' Respondent No,1 filed a suit against Federal Government of Pakistan, the appellant seeking decree for ejectment of a residential house situate in Islamabad, which was on rent with the appellant. The suit has been contested and also for grant of mesne profits for use and occupation of the house after termination of the lease period. On the basis of pleadings of the parties, learned trial Court framed the following issues:--
(1) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to get possession of the suit house from the defendant No,1, alongwith rent and mesne profit, if so, at what rate and for what period? OP (OPP)
(2) Whether the proper court-fee has not been fixed, if so, its effect? OPD.
(3) Whether the suit is without any cause of action? OPD.
(4) Whether the suit of the plaintiff is barred under section 49-E of the CDA Ordinance and under the provisions of Specific Relief Act? OPD.
(5) Relief.
' The suit was ultimately decreed by the learned trial Court in favour of respondent No,1 vide judgment and decree dated 1-12-1989. Decree for ejectment and payment of mesne profits has been granted against the appellant who filed appeal against the said judgment and decree before learned District Judge, Islamabad. Respondent No,1 also filed a case appeal before the said Court securing enhancement of mesne profits. Learned First Appellate Court vide judgment and decree dated 26-10-1992 partly accepted the appeal filed by the appellant and the rate of mesne profit was reduced from Rs,7,000 p.m. To Rs,3,600 p.m. However, decree of ejectment was maintained.
This judgmentand decree has been challenged in this regular second appeal by the defendant.
The appeal filed by respondent No,1 was dismissed and the said respondent has not challenged the decree of dismissal of his appeal and hence has accepted the decree passed by the learned trial Court as modified in appeal.
2. Mr. Mansoor Ahmed, Advocate, learned counsel for the appellant has argued that as value of the suit as mentioned in the plaint was Rs,6 lacs, the appeal before the learned First Appellate Court was not competent, and, hence, the impugned judgment and decree rendered by the learned First Appellate Court is without jurisdiction. No other point has been urged on merit of the case.
3. Raja Abdul Aziz Bhatti, Advocate has appeared on behalf of the respondent placing reliance on case Aman Ullah Khan v. Chotey Khan (1973 SCM R 14). Learned counsel has argued that the appellant himself having filed the appeal before the learned District Court cannot now turn round and challenge the jurisdiction of that Court after having party failed in appeal. Hence the impugned judgment and decree is not challengeable on the plea of lack of pecuniary jurisdiction of the lower appellate Court and as no objection has been raised regarding merits of the case. The appeal is liable to be dismissed as held in case Illahi Bakhsh and others v. Mst. Bilqees Begum (PLD 1985 SC 393).
4. I have considered the arguments addressed by the learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the record as well as the case referred to by the learned counsel for the appellant and other cases which I have come across as result of my own research. There is no denying the fact that the jurisdictional value of the suit as mentioned in the plaint is Rs,6 lacs and hence the appeal was not competent before the District Court.
' However, both the parties challenged the judgment and decree rendered in the suit before the learned District Court, Islamabad. During the course of hearing of both the appeals none of the parties raised objection of lack of jurisdiction. Appeal filed by the appellant has been partly dismissed and the decree passed by the trial Court has been modified, in favour of the appellant still dissatisfied the appellant has filed this second appeal. Appeal filed by the respondent was dismissed but he has not challenged the judgment and decree rendered by the learned First Appellate Court passed in both the appeals. In view of the above, it is clear, therefore, that the appellant himself invoked the jurisdiction of the learned First Appellate Court. The appeal filed by the appellant has been partly dismissed in relation to the decree for ejectment passed against him. It is an established legal principle that if the litigant himself choses a forum for redress of his grievance, he is estopped to challenge the jurisdiction of that forum if the ultimate decision is rendered against him. In case of "Aman Ullah Khan" referred to supra by the learned counsel for the appellant at page 14 of the report, it has been held as under:-- "It was contended before us that the Second Appeal was not competent in view of the decision of this Court in Ibrahim v. Muhammad Hussain (1) and, therefore, the judgment is a nullity. But this contention appears to be misconceived for, it was the petitioner who had filed the appeal and if according to him, it was incompetent he should not have done so. But having invoked the jurisdiction and the decision being against him he is disentitled by his conduct to seek special leave to appeal against it."
' Similarly, in case of N.W.F.P., Peshawar through Collector, Abbottabad and another v. Abdul Ghafoor Khan through Legal Heirs and 2 others (PLD 1993 SC 418) at page 424 of the report, it has been held as under:-- "The fact that on filing of the appeal, the trial Court's judgment lost its fmality wa riot a bar to the procedure adopted by the High Court under its order dated 24-6-1986. The impugned order practically has the effect of reviewing the said order, for which there is no warrant in law. The High Court was also wrong in importing the concept of jurisdiction into this case. By the term jurisdiction, is meant to take cognizance of a case, and to adjudicate upon the controversy between the parties to the suit. It cannot be said that the Court was not possessed of the jurisdiction to hear and decide the appeal or that the procedure followed by it was in conflict with any jurisdictional issue.
Likewise the respondents themselves having invited the order dated 24-6-1986 should not have been allowed to resile from the consent given by their learned counsel. In this view of the matter, no exception can be taken to the High Court's order in question. We may say and say so with respect that the learned Judge of the High Court failed to examine the case in correct perspective. The impugned judgment, therefore, cannot be sustained."
' In case of Nazar Hussain v. Faqir Muhammad (1974 SCM R 188) at page 189 of the report it has been held as under:-- "It is submitted iw the learned counsel for the petitioner that in fact the value of the subject-matter of the suit was Rs,52,000 which was the sale price of the land, and, therefore, in terms of the amendment introduced in section 115 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure by Article 5 of the Schedule to the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, the learned District Judge had no jurisdiction to entertain a revision petition in this matter, with the result that the order passed by him was a nullity in the eye of law, and the High Court had jurisdiction to entertain the revision petition.
' It is correct that under the newly-added subsection (2) of section 115 of the C.P.C. The District Court has been authorized to exercise revisional powers in respect of cases in which the amount or value of the subject-matter does not exceed the limits of the appellate jursidicton of that Court, viz., Rs,25,000 at present, and, therefore, prima fade the District Judge did not have the jurisdiction to entertain the petitioner's revision petition in view of the value of the land forming the subject- matter of the suit. However we do not regard this as a fit case for our interference for the reason that it was the petitioner himself who invoked the revisional jurisdiction of the District Court, and he cannot now be premitted to contend that Court had no jurisdiction simply because he had failed on merits."
' The law declared in the aforementioned judgments, therefore, fully supports the contention raised by the learned counsel for the respondents to the effect that the appellant having himself invoked the appellate jurisdiction of the District Court cannot be allowed to challenge the jurisdiction of the lower appellate Court after having failed in past. As no other point has been urged in support of this appeal on merits, I see no force in this second appeal, hence, the same is dismissed, with no order as to costs.