' These are eight connected writ petitions. The relevant facts are that one Shahla Begum was owner of land measuring 336 kanals situated in Mouza Kotla Ghulam, Tehsil and District Muzaffargarh. The petitioners purchased land through mutation No, 533 dated 30-4-1979. The land was in possession of tenants, who are respondents in these writ petitions. The detail is as under:- {{TABLE}} Srl. No, W.P. No, Respondent No, Area 204/86 3 25 K 18 M 647/86 3 58 K 13 M 648/86 3 52K 649/86 L.Rs, of Resps. No,3-1 to 10. 24 K 650/86 3 8K 658/86 3 8K 652/86 3 8K 653/86 1 8K {{TABLE}} ' These respondents-tenants filed separate suits to pre-empt the sale in favour of the petitioners to the extent of land under their tenancy. The petitioners resisted the suits. The Collector dismissed the suits of all the tenants except three suits filed by the respondents in W.P. 647/86, W.P. 650/86 and W.P. 633/86 namely Allah Bachaya and Din Muhammad. The petitioners filed appeals against the orders of the Collector in the case of these respondents while other respondents filed appeals against the order dismissing their suits. The appeals were dismissed by the Additional Commissioner Revenue, D.G. Khan vide order dated 18-11-1982, thereafter the parties aggrieved filed revisions in the Board of Revenue. These revisions were accepted and cases remanded back to the Additional Commissioner for fresh decision in accordance with law. The order of the Board of Revenue is dated 12-10-1983. The Collector was also directed to prepare the decree-sheets in all the cases and supply the same to the respondents-tenants.
2. The decree-sheets in these writ petitions was prepared and handed-over to the respondents on 22-10-1983. The Additional Commissioner this time accepted the appeals filed by the tenants and dismissed the three appeals filed by the present petitioneRs, The result was that all the suits of the tenants stood decreed. The orders are dated 23-9-1985. The petitioners assailed these orders through revision before the Board of Revenue but the same were dismissed on 13-11-1985. It is thereafter that the petitioners have invoked Constitutional jurisdiction of this Court.
3. The W.P. No, 204/86 was filed first of all. The same was admitted to regular hearing and the other petitions were filed subsequently. The same were also admitted on the basis of this writ petition.
The notices were, issued to the respondents.
4. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioners as well as learned counsel for the respondents- tenants and Rana Muhammad Aishad. A.A.G. For the official respondents. The learned counsel for the petitioners in support of the petitions has argued that the appeals filed by the tenants before the Additional Commissioner were incompetent as the decree-sheets were not appended by the tenants with their respective appeals and Board of Revenue wrongly and illegally remanded the appeals of both sides to the Additional commissioner and directed the Collector to prepare the decree sheets. It is added that the decree-sheets were placed on the files of appeals before the Additional Commissioner without seeking condonation of delay. It was added that it was cases of partial pre-emption, therefore, the suits were liable to be dismissed.
5. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents has pointed out that W.P. 647/86 and W.P. 650/86 are not competent because the same have been filed against the dead person namely Allah Bachaya. On merits it is argued that since no decree was drawn, therefore, there was no question of appending the same with the appeals by the tenants. The learned counsel has pointed out that even the three appeals filed by the petitioners were not accompanied by copy of decree-sheets for the same reason.
6. The learned A.-A.G. Has argued that the suit ends in an order, which is appealable. The decision of the Collector or appellate Court is not a judgment and rightly the decree-sheets were not prepared.
7. I have given my anxious considerations to the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties, gone through the record and relevant law. I would like first of all, to refer sub-paras. (6) and (7) of para. 25 of M.L.R. 115, which read as under:- "(6) Any person aggrieved by an order passed by a Collector under the preceding sub-paragraph may, within thirty days of such order, present an appeal to Commissioner.
(7). The Board of Revenue may at any time of its own motion or otherwise call for the record of any case or proceedings under this paragraph which is pending or in which a Collector or Commissioner has passed an order, for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of such proceedings or order, and may pass such order in relation thereto as it thinks fit", ' It is clear from the text of these provisions that the appeal lies to the Commissioner against the 'order' passed by the Collector and similarly revision suo motu or otherwise is competent against the 'order'. The legislature has nowhere used the expression decree in both of these provisions in its wisdom. The learned counsel for the petitioners referred to sub-para. (8) and section 141 C.P.C. To argue that in view of the provisions of sub-para. (8), the decree has to be drawn. In order to have a clear picture, I would refer to sub-para. 8, which reads as under:- "(8) For the purposes of this paragraph a Collector, a Commissioner and the Board of Revenue shall be deemed to be a Civil Court and shall have all powers of a Civil Court under any law for the time being in force and the final order passed in such suits shall be deemed to be a decree of a Civil Court and shall be executed as such."
' It is clear from this provision that legislature by legal fiction has bestowed the status of decree on the milers passed by the Revenue Courts in pre-emption matters under para 25 of M.L.R.
115. This is not all. The Revenue Courts exercise all the powers of the Civil Court but it does not mean that formal expression of their opinion was also to be followed by the decree-sheet. The legislature has only given them the powers of the Civil Court. If this sub-para. Is critically examined, it deals with powers or in other words procedure to be adopted by the Revenue Courts for adjudication of pre-emption suits and mode of execution. The order has been given status of decree only for purpose of execution and for no other purpose. This is not unusual. The same is exactly the position of the orders passed under Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959. The orders were previously executable by the Civil Court as decree but this did not make the order, a decree or the drawing of decree in pursuance of the order was not requirement of the law. The same is position here. Section 17 of The Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 reads as under:- "17. Execution of OrdeRs,--Every order made under section 10 or section 13, and every order passed on appeal under section 15 shall be executed by a Civil Court having jurisdiction in the area as if it were a decree of that Court."
' This provision was discussed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mst. Afzal Begum and others v. Y.M.C.A. Through its General Secretary (PLD 1979 Supreme Court 18). The relevant portion of the judgment reads as under:- "In the light of the above discussion I am of the considered opinion that the ejectment order dated 9th of April, 1974 was passed ex parte by the High Court in appeal under section 15 (4) of the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959. It was not a decree as such and, therefore, Article 169 of the Limitation Act was not at all applicable to the application made by the petitioners to set aside the ex parte order and rehearing of the appeal. It was governed by the residuary Article 181 of the Limitation Act and the application for rehearing of the appeal could have been made within three yeaRs, The cause of action had accrued to the petitioners on the passing of the ex parte ejectment order on 9-4-1974 and therefore, the application filed by them in the High Court on the 23rd of February, 1978 for rehearing of the appeal was clearly barred by time.
' In coming to this conclusion, however, I am not unmindful of the provisions contained in Section 17 of the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959. It, inter alia lays down that every order made under section 15 shall be executed by a Civil Court having jurisdiction in the area as if it were a decree of that Court. It implies that although an order passed in appeal under section 15 is not by itself a decree yet for the limited purpose of execution only it shall be treated as if it were a decree of that Court. It does not clothe the ejectment order passed under it with the full effect of a decree for all other purposes including that of Article 169 of the Limitation Act.
' In Syed Sarwar Abbas v. Syed Muhammad Taqi Rizvi this Court observed that by virtue of section 17 of the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, the ejectment order passed by the appellate authority has the force of a decree of a Civil Court. But these observations were made in the context of the proceedings under section 15 thereof for the execution of the ejectment order."
' Therefore, I find no merit in the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioneRs,
8. Now coming to the question that since it was a case of partial preemption, therefore, the same should have been dismissed. The argument is clearly misconceived because the khasra Nos,139/126/127 are not agricultural and but residential area (Ghair Mumkin Abadi).
9. The petitioners have failed to make a case for interference in Constitutional jurisdiction. There is neither misreading nor non-reading of material evidence on record. In fact learned counsel for the petitioners has failed to point out anything wrong in this behalf. The arguments on merits were just a formality otherwise the whole emphasis was the preparation and appending of the decree sheet.
10. The learned counsel for the respondents in W.P. 647/86, W.P. 650/86 and 653/86 has rightly raised the objection that these petitions are incompetent having been filed against a dead person.
The learned counsel has pointed out that the tenant-plaintiff died on 15-7-1984 during the pendency of the proceedings before the Additional Commissioner after remand.
11. The learned counsel for the respondents-decree-holders has further submitted that although the petitioners are challenging the order dated 12-10-1983 of M.B.R. Also alongwith the orders dated 23-9-1985 and 13-11-1985 yet they have not appended the same alongwith the writ petition. The argument is that in the absence of order the petition is rendered incompetent. Be that as it may the petitioners are guilty of gross laches in moving against order dated 12-10-1983 rather they are estopped from finding fault with the same because through this order the matter in all revisions was remanded to Additional Commissioner. The petitioners did not challenge this order forthwith rather accepted the same by joining proceedings before the Additional Commissioner. The petitioners have challenged the order after about `three years, therefore, they cannot be allowed to find fault with the same now. This is so far as order dated 12-10-1983 of the Member, Board of Revenue is concerned while no case, as already observed, has been made for interference in respect of orders dated 23-9-1985 and 13-11-1985.
12. The result is that I do not find any merit in these petitions. The same are dismissed.