M. Muhboob Ahmad, CJ.-- This Full Bench has been constituted in pursuance of order dated 6th of April, 1986 passed in Writ Petition No. 737 of 1980 by a Division Bench of this Court. By the said order a question of law to the .Following effect was formulated for reference to a larger Bench:- "Whether or not the presentation of the petition by a worker "himself is the essential requirement of Sub-Section (4) of Section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969"
The circumstances in which the question has arisen have been given in detail in the aforementioned order of reference and need not be dilated upon in this order.
2. Suffice it to say that an application under Section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance for the redress of the grievance was filed by the petitioner against respondent No.1 which was allowed vide order dated 18.4.1985 passed by the Punjab Labour Court No.4 Faisalabad. The said respondent feeling aggrieved of the aforesaid order went up in appeal before the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal. In appeal it was urged that the presentment of the grievance petition through advocate is not warranted by law and therefore, the same was not maintainable. This argument seemingly weighed with the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal which remanded the case to the Punjab Labour Court with the observation that after affording proper opportunity to the respondent to prove that the presentment of the grievance petition was proper and giving an opportunity to the appellant of rebuttal, the cases be decided afresh on all the points including the question of presentment of the grievance petition properly or otherwise. The petitioner feeling aggrieved of this order of the Labour Appellate Tribunal came up to this Court in the Constitutional petition (W.P. No. 737/86) contending that in law there was no embargo on the presentment of a grievance petition before the Labour Court through an Advocate.
3. The same question also fell for determination in the following other writ petitions :-- W.P.No. 738/86 Akhtar Baig Vs. The Sargroh Vegetable Ghee & General Mills etc. W.P.No.. 739/86 Akhtar Hussain Vs. The Sargroh Vegetable Ghee & General Mills etc. W.P.No. 740/86 Mukhtarr Ahmad Vs. The Sargroh Vegetable Ghee & General Mills, W.P.No. 847/86 Muhammad Sultan Vs. The Sargrah Vegetable Ghee & General Mills.
W.P. No. 1793/86 Rashid Ahmad Khan Vs. Chairman, Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal etc W.P. No. 2498/88 Muhammad Tariq Vs. Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal etc. W.P. No. 3341/88 Muhammad Samiullah Khan Vs. Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal etc.
3. The learned counsel for the petitioner has raised the following contentions:---
(1) That Sub-Sections (1) and (4) of Section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 are to be read independent of each other and there is no compulsion to read Sub-Section (4) conjunctively with Sub-Section (1) ibid so as to import the word "himself' in the former Sub-Section viz Sub-Section (4); and
(2) That the omission of the word "himself' from Sub-section (4) ibid is significant and shows the intention of the Legislature to deal with a petition under Sub-Section (4) independently of the provisions of Subsection (1) ibid.
4. Contrarily, the learned counsel for the respondent has submitted: First, that since Sub-section (4) is a continuation of Sub-section (1) of Section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 the two Sub-sections have to be read conjointly and by so doing, the .Obvious that follows is that a worker has to present a petition under Sub-section (4) of Section 25- A ibid personally and that he cannot do so through a legal practitioner or an attorney.
In support of the above contention, the learned counsel for the respondent has placed reliance on "Messrs Dandot Cement Company Ltd. Vs. Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal 'and another" reported as 1985 P.L.C. 413 and "Gulistan VS. Smd Labour Appellate Tribunal Karachi and 2 others" reported as 1982 P.L.C 1007. Reference was also made by him to ''Syed Muhammad Hussain Vs. Messrs Pakistan Tobacco Co. Ltd. And ^nother" reported as PLD 1980 SX2.80; and Secondly, that Sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 49 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance prohibit the representation of a party in the Labour Court through a counsel except with the leave of the Court and, therefore, the presentment of the application before the said Court could also be not made through an Advocate.
5. Mr. S.M. Masud, Advocate has also been heard in these cases. He has supported the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. Relying upon "Managing Director, Lyallpur Cotton Mills, Faisalabad Vs. Labour Appellate Tribunal (Punjab) Lahore and 2 others" reported as 1990 P.L.C.
514, the learned counsel has submitted that though this point has not fallen for consideration in the cited judgment directly but in the case of an appeal it has been held that the same if signed by the counsel is valid.
6. Having given consideration to the controversy, we are of the view that the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner have force, For facility of reference Sub-Sections (1) and (4) of Section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance may be reproduced hereunder: ~ Sec. 25-A "(1) A worker may bring his grievance in respect of any right guaranteed or secured to him by or under any law or any award or settlement for the time being in force to the notice of his employer in writing, cither himself or through his Shop Steward or Collective bargaining agent, within three months of the day on which cause of such grievance arises".
"(4) If the employer fails to communicate a decision within the period specified in sub-section (2) or, as the case may be, sub-section (3), or if the worker is dissatisfied with such decision, the worker or Shop Steward may lake the matter to his Collective Bargaining Agent or the Labour Court, or, as the case may be, the Collective Bargaining Agent may take the matter to the Labour Court, and where the matter is taken to the Labour Court it shall give a decision within seven days from the dale of the matter being brought before it as if such matter were an industrial dispute: Provided that a worker who desires to so take the matter to the Labour Court shall do so within a period of two months from the date of the communication of the .Employer or, as the case may be, from the expiry of the period mentioned in sub-section (2) or sub-section (3), as the case may be."
7. A perusal of the aforementioned provisions leads to an irresistible conclusion that where the matter is to be considered by a domestic forum, the representation by the worker will be through in-home agencies viz. Himself, Shop Steward or the Collective Bargaining Agent but where the matter goes to an outside forum like a Court, then the parties are not to be deprived of the essential assistance of a technical person like a legal practitioner. This interpretation finds support from the very specific and clear omission of the word ^'himself' from subsection (4) of Section 25-A when read in comparison with sub-section (1) thereof. Enunciation on the assumption that the two provisions being in para material have to be read together, with utmost respect is not correct: It may be observed that the two provisions viz sub-section (1) and sub-section (4) of Section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance are intended to cater for different situations which are in no manner over-lapping or even similar; one is intended to have the settlement of grievances within the domestic sphere whereas the other is intended to have an adjudication of a cause or lis before a forum which is in the nature of a Court.
8. Generally speaking, it is correct that sub-sections of a Section have to be given a conjoint reading but the principle is not of. Universal application and inflexible. It wouId have no applicability when the situations to be catered for by the different sub-sections are intended to meet wholly different conditions. Reference if any needed in this regard may usefully be made to Smt Sudhira Bala Ray Versus. State of West Bengal and. Others reported as AIR Calcutta 36 1981.
9. Another aspect of the matter which lends support to the view as we have formed above may be found from the fact that it is the admitted position, and so is the law clear on the subject that by virtue of Section 36 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance,1969, a Labour Court shall be deemed to be a"Civil Court. That being so, the provisions of Civil Procedure Code unless- they be repugnant or specifically excluded by the Industrial Relations Ordinance shall be deemed to be applicable to the proceedings before the Labour Court, which would mean that Order III Rule 1 CPC would also be applicable to proceedings before a Labour Court. Order III Rule 1 CPC reads as under:-- "1. Appearances, etc., may be in person, by recognized agent of by pleader.- Any appearance, application or act in or to any Court, required or authorized by law to be made or done by a party in such Court, may, except where otherwise expressly provided by any law for the time being in force, be made or done by the party in person, or by his recognized agent, or by a pleader appearing, applying or acting, as the case may be on his behalf; Provided that any such appearance shaft, if the Court so directs, be made by the party in person."
Now the above provision on the plain reading thereof implies that there are three stages which it envisages in a proceeding.
(1) Making of an application;
(2) Appearance; and
(3) Acting.
All of the above steps can be undertaken unless otherwise expressly provided by any law for the time being in force by the party in person, or by his recognized agent or by a pleader, appearing, applying or acting, as the case may be, on his behalf. There is no express bar contained in Section 25-A (4) to the making of an application by a pleader on behalf of a worker and, therefore, by virtue of Order III Rule 1 CPC, an application on behalf of a worker could be presented by an Advocate.
10. The support to the above view can also be inferred from the provisions of Section 49 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, especially sub-sections (2) and (3) thereof when read along with Section 25-A (4) and Order III Rule 1 CPC . By virtue of sub-section (3) ibid, a party to an industrial dispute can be represented by a legal practitioner in any proceedings before the Labour Court or before an Arbitrator with the permission of the Court or the Arbitrator as the case may be, meaning thereby that there is no prohibition as such or specific exclusion of a legal practitioner representing a party; rather it impliedly allows the presenting of an application or making appearance or acting by a legal practitioner on behalf of a party. It may also be pertinently observed that where the representation etc through a legal representative is intended to be excluded it has been so done explicitly and specifically as would be seen from sub-section (1) of Section 25-A where it has been mentioned that a worker can bring his grievance to the notice of his employer in writing, either "himself' or through his Shop Steward or through bargaining agent and also from sub-section (2) of Section 49, where the exclusion has been made in un-equivocal terms by couching the language of the provision in a mandatory, prohibitory form, dis-entitling a party to be represented by a legal practitioner in any conciliation proceedings under the Ordinance.
11. Examining the situation from yet another angle, it would be noticed that this is a cardial principle of interpretation of Statutes that the provisions should be so construed as to make them beneficial and create equality amongst the contending parties. If the interpretation as canvassed by the learned counsel for the respondent is accepted and the word "himself is also read in sub-section
(4) of Section 25-A ibid by giving it a conjunctive reading with sub-section (1) thereof, it would, to our mind, amount to placing a narrow construction, which has to be avoided. Such an interpretation would also be against the principle that a word specifically omitted by the Legislature should not be unnecessarily imported in a provision, which might de-fleet the Legislative intent. The construction sought to be placed by the respondent would also place the worker at a dis-advantageous position as compared to an employer in proceedings before the Labour Court in that the former would not be in a position to make the application through a Legal Practitioner and will be deprived of the technical assistance whereas the employer who has all the reasons at his disposal will have an edge by .Having the services of a technical person as its employee for making petitions and representations in the Court.
12. The insistence to read "himself' in sub-section (4) of Section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance can also lead to very anomalous situations. It may result in severe hardship for example in the case of a worker who is invalid, or infirm or is incapacitated and unable to move about, he might be deprived of the opportunity of presenting the petition even through an attorney. Such a situation which obviously will lead to infliction of grave injustice cannot be said to be the intent of the Legislature and unless there be an in-surmountable obstacle must be warded off.
13. All he cost of repetition, we may also observe that the intention of the Legislature in avoiding the use of the word "himself in sub-section (4) of Section 25-A which has been. Specifically used in sub-section (1) thereof is clear and meaningful as it is intended that insofar as in-home proceedings are concerned cither party should not have the services of a legal practitioner, but where the proceedings are before a forum like court it may have such assistance. Further support to this view can also be had by a comparative reading of sub-section(2) of Section 4) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance and sub-section (3) of the same Section, from which it would be found that so far the proceedings in an in-home forum are concerned, the representation through a legal practitioner has been prohibited and specifically excluded, but where it is before a Labour Court, such representation by a legal practitioner has been made permissible.
14. In view of the foregoing discussion, we answer the question referred to this Bench as under:- "that the presentation of the petition by a worker "himself is not an essential requirement of sub- section (4) of Section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969".
15. The question referred having been answered, let the writ petitions be placed before the appropriate Bench. revisions by the competent authorities. Therefore, it is advisable to consult the official sources or legal professionals for the most up-to-date and accurate information.