution and the reasonable restrictions contained in this Article do not apply to the case of the appellants. It is submitted that setion 1(3)(a) of the Ordinance is hit by Article 17(1) of the Constitution. This Article reads as under:-- "17(1). Freedom of associations. --Every citizen shall have the right to form associations or unions, subject to any reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the interest of sovereignty or integrity of Pakistan, public order or morality."
8. ' The intention of the Constitution is quite obvious that restrictions can be imposed for the reasons stated in this Article. Both the learned counsel have agreed that in these particular appeals, the Court is required to interpret the expression "public order". Article 17(1) is to be considered alongwith Article 8(3) of the Constitution, It reads as hereunder:-- "8(3). The provisions of this Article shall not apply to--
(a) any law relating to members of the Armed Forces, or of the police or of such Other forces as are charged with the maintenance of public order, for the purpose of ensuring the proper discharge of their duties or the maintenance of discipline among them."
9. ' The learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the bar contained in Art.8(3) does not apply to the respondent establishment as it is a public limited company having no connection with the Armed Forces or the law enforcing agencies who are charged with the maintenance of law and order. Section 1(3)(a) of the Ordinance which has been challenged by the appellants reads as follows:-- "1(3).--It shall not apply to any persons employed--
(a) in the Police or any of the Defence Services of Pakistan or any services or installations connected with or incidental to the Armed Forces of Pakistan including an Ordnance Factory maintained by the Federal Government."
10. The word "including" mentioned in clause (a) of section 1(3) of the Ordinance has wide connotation.
11. Its meaning is not restricted rather it extends the scope of the provision. Though the appellants are not members of the Armed Forces but their services are directly concerned with Armed Forces.
12. They are employees of an installation which supplies Telecommunication equipments to the Army.
13. The appellants in both these appeals are covered by the provision of section 1(3)(a) of the Ordinance and as such they cannot seek registration under the provisions of this Ordinance.
14. ' However, the learned counsel submitted that only sensitive installations have been excluded from the Ordinance. To our mind, the National Radio and Telecommunication Corporation is also a sensitive establishment as it provides all their goods to the Armed Forces. Like the Ordnance Factory the Corporation's installation has straight link with the Armed Forces. Without proper supply, the activities of Armed Forces at the time of war and peace will be hampered.
15. ' The High Court in its judgment dated 17-12-1989 has considered the merits of the case and observd that "notwithstanding the fact of registration of the respondent-Corporation as a private limited company, the organisation is certainly connected with or incidental to the Armed Forces as is evident from the constitution thereof as also the total financial and complete administrative control of Government of Pakistan through Ministries of Defence, and Communications". The Labour Court has noted that the Corporation is hundred per cent financed and controlled by the Government of Pakistan. The entire Board of Directors consists of officials of Central Government and Armed Forces.
16. ' The learned counsel for the appellants submitted that section 1(3) of the Ordinance does not concern any of the Forces; the appellants do not belong to the Armed Forces charged with the maintenance of public order. He submitted that right to form a Trade Union has been granted to the citizens and the restrictions imposed by section 1(3)(a) are not reasonable. He repelled the contention of the respondent that appellants may form associations and stated that associations cannot be formed without any purpose and the purpose of forming a Trade Union in the present case is to exercise all rights guaranteed to them by the Ordinance as the primary object of the Trade Union is to regulate the relations between the worker and employer. The learned counsel in this context referred to the history of Trade Unions in Britain, U.S.A. And Sub-continent. He also relied upon Swadeshi Industries Ltd. v. Its Workmen (AIR 1960 SC 1258); and various Articles of Declaration of Human Rights. He also referred to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
17. Reliance has been placed on Miss Benazir Bhutto v. The Federation of Pakistan PLD 1988 SC 416 wherein this Court came to the conclusion that "A number of restrictive provisions were ultra vires of the Constitution". A Trade Union is established for the purpose of Collective Bargaining. The activities of a Trade Union is controlled by the Industrial Relations Ordinance. He stated that there is no nexus between the restrictions imposed by section 1(3) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance and the Constitutional restrictions as contained in Article 17(1). He has relied upon: Banchey Lal v. State of U.P. (AIR 1959 Allahabad 614); Eastern Railway Employees Congress v. General Manager, Eastern Railway (AIR 1965 Cal. 389); O.K. Ghosh v. E.X. Jozeph (AIR 1963 SC 812); Kameshwar Parshad v. The State of Bihar (AIR 1962 SC 1166) and Miss Renazir Bhutto v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1988 SC 416).
18. He submitted that Industrial Relations Ordinance was made in 1969 when fundamental rights were not availabale. Section 1 (3) was substituted for the original on 5-4-1973. It may be noted that it is not an absolute right or uncontrolled right. It could be granted with reasonable restrictions. In law Lexicon Digest "public order" has been defined as follows:-- "Public order is a word of wide impact. It cannot have any static or fixed meaning. Its concept has to vary with improvement or deterioration in social, economic and political conditions of society.
19. Therefore, while making religious freedom as the basis of secular democracy, a recognition of Indian culture and civilization, provision was made for State interference if freedom was abused either because it got mixed with politics or because it became necessary in the interest of society.
20. It was with this objective that the word was used. It has to be given a liberal and wide interpretation. While maintaining absolute freedom of religion, both individual and denominational, the social necessity and political abuse of religion protection may require the legislature to restrict and regulate it. When it should be done can be judged best by the legislature. The Court should be reluctant to interfere with this wisdom. In Ramjilal Modi v. St of UP 1957 SC 620 it was held, it could not be predicated that freedom of religion could have no effect whatsoever on maintenance of..."
21. ' In Abdul Hamid v. District Magistrate, Lahore (PLD 1957 Lahore 213), it has been observed that "danger to human life and safety and disturbances to public transquillity fell within the purview of expression "public order".
22. ' Mr. A.K. Brohi in his Fundamental Rights of Law (Ist Edition) at pages 382-383 has referred to expression "public order" in the following words:-- "The expression 'public order' has reference to the maintenance of conditions whereunder the orderly functioning of Government can be carried on. It is the duty of Government to see that the lives, properties and liberties of the citizens are not thrown in jeopardy. `Public order' is wider than 'public safety' and implies absence of internal disorder, rebellion, lack of interference with or obstruction to the supply or distribution of essential commodities or services. Security of State involves something more than maintenance of public order, the latter term having exclusive reference to the creation of internal conditions within a State which make it possible for the State to carry on its duties, and discharge its functions. Security of State implies also an external reference, such as immunity from war of external aggresiion, avoidance of unfriendly relations with the neighbouring States etc. It must, however, be admitted that these terms have not been precisely defined anywhere and even the judicial pronouncements in India as well as in our country which have a bearing on the interpretation of these terms do not seem to proceed on any well-accepted basis or approach for the comprehension of these vague words. Security of the State could be achieved by preventing the recrudescence of all the prejudicial acts which bring about its political or economic stability. In relation to the conduct or its external affairs the security of the State can be exposed to grave risk in case friendly relations with the neighbouring states are disturbed by well calculated attempts on the part of pestiferous provocateurs to precipitate crisis etc. The Supreme Court of India in the case referred to earlier (Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras, AIR (1950 SC 124), did not give any definition of the expression `Security of State', but indicated that it connoted something more than mere breaches of public safety or public order which do not constitute any danger to the state itself. In the words of Patanjali Sastri: ' The Constitution thus requires a line to be drawn in the field of public order or tranquillity marking off, more or less roughtly, the boundary between those serious and aggravated forms of public disorder which are calculated to endanger the security of the State and the relatively minor breaches of the peace of a purely local significance treating for this purpose difference in degree as if they were differences in kind." (p. 128).
23. ' The meaning of 'public safety' and 'public order' was adverted to by Fazl Ali, J. In his dissenting judgment in the case of Brij Bhushan v. State of Delhi, AIR 1950 SC 129. He felt that the expression 'public safety' "has now acquired a well-recognized meaning in relation to an Act like the impugned Act (East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949) as a result of a long course of legislative practice, and may be taken to denote safety or security of the State. In this sense, it was used in the Defence of the Realm (Consolidation) Act, 1914, as well as the Defence of India Act, and this is how it was judicially interpreted in Rex v. Governor of Wormwood Scrubbs Prison (1920) 2 K.B. 305". (p. 130).
24. ' The learned Judge further went on to remark: "Thus 'public order' and 'public saftey' are allied matters, but in order to appreciate how they stand in relation to each other, it seems best to direct our attention to the opposite concepts which we may, for convenience of reference, respectively label as 'public disorder' and `public unsafety'. If 'public safety' is, as we approach the matter in this way, we find that while 'public disorder' is wide enough to cover a small riot or an affray and other cases where peace is disturbed by or affects a small group of persons, 'public unsafety' (or 'insecurity of the State') will usually be connected with serious internal disorders and such disturbances of public tranquillity as jeopardize the security of this State."
25. ' In O.K. Ghosh and another v. E.X. Joseph (AIR 1963 SC 812), it has been observed as hereunder:-- "The words 'public order' must have the same meaning in both clauses (2) and (4) of Article 19. In clause (2), public order is virtually synoymous with public peace, safety and tranquillity. The denotation of the said words cannot be any wider in clause (4). A restriction can be said to be in the interests of public order only if the connection between the restriction and the public order is proximate and direct. Indirect or far-fetched or unreal connection between the restriction and public order would not fall within the purview of the expression 'in the interests of public order'. This interpretation is strengthened by the other requirement of clause (4), that, by itself the restriction ought to be reasonable. A restriction which does not directly relate to public order cannot be said to be reasonable on the ground that its connection with public order is remote or far-fetched.
26. Therefore, reading the two requirements of clause (4), it follows that the impugned restriction can be said to satisfy the test of clause (4) only if its connection with public order is shown to be rationally proximate and direct. AIR 1960 SC 838 and AIR 1950 FC 67 rel. On."
27. ' In A.I.B.E. Association v. N.I. Tribunal (AIR 1962 SC 171), it has been observed as follows:-- "Applying what has been stated earlier to the case of labour union, the position would be this: While the right to form an union is guaranteed by sub-clause (c), the right of the members of the association to meet would be guaranted by sub-clause (b), their right to move from place to place within India by sub-clause (d), their right to discuss their problems and to propagate their views by sub-clause (a), their right to hold property would be that guaranteed in sub-clause (f) and so on-- each of these freedoms being subject to such restrictions as might properly be imposed by clauses (2) to (6) of Article 19 as might be appropriate in the context. It is one thing to interpret each of the freedoms guaranteed by the several Articles in Part III in a fair and liberal sense, it is quite another to read each guaranteed right as involving or including concomitant rights necessary to achieve the object which might be supposed to underlie the grant of each of those rights.
28. ' A right to form unions guaranteed by sub-clause (c) of clause (1) of Article 19 thus does not carry with it a fundamental right in the union so formed to achieve every object for which it was formed.
29. Even a very liberal interpretation of sub-clause (c) of clause (1) of Article 19 cannot lead to the conclusion that the trade unions have a guaranteed right to an effective collective bargaining or to strike, either as part of collective bargaining or otherwise. The right to strike or the right to declare a lock-out may be controlled or restricted by appropriate industrial legislation and the validity of such legislation would have to be tested not with reference to the criteria laid down in clause (1) of Article 19 but by totally different considerations."
30. ' In Islamic Republic of Pakistan v. Abdul Wali Khan (PLD 1976 SC at page 103), it has been observed as hereunder:- "When, however, we speak of a matter being left to the Court, we do not mean that the Court is being given only such limited jurisdiction as it has under the writ jurisdiction, particularly where the question concerned is of such great importance to the functioning of a democratic system of Government. Read in this light, there will be no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that the restrictions imposed are not unreasonable, because, as I have pointed out in the case of Abul A'ala Maudoodi v. Government of West Pakistan (PLD 1964 SC 673) `reasonableness itself is a relative term. What is unreasonable in one given set of circumstances may well be reasonable in another different set of circumstances'. In order to test the reasonableness of such restrictions, therefore, no general standard exists. It will depend upon a variety of circumstances including the interest and urgency of the action proposed and the nature of the safeguard, if any, provided to prevent possibilites of abuse of power. The investment of arbitrary power in the executive to put to an end to the existence of a political party on the basis of its own satisfaction which may or may not be capable of being proved in a Court of Law may well be an unreasonable restriction having regard to the importance of the right of association guranteed by the Constitution. The safeguard that such a declaration by the Executive will be subject to the decision of the Supreme Court is, however, a sufficient safeguard of the interests of the political party and adequately protects it from being dealt with either arbitrarily or whimsically or out of political vengeance. This can, in no sense b restriction". Considered to be an unreasonable ' In Benazir Bhutto v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1988 SC 432), the following observations are relevant:- "As the phrase 'pubic order' is separately used, it has to be construed in the ordinary context as being synonymous with public peace, safety and tranquility. Public order is an elemental need in any organized society, and no association can flourish in a state of disorder.
31. ' The word 'public order' is accordingly referable to public order of local significance as distinguished, from national upheavals such as revolution, civil strife and war. Equally it is distinguishable from the popular concept of law and order and of security of State. Law and order represents the largest circle, within which is the next circle representing public order and the smallest circle represents security of the State. Hence an activity which affects law and order may not necessarily affect public order and an activity which may be prejudicial to public order may not necessarily affect security of the State. It has not been incorporated as a separate limitation apart from being a constituent of the expression 'sovereignty or integrity of Pakistan' in Article 17 (2) of the Constitution. Therefore, it cannot be read into it as it would amount to re-writing the limitation in the Constitution".
32. "Public order" refers to peace and security of local nature so that function of an establishment can be carried out in an orderly way. The combined effect of Article 8 (3) and Article 17 (1) of the Constitution is that reasonable restriction can be imposed in the interest of public order relating to an establishment having incidental relations with the Armed Forces. The formation of an association is subject to certain restrictions. The appellant's are connected with the Armed Forces.
33. The paramount duty of the Armed Forces is to protect the country from external aggression and to save it from internal disorder (Article 245 of the Constitution). If they are permitted to form Trade Union then all the provisions of the Industrial Relations Ordinance would apply. They may raise industrial dispute. They may call for strike and thus force the management to stop the production.
34. The smooth supply of the goods to the Armed Forces would be disrupted. Supply of equipment's to the Armed Forces by the respondent should be free from impediment. If the contention of the appellants is accepted, the law would o cover the Ordnance Factory maintained by the Government. The restriction imposed by section 1 (3) of the Ordinance is directly connected with the pub 'c order and is not remote. There exists an immediate connection between restriction and public order. This is necessary for the maintenance of public order. The provision is neither unreasonable nor does it infringe any fundamental right of the appellants. The restriction is reasonable and not violative of Article 17 (1) of the Constitution.
35. ' These appeals have no force. The same are accordingly dismissed.