' SARDAR MUHAMMAD DOGAR, J.---The nomination papers of the appellant were rejected by the Returning Officer vide order, dated 1-9-1993 for the reason that the seconder was not a registered voter of the constituency, from which he wanted to contest the election.
' Not feeling satisfied the appellant has challenge'd the order of the Returning Officer.
2. Learned counsel for the appellant did not challenge the factual aspect i.e. that the seconder was not from the constituency. However, he contends that nomination papers could not have been rejected unless somebody had raised the objection, in support of the argument he placed reliance on Rafiq Paul v. Returning Officer PLD 1984 Journal 150 and that according to clause (iv) of section 2 of the Representation of the People Act, 1976 `candidate' "means a person proposed as a candidate for, or seeking election as a member". ' so even if there was no seconder or a proper seconder, the candidature of the appellant could not have been rejected, that acccording to the proviso (ii) of subsection (3) of section 14 of the aforementioned Act, the Returning Officer ought not to have rejected the nomination papers, unless the defect was of substantial nature and should have allowed an opportunity for remedying the error and that as the provisions of the Representation of the People Act are not mandatory and are merely of directory nature, the Returning Officer should have taken a broader view and should have allowed the appellant to contest the election. For the last contention, learned counsel placed reliance on Malik Muhammad Akhtar v. Mian Salahuddin PLD 1971 Lah.
737.
3. We have considered the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellant and have gone through the authorities cited by him. According to the provisions of section 12(1) the nomination of a candidate has to be done by a proposer and seconder from the same constituency. The requirement of nomination to be done, both by a proposer and a seconder from the same constituency is so clear and unambiguous that we feel it difficult to accept contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that even if there was no seconder, the nomination of the appellant was valid. According to the principles laid down for interpretation of statutes the latter provisions of a staute overrule the former. So even if the definition of 'candidate' does not contain the seconder, it cannot be assumed that a person should be accepted as a lawfully nominated candidate in the absence of valid seconder.
' After having gone through PLD 1984 Journal 150 we found that the nomination papers in that case were rejected by the Returning Officer merely on the ground that neither the candidate nor the proposer nor seconder were present at the time of scrutiny of the papers. It was in that light that the Election Tribunal observed that the nomination papers could not have been rejected unless someone had raised an objection about the validity of the papers. Obviously the objection could have been that the candidate had not signed or the proposer had not proposed him or the seconder had not affixed signatures on the nomination papers. The said authority, therefore, does not advance the case of the appellant.
The argument that the provisions of Representation of People Act, 1976 are not mandatory but of directory nature have to be seen and interpreted in the light of the facts of each case. In the case in hand a celar provision of Representation of People Act, 1976 has been violated, in that the seconder with whose signatures the nomination papers were filed was found to be not belonging to the constituency for which the candidate had filed nomination papers. Such a violation could not have been left unnoticed nor could the same be remedied.
' The facts of the case reported as Malik Muhammad Akhtar v. Mian Salahuddin PLD 1971 Lah. 737 were entirely different from the case in hand. In that case the mere violation was that the candidate instead of filing the nomination papers on 15th as announced, had filed the same, a day earlier i.e. on 14th. However, the scrutiny of the papers was done on the date fixed for the scrutiny. It was in the light of such facts that it was held that the nomination papers were not filed unlawfully.
4. Having considered all aspects of the case and having gone through the record as well as the judgments cited by the learned counsel for the appellant, we are not convinced that any case for interference in the impugned order is made out. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed.