' The suit giving rise to this civil revision was instituted by Aslam Khan respondent for a declaration that he had become the owner by purchase of timber in Index Seri Forest and that the defendants could not legally interfere in his rights. A relief for perpetual injunction so as to restrain the petitioners herein from interfering in his rights and preventing him for taking away the timber from the forest was also claimed. The learned Senior Civil Judge, Abbottabad non-suited the respondents. The learned District Judge, Abbottabad also affirmed the findings of the learned trial Judge and dismissed the appeal on 24-7-1977. The respondent dissatisfied with the findings of the learned District Judge, Abbottabad, tiled a civil revision in this Court which was accepted by Inayat flahi Khan, J, as his Lordship then was vide his exhaustive judgment, dated 7-11-1984. The petitioners challenged the judgment and decree of this Court in the Supreme Court of Pakistan which too was dismissed on 8-1-1991 and thus the judgment and the decree attained finality. The respondent moved the Court of Senior Civil Judge, Abbottabad, for the execution of the decree and in consequence vide his orders, dated 14-1-1992 and 22-1-1992 directed the petitioners to produce the disputed timber in the Court or in the alternative to deposit its price or in default ordered the attachment of the vehicles of the concerned Forest Department. In consequence of the above orders the Court took the custody of the Government vehicles. Feeling aggrieved the petitioners filed an appeal against the above-stated orders of the Executing Court before the learned District Judge, Abbottabad, which too was dismissed on 7-6-1992.
2. The petitioners have come up in revision to this Court against the orders of the two Courts below.
3. The only point which was agitated before me by Mr. Muhammad Aslam Khan, A.A.-G., appearing on behalf of the petitioners was that the decree passed by the learned trial Judge was not executable as it was only for the declaration and perpetual injunction and referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court, dated 8-1-1991 to submit that the matter "regarding the conditions of the cut wood was to be determined by the lower Court after recording the evidence of the parties". The grievance of the learned AA.-G. Is that the learned Executing Court has ignored to record evidence to determine the question of possession of the timber and also conditions therefor and the sale price and, therefore, the impugned orders of the two Courts below are not sustainable.
4. Haji Ghulam Basit, learned counsel for the respondent, on the contrary, opposed the revision petition and submitted that it was upon the submission of the learned Advocate-General in the Supreme Court that about 20 years had gone when the contract was formulated and that the timber on the spot which the respondent wanted to remove would have totally gone waste or have been disposed of by the appellants in terms of the contract and that the respondent would at best be entitled to the sale price upon which the argument of the learned A.A.-G. Has been built. The learned counsel for the respondent, therefore, submits that the disputed timber, according to the petitioners themselves, had either totally gone waste or would have been disposed of by the petitioners in terms of the constract and, therefore, the respondent at best is entitled to the sale price. In execution of that decree, according to the learned counsel for the respondent, the notice was issued to the petitioners by the Executing Court either to produce the disputed timber or to deposit the price thereof. The learned counsel for the respondent argues that when the petitioners failed to comply with this direction of the learned Executing Court it was left with no alternative but to proceed to execute the decree by the attachment of the vehicles of the petitioners-department.
5. The observations of the Supreme Court of Pakistan in paras. 3 and 4 of the judgment are in accord with Order XX, Rule id, C.P.C. Providing that where the suit is for movable property and the decree is for the delivery of such property, the decree shall also state the amount of money to be paid as an alternative if delivery cannot be had. The contention of the learned A.A.-G. That the decree for declaration and perpetual injunction is unexecutable is again untenable. It may be so, in the case of declaratory decree but a decree for permanent injunction is executable if it is violated or the directions of the Court in the terms of the decree are not carried out. Under sub-rule (5) of Rule 32, Order XXI, C.P.C. The Court can direct the act to be done so far as practicable by the decree-holder or some other person appointed by the Court. It provides that where a decree for specific performance of a contract or for an injunction has not been obeyed the Court may in lieu of or in addition to all or any of the processes aforesaid, direct that the act required to be done may be done so far as practicable by the decree-holder or some other person appointed by the Court at the cost of the judgment-debtor and upon the act being done the expenses incurred may be ascertained in such manner as the Court may direct and may be recovered as if they were included in the decree.
6. It would thus be seen that the decree for permanent injunction is executable in the mode provided for under Order XXI, Rule 32(5), C.P.C. Reference may be made to: (1) 'Toon Lal and others v. Sonoo Lall and others' AIR 1938 Patna 502 and (2) 'Mosque known as Masjid Shahid Ganj and others v. Shromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee, Amritsar' AIR 1938 Lahore 369.
7. The details of the disputed timber have been furnished in his report, dated 10-11-1991 by Khalid Khan, Senior Clerk of the Gallies Forest Division, Abbottabad, the price whereof has been placed on the file in the Schedule at page 33 of the file of the Executing Court which amounted to Rs,7,72,295.75 excluding the earnest money of Rs,46,00,000 for which interest is also claimed from the year 1970 onwards. In the replication of the petitioners put into the application for the execution of the decree they have categorically denied to have got any timber belonging to the respondent.
The Court was, therefore, left with no alternative but to direct the petitioners to pay to the respondent decree-holder the amount worked out by him as aforesaid.
8. This petition has, therefore, no substance which is dismissed with costs.