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PLD 1993 Supreme Court 52

GHULAM RASOOL and another vs MUHAMMAD LATIF and 2 others

CitationPLD 1993 Supreme Court 52
CourtSupreme Court of Pakistan
Case No.Civil Appeal No,1017 of 1990
Date1992-11-22
Judge(s)Muhammad Rafique Tarar, Shafi-ur-Rehman, Saad Saood Jan
ResultAppeal dismissed

SHAFIUR RAHMAN, J.---Leave to appeal was granted to the two joint vendees to examine whether their case was not hit by section 21-A of the Punjab Pre-emption Act in shedding off a disability as distinguished from an improvement effected after the institution of the pre-emption suit.

2. The factual background of the case is that Mst. Rasool Bibi sold 38 kanals 6 marlas of land on 31- 5-1979 in favour of the appellants and three other joint vendees with them. Suit for pre-emption was instituted on 29-5-1980. On 9-6-1980, the three other joint vendees who had no preferential or equal right of pre-emption to compete with the pre-emptors sold their share in favour of the appellants. The appellants had a competing pre-emption claim against the pre-emptors and were at par with them. In this manner having shed off that disability of joint vendees who were strangers, they claimed that their pre-emptive right being equal and that of the pre-emptors being not superior, the pre-emption suit should not succeed. The trial Court disposed of this claim of the appellants as hereunder:- "The plaintiffs were owners in the estate whereas all the vendees defendants did not possess this status. The defendants Nos. 3 to 5 were strangers and since the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 had joined with them the strangers the rule of sinker applies and in that case the status of the defendants Nos.

1 and 2 also relegates to that of the strangers and they would also be considered as strangers for the purpose of present suit. The plaintiffs being owners in the estate possess superior right as against the vendee/defendants. Issue No,1 is decided in favour of the plaintiffs. The sale of the suit land in favour of defendant No,2 made on 9-6-1980 by way of registered sale-deed and during the pendency of suit shall have no effect upon the rights of the preemptor/plaintiffs."

3. On Regular First Appeal, the High Court too affirmed this judgment after extensively examining the case-law on the subject. Hence this appeal.

4. Ch. Khahlur Rehman, Senior Advocate, the learned counsel for the appellants has taken us to the case-law previous to the introduction of section 21-A in the Punjab Pre-emption Act by Punjab Act I of 1944. This he has done with a view to distinguish the three principles operative in the field of pre- emption law. The first is the status with regard to the pre-emption law; the second is the disability attaching to a pre-emptor and the shedding off; the third is the doctrine of lis pendens. It is contended that section 21-A of the Preemption Act takes care of the first and the third principles but it leaves unaffected the second namely, a case of shedding off a disability. He has relied for this view on Her Keshi v. Mewa Ram and others AIR 1923 Allahabad 294; Madho Singh and another v.

Lieut. James R.R. Skinner and others 23 ILR 155, Ali Muhammad and another v. Muhammad Din and others 23 ILR 190, Jallu and others v. Shahu, Mirza and others 19 ILR 93, Hayat Bakhsh v. Mansabdar Khan Dadan and others 16 ILR 921, Mool Chand and others v. Ganga Jal and others AIR 1930 Lahore 356 and Bishan Singh and others v. Khazan Singh and another AIR 1958 SC 838.

5. In resisting the appeal, Mr. Asadullah Sheikh, Advocate, the learned counsel for the respondents/pre-emptors has contended that all the three principles applicable to a pre-emption case have been taken care of by the amendment introduced by Punjab Act I of 1944 and this has been examined in this Court in Muhammad Mumtaz v. Muhammad Shafi and 4 others 1992 SCM R 1814, Sawar Muhammad Sharif and 2 others v. Makhmool and others 1991 SCM R 1419, Maula Baldish and 10 others v. Muhammad Sharif PLD 1989 SC 278 and Muhammad Ismail and others v. Karamat All PLD 1989 SC 474.

6. Section 21-A of the Punjab Pre-emption Act was introduced by Punjab Act I of 1944. It provides as hereunder:- "Any improvement, otherwise than through inheritance or succession, made in the status of a vendee-defendant after the institution of a suit for pre-emption shall not affect the right of the pre- emptor plaintiff in such suit."

7. The statement of objects and reasons published in the Punjab Gazette, dated 15th March, 1944 while notifying the bill proposing this amendment mentions as hereunder:--- "Section 21-A is being added to the Punjab Pre-emption Act to restore the status quo in the case of pre-emption suits wherein the vendee seeks to improve his position by means of a voluntary acquisition of right of property made after the institution of the suit."

8. Two expressions relevant to the case in hand contained therein are "status quo" and "voluntary acquisition" both relatable to vendee in pre-emption suits. Status quo will imply fixing the status of the vendee as on the date of the institution of the suit. Secondly in the case in hand, there is voluntary acquisition of right of property by the vendee after the institution of the suit. Besides, riddance of a disqualification or a disability also amounts to change in the status quo, an improvement in status. The word "status" in the context of Pre-emption Law means position or locus standi to pre-empt a sale, to compete with the pre-emptor or to defeat the rights of a pre-emptor.

The word is pervasive in scope to cover and include even the shedding off a disability.

' In the circumstances, no merit is found in the appeal which is dismissed with no orders as to costs.

Cited by 9 cases

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