' M/s. Gulshan Fabric (Pvt.) Ltd., the petitioner herein, is running a Dyeing and Finishing plant at Lahore-Sheikhupura Road, within the local area of Town Committee, Kot Abdul Malik. By a notification dated 25th of April, 1992 published in the Punjab Gazette on 13th May, 1992, the respondent Committee has levied octroi duty on goods being imported into its local limits. In pursuance to that notification, the petitioner has been asked to pay duty on the grey cloth, which is being imported by it for the purposes of dyeing and bleaching at its Mills. The petitioner objected to this demand on the ground that the cloth in question having not been imported for the purposes of consumption, use or sale, no duty was payable on it. On these premises, the levy of duty was challenged by the petitioner, by filing an appeal before the Deputy Commissioner, Sheikhupura, which, however, was dismissed on 26th July, 1992.
2. Ch. Hamid-ud-Din, learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that in law import tax/octroi duty can only be levied on goods which are imported for the purposes of consumption, use or sale and as the cloth in question is not imported for any of the three purposes, no octroi can be charged. It was explained by the learned counsel that coarse grey cloth is brought into the Mills of the petitioner for the purposes of its dyeing and bleaching, and after the same has been processed, it is taken outside the local limits of Town Committee, Kot Abdul Malik. Learned counsel also referred to the Punjab Local Council Octroi Rules, 1964, particularly, rule 35 thereof, to contend that on such temporary import demand for payment of duty was not justified. Reliance was sought to be placed on Abdul Razaq and another v. Sharif Khan and 6 others (1986 CLC 281), Mst. Ashrafi and another v. Settlement Commissioner (Lands), Multan and 4 others (PLD 1973 Note 59 at p.81) and Municipal Committee Multan through its Chairman v. Burmah Shell Storage & Distributing Co.
Of Pakistan Ltd. And another (PLD 1976 Lahore 726).
3. Mr. Irfan Qadir learned Additional Advocate-General and the learned counsel for respondent No,2, on the other hand maintained that the duty is leviable not only on goods imported for consumption and sale but also for use and as the petitioner was using the both, the respondents were justified in demanding the duty.
4. Section 137 of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979, authorises a local council to levy any of the taxes mentioned in the Second Schedule to the Ordinance. Octroi duty falls under heading 1 of Part III of the Schedule which reads as under:- "Tax on the import of goods and animals in the urban local council for consumption, use or sale therein."
' On the plain language of the provision, there cannot be any possible exception to the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the import duty is not leviable on all imports of goods and animals, but only on those goods and animals, which are imported for consumption, use or sale within urban limits of a local council. It is also not disputed that the cloth which is brought into the Mills of the petitioner for the purposes of processing and is thereafter taken back is not for the purposes of consumption or sale. The difficulty, however, arises as to whether or not the cloth can be said to have been imported for the purposes of 'use' within the meaning of the Schedule.
5. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the word 'use' in entry 12 of the Schedule, should be interpreted adjusdem generis and should be taken to have been in the same sense as consumption. The argument is in other words that in order to attract the levy of import tax, the goods must have been used in the sense that they ceased to exist and must be used up.
The learned counsel pointed out that in the present case, the cloth which is imported for bleaching and dyeing and is exported after undergoing that process, remains the same without anything being added to it.
6. It is difficult to accept the interpretation being placed by the learned counsel on the word 'use' as appearing in entry 12 of the Schedule. It may be correct that as the word 'use' is preceded by word 'consumption', it may take colour from the former but there is no justification for holding that both these words convey the same sense. According to the well accepted principle of interpretation, redundancy cannot be attributed to legislature and each word used in a statutory instrument must be given its meaning. If 'use' and `consumption' are held to be the same word 'use' would be rendered superfluous.
7. According to its dictionary meaning the word 'use' as a verb, means to make use of some material thing as means or constitute to employ for a purpose. (See Shorter Oxford Dictionary). In Webster's New Twelfth Century Dictionary, several meanings of word 'use' are given but the two which are more relevant for the present purposes are "to put or bring into action or service to employ for or apply to given purpose". The import of this expression `used' was considered in Shallmex and B.P. Ltd. (1955) 3 All England Report 102 in which it was ruled that the word 'use' in its natural meaning is a word of wide import and use and the meaning assigned to it is "to employ for any purpose". In British Motor Syndicate Limited v. Taylor & Son (1 Ch. D. 577) the dictionary meanings of the word 'use' as given in Johnson's Disctionary were approved in the following words:-- "The first meaning assigned to the word 'use' in Johnson's Dictionary is 'to employ to any purpose', it is, therefore, a word of wide signification, It seems to me that the terms 'use' and 'make use of are intended to have a wider application than 'exercise and put in practice' and without saying that no limit is to be placed on the two former expressions in the patent, I think, on the best consideration that I can give, that they are not confined to the use of a patented article for the purpose for which it is patented. In my opinion, the transport within the United Kingdom of the articles made according to the plaintiffs' patent under the circumstances which occurred in this case was, indirectly at least, 'making use of those articles within the meaning of the patent, and consequently is an infringement."
' Reference may also be made to the definition of word 'use' as appearing in Words and Phrases (Permanent Edition) at page 267 which is to the following effect:-- "Generally the 'use' of a thing does not mean the thing itself but that the user is to enjoy, hold, occupy, or have in some manner the benefit thereof."
' It flows from the above that the 'use' is not same as 'consumption' and is understood in the sense of being employed for any purpose. Consequently, even if the goods remain the same and are not consumed or used, still it cannot be said that the same have not been used.
8. The view taken above is not without any authority. A Division Bench of this Court in Abdul Majid v.
The State PLD 1963 (W.P.) Lahore 292, while considering the provisions of section 3 of the West Pakistan Supplementary Paddy and Rice (Control) Order, 1958 it was held that the words 'use' and `consumption' convey different intention and the two cannot be equated with each other. Another important decision in this respect is that of the Division Bench in M/s. Saadat Factory v. The Chairman, Municipal Committee, Dera Ghazi Khan (Writ Petition No,42) of 1961 decided on 21st November, 1991, which is on all fours with the present case. In that case also, the dispute was regarding levy of octroi duty and the treated meaning of the words `consumption' and 'use' as appearing in the relevant law. The relevant portion of the aforesaid judgment reads as under:-- "It appears to us that if such a person does something more than mere retention of the goods, as, for instance, subjects it to some kind of process of milling, pressing, etc. Although he may not be consuming or selling those goods, he is using them and, as such he would be liable to pay octroi duty under rule V -17 and cannot, therefore, avail of the Re-export Pass System under rule V -32-A.
We are also of opinion that the 'retention of such goods, though temporary in the sense that the goods, after being subjected to some kind of process, are reexported, is not temporary in the sense that the goods are retained in the original condition; the intention being not merely to 'retain' them but to subject them to some kind of process. For this further reason also rule V-32-A would not be applicable to such a case.
' The ordinary dictionary meaning of 'use' is utilization or employment for or with some aim or purpose or application or conversion to some end. In special senses it means the act of using or the fact of being used as food etc. Keeping in mind this dictionary meaning, there would be no difficulty in holding that by employing the word 'use' in rule V-32-A the intention was that if the goods so imported were intended to be utilized in some manner, though not consumed or sold the facility afforded by this rule would not be available to the importer."
9. Ch. Hamid-ud-Din, learned counsel for the petitioner, on the other hand, has heavily relied upon a judgment of learned Single Judge of this Court in Managing Director, Pakistan Agricultural Storage and Service Corporation Ltd., Lahore and another v. Nawab Din and 2 others (1981 CLC 284) to canvass that where the goods remain in the same state, and their physical condition does not undergo any change, the same cannot be said to have been imported for the purpose of use and no octroi duty is payable. Reliance of the learned counsel on this case is misplaced which cannot be taken as laying down the principle which the learned counsel wishes to press into service. The question before the Court in that case was as to whether import/tax/octroi duty could be charged on potatoes imported within the municipal limits for storage and preservation in a cold storage. It was held and if I may say so with great respect rightly so, that the import of goods only for the purposes of storage within octroi limits cannot be said to be import for the purposes of consumption, use or sale. The learned Judge, while noticing the significance of the word 'use' himself observed that:-- "Therefore, the word 'use' has to be interpreted in the sense that the user will diminish, decrease or lead to extinction of the goods in due course as is natural with the 'use' of goods. The word 'use' does not mean nor carry the connotation that the goods will be kept intact or preserved."
' This case is, therefore, of no help to the petitioner. It needs also to be noticed that the attention of the learned Judge was not drawn to the Division Bench judgment as mentioned above.
10. The next case cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner in support of his case was Kh. Abdul Waheed and another v. Punjab Government and Municipal Committee, Mandi Bahauddin PLD 1978 Lah.
811. That case again is distinguishable for there the dispute related to the machinery which was imported within municipal limits for the purposes of storage only.
11. Two judgments from the Indian jurisdiction, namely, Municipal Council, Pandhurna v. R.P. Dube and another (AIR 1969 Madhya Pradesh 1), M/s. Anwar Khan Mahboob Co. v. The State of Bombay (now Maharashtra) and others AIR 1961 SC 213, were also relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner. Both these judgments are of no relevance. In the case before Madhya Pradesh High Court, the dispute related to the goods which remain the transit while passing through the municipal limits. There is nothing in this judgment, which would support the contention that the expression 'use' and `consumption' carry the same meaning as has been contended by the learned counsel. So far as the decision of the Indian Supreme Court in M/s Anwar Khan Mahboob Co. v. The State of Bombay (now Maharashtra) and others AIR 1961 Sc 213, is concerned, it relates to the interpretation of the use of word 'consumption' in the Bombay Sales Taxation Act, 1953 and Article 286 of the Constitution. Ratio in that case, instead of supporting the case of the learned counsel for the petitioner goes against him inasmuch what was held was that conversion of a commodity into a different commodity by subjecting it to some process, is consumption within the meaning of Explanation A to Article 268 of the Indian Constitution.
12. The learned counsel had relied upon rule 83 of the West Pakistan Municipal Committee Octroi Rules, 1964, which reads as under:-- "83. "Where any goods are to be imported--
(a) for repairs and export;
(b) for the execution of any works within the Octroi limits and export;
(c) for use in connection with any function or ceremony, and export;
(d) for professional use in the case of goods which are the bona fide belongings of traders including implements and paraphermalia of their trade or profession and ultimate export; and
(e) for any other purpose, which Government may declare to be temporary retention for the purpose of this Rule, the importer may require that an Octroi Pass may be issued in favour of such goods."
' This rule, on the face of it, has no applicability in the instant case as it is not the case of the petitioner that the goods are imported for any of the purposes mentioned in clauses (a) to (d) nor is there any declaration by the Government under clause (e). The learned counsel attempted to rely upon the judgment of Muhammad Afzal Zullah, J. (as his Lordship then was) in The Murree Beverage Co. Ltd., Rawalpindi v. The Municipal Corporation, Lahore and another (PLD 1973 Note 44 at p.59). As the facts of that case were not discernible from the report, the original file was sent for which shows that that case has no applicability here. There the dispute before the Court was as to whether octroi duty can be charged on the weight of the containers like empty bottles and wooden crates etc. It was held that the empty bottles/containers are for the purposes of temporary retention only and, therefore, no octroi duty was chargeable there. While coming to this conclusion, the Court treated the statement made by the learned Advocate-General to the effect that use of bottles was temporary retention under clause (e) of rule 83 as a declaration by the Government.
13. The other provisions which came up for consideration in that case were rules 35 and 36 of the said Rules. It was in that context observed as the bottles and the crates were only temporarily retained within the municipal limits, no octroi duty was payable. The present case, is wholly distinguishable inasmuch as in this case the cloth imported by the petitioner is not for the purpose of temporary retention but its use for its industrial concern for the purpose of producing cloth in finishing form. Furthermore the end product which comes out as a result of the process employed by the petitioner and in its Mill is not the same. This aspect of the matter need not be dilated upon any further in view of decision of the Division Bench of this Court in M/s. Saadat Factory v. The Chairman, Municipal Committee, Dera Ghazi Khan reproduced in para. 8 above.
14. Similarly, the reference by the learned counsel to Municipal Committee, Multan through its Chairman v. Burmah Shell Storage and Distributing Co. Of Pakistan Ltd. And another PLD 1976 Lahore 726 is wholly inapt. In that case, also the dispute was as to whether the temporary storage of the goods within municipal limits attracts the levy of octroi duty. It was observed that as the sale of goods had taken place at cities other than Lyallpur, simply because the lubricants were despatched from storage of depot of Lyallpur, did not authorize the Municipal Committee, to levy the octroi duty.
15. The conclusion which flows from the above is that the cloth imported by the petitioner is for the purposes of its 'use' within the limits of Town Committee, Kot Abdul Malik, and, therefore, the respondents are justified in demanding the octroi duty on the import of these goods.
' This petition fails and is dismissed in limine.