' Briefly stated facts of the case out of which this civil revision has arisen are that the land measuring 300 acres comprising lot No,1 situated in Chak No,41/10-R District Multan, was leased out to one Saeed Ullah Khan, under section 10 of the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act (V of 1912) under the live-stock breeding scheme. Before the conferment of proprietary rights upon the grantee Saeed Ullah Khan, he executed an agreement for sale in favour of M/s. Ch. Zia Ullah son of Ch. Ahmad Khan and one Mehar Muhammad Nawaz son of Bahawal Khan, without obtaining permission from Collector/Colony Authority in accordance with the provisions of section 19 of the Act and transferred possession of the lot to them. This agreement for sale appears to have not been approved and accepted by the Provincial Government to whom the land belongs. Khan Saeed Ullah, the original lessee neither approached the authorities for conferment of proprietary rights nor filed any other proceedings to claim rights in property in question till the expiry of his lease period. However, Ch. Ahmad Khan father of Ch. Zia Ullah Khan petitioner No,1 and Mehr Muhammad Nawaz petitioner No,2 in whose favour aforementioned agreement for sale has been executed, filed a suit in the Civil Court seeking declaration to the effect that they are in possession of the land in question as allottee under live-stock breeding scheme firstly for, the original lease period and the period of 20 years lease shall be deemed to have been extended from time to time by conduct of the defendants and their officers and as such they are entitled to retain the possession of the land for another 10 years and further that so long the conditions of the lease are fulfilled they shall be deemed to be tenants holding over and are not liable to be ejected from the land in question without their being any lawful and due process of law. In the alternative it has been prayed that if they are dispossessed, they are entitled to the assessment and payment. of compensation and that the Memos No, 6023 of 1981 and 2112-CLV dated 27-7-1982 issued by the Secretary Government of Punjab Colonies Department and other notification are arbitrary, illegal, mala fide and against the principle of natural justice and, hence, are inoperative against their rights of tenancy in the land in question. This suit has been contested by the defendants- respondents inter alia on the grounds that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to try the suit, that the plaintiffs are not subsisting lessees, therefore, cannot challenge the notification in question and that the plaintiffs have no locus standi to file the suit.
2. Learned trial Court vide judgment and decree dated 26-3-1990 dismissed the suit holding that the original lease period having expired, hence, the plaintiffs have no locus standi to file the suit, that the suit is not maintainable in its present form; that the suit is premature inasmuch as no order has been passed by the respondents on the basis whereof the plaintiffs could challenge notification/Memos in question that the plaintiffs have no cause of action to file the suit inasmuch as they did not possess any subsisting right in the land in question, that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to try the suit and that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the matter and further that the tenancy automatically stood terminated after the expiry of 20 years in the year 1980 and, therefore, the land stood resumed in favour of the Government, hence neither plaintiffs were the lessee nor the tenants holding over and that the grant or refusal of extension the lease and proprietary rights being within exclusive jurisdiction and discretion of the respondents, no relief can be granted to the plaintiffs in the suit. Regarding the claim of compensation it had been held that as the plaintiffs have been drawing undue benefit from the State land, they are not entitled to the grant of any compensation.
3. Aggrieved of the said judgment and decree, the plaintiffs. who are petitioners Nos.1 and 2 in this revision petition filed appeal in the. District Court of Multan which has been dismissed vide judgment and decree dated 27-10-1992 on the ground that as the lease was granted to Saeed Ullah Khan who is neither the plaintiff nor the appellant, no reliaf as prayed for by the plaintiffs, can be granted on the basis of a mere agreement to sell. Learned District Judge further held that the alleged agreement being in violation of section 19 of the Colonization of Government Lands Act, 1912 is void and does not create any actionable rights. Original lease period having expired, the suit is not. maintainable at any rate.
4. Aggrieved by both the judgments and decree, the plaintiffs as well as Ch. Zia Ullah Khan and Khan Saad Ullah respondents Nos. 3 and 4 (not parties to the suit or appeal have filed, this civil revision).
5. Mr. Mian Pervaiz Akhtar, Advocate, learned counsel for the petitioners has argued that as admitted by the respondents, the lease in question having been granted to Saeed Ullah Khan, petitioner No,4 who executed an agreement to sell in favour of petitioners Nos.2 and 3 and that the petitioners Nos. 1, 2 and 3 being still in possession and the lease having not been resumed by any express order it shall be presumed that the lease granted to Saeed Ullah petitioner No,4 stood automatically exended and, therefore, the petitioners are entitled to the grant of all the benefits of extended lease including right to get proprietary rights in the land in question inasmuch as the land has been made culturable by the plaintiffs and is still in their possession. On the question of jurisdiction, the learned counsel has argued that the Civil Court being a Court of general jurisdiction has the jurisdiction to grant the declaration sought for in the suit and as the memo/notification issued by the Secretary, Colonies, Member Board of Revenue is patently illegal and without jurisdiction, the suit is liable to be decreed and further that the revision petition is continuation of the proceedings of the main suit, hence, the petitioner No,4 who is the original lessee as well as the second agreement holder who is petitioner No,3 having been joined in this revision petition, the defect in the suit, if any, which was not the result of any negligence or lapse on the part of the plaintiffs, stands cured, hence the suit is liable to be decreed. Learned counsel further argued that the petitioners Nos.3 and 4 are entitled to challenge the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court which has illegally been confirmed by the learned first appellate Court and, therefore, even if they were not parties before the learned trial Court, they have a right to challenge the decree as it affects their rights adversely and, hence, the petitioners Nos.3 and 4 may be permitted to challenge the impugned judgments and decree in this civil revision. Learned counsel has finally argued that the memo/notification issued by the Secretary, Board of Revenue amounts to a threat of interference with legal rights of the plaintiffs, hence its legality and vires could have been challenged in this suit, but the Courts below have illegally held otherwise. Lastly, learned counsel has argued that in order to do complete justice, the petitioners shall be given protection.
6. I have considered the arguments addressed by the learned counsel for the petitioners and have also gone through the record. Narration of above-stated facts clearly demonstrates, that the plaintiffs of the original suit do not have any subsisting and actionable right in the land in question qua the respondents. They are not lessees merely because there is an agreement for sale in their favour which admittedly has been executed without seeking permission from the Collector and hence does not create any rights in the land in question being a void agreement for sale which has all the incidents of a sale.
' In case of M. Ghulam Muhammad v. Custodian of Evacuee Property, Lahore and others PLD 1966 (W.P.) Lahore 953, it has been held as under:- "On the facts of the case the petitioner cannot claim that the property was not an evacuee property. He claims relief on the basis of an agreement to sell, dated the 19th of May, 1945. An agreement to sell does not create any right, title or interest in immovable property. The petitioner for that reason did not apply under section 18 of Ordinance XV of 1949 for a declaration that the property was not evacuee. He instead applied for the confirmation of the transaction. On the confirmation of the' deed, the petitioner again could not acquire any right and the Custodian could in that event only direct him under section 16 of the Act to file a suit for the specific performance of the agreement. On the facts of this case the property would have continued to be an evacuee property under the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act, and it was only if the agreement had been confirmed, the decree for the specific performance had been obtained and then confirmed by the Custodian that the property could cease to be an evacuee property. It is in this context that we are to examine the Notificatin of the Central Government and to see whether the Custodian was justified in passing the impugned order whereby he refused to decide the appeal."
' In case of Wajid Ali and 2 others v. Board of Revenue, Punjab and 2 others PLD 1982 Lah. 716, it has been held as under:-- "I am also persuaded to dismiss this writ petition on the ground that the petitioners have neither had clean hands in the litigation before the hierarcy below nor did they come to this Court with clean hands. In addition to various facts pointed out by the learned counsel for respondent No,3 to establish the mala fides of the petitioners and the collusive nature of whole of the transaction which is being pressed into service by them it has been further held that apart altogether from the above position the petitioners do not have any case on merits either. It has been laid down by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in Ghulam Rasul and others v. Muhammad Anwar and others (1) and consistently followed by this Court (Refer PLD 1978 Lah. 421, PLD 1979 Lah. 865 and PLD 1981 Lah. 457) that a transfer prohibited by section 19 of the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912 is void even between the parties to the transaction in the absence of consent in writing of the Government and that in the absence of such consent in writing of the Government no specific performance of an agreement for sale could have been ordered. That being so, the alleged purchase of the land by the petitioners which admittedly was without the consent of the Government and in violation of section 19 as also violative of the statement for conditions under which the land was allotted to respondent No,3 could confer no title on the petitioners qua the land in dispute and they have rightly been held to be trespassers. It may also be added here that assuming that the petitioners had purchased the land in question from respondent No,3 in 1973, no title could be conferred on them by virtue of the said sale, firstly, for the reason that, point of time, the land had already been resumed from respondent No,3 who was, thus, left with notitle therein and therefore could pass none to others; and, secondly, because there was no previous sanction obtained regarding the transaction in question from the authorities concerned. I am fortified in my above view by Abdul Aziz and 2 others v. Sadiq Muhammad and 9 others (2). The petitioners having been held to be trespassers. There was no impediment in the way of the Collector to dispossess them from the land in dispute in exercise of the powers conferred on him by section 32 of the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912. In the attendant circumstances of the case the petitioners in my view were not entitled to any notice. Even if it be taken that in pursuance of the principles of natural justice they should have been given an oppbrutnity of being heard before their eviction, the defect if any in this regard at the initial stage, stood cured by the subsequent opportunities of hearing afforded to the petitioners by the hierarchy above the Collector."
A declaratory suit is maintainable on the basis of a legal and jurisdrict right, land in question admittedly belongs to the respondents. Lease has not been extended even in favour .of petitioner No,4 who has never asked for the extension thereof. He has rather violated the terms of original tenancy by entering into an agreement for sale without permission of the Collector. He is not even a plaintiff in this suit. No adverse order has been passed against the plaintiffs who have absolutely no right to retain the property in question. Their possession is as of tresspassers. Contents of the plaint clearly show that the plaintiffs have absolutely no cause of action as is clear from the law laid down in case of Muhammad Aslam Baig v. Member (Colonies), Board of Revenue,' Punjab and others 1989 SCMR 1122 as under: "Learned counsel for the petitioner attempted to argue before us that previously on an adverse report of this nature from the District Remount Officer, the Collector had allowed the petitioner to retain the grant. We have heard learned counsel at some length but generally speaking grants of this nature are discretionary in character and no vested right is created in them."
' Hence, the plaintiffs have rightly been non-suited as having no locus standi and cause of action.
7. As per bar of jurisdiction contained under the provisions of section 36 of the Act, in view of the substantial relidfs claimed in the suit which can only be granted by the authorities appointed under the Act Civil Court lacks jurisdiction in the matter. If the authorities have refused to accept the petitioners as lessee expressly or implicdly Civil Court cannot sit over their judgment due to clear bar of jurisdiction as held in case of Abdul Hameed and others v. Province of the Punjab through Collector, Faisalabad and others 1989 SCMR 1741 wherein is held as under:--- "Briefly the facts are that the petitioners were in possession of the disputed land under Grow More Food Scheme in 1956 but the allotment in their favour was cancelled for the reasons that the said land not being waste land could not be allotted under the scheme. Consequently it was resumed in 1961. The petitioners first filed writ petition challenging the resumption order but failed. Thereafter, they filed a civil suit against the resumption order but the plaint was returned on the ground that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction in the matter under section 36 of the Colonization of the Government Lands Act, 1912. The appeal of the petitioners failed. Therefore, they filed a revision petition in the Lahore High Court, against the order of the Civil Courts which was likewise dismissed for the main reason that since the civil suit did not lie under section' 36 of the aforesaid Act, it was a clear bar of jurisdiction on the civil side."
So far as the relief of challenging a notification issued by the Board of Revenue is concerned, the same cannot be granted in a civil suit inasmuch as unless and until the plaintiffs petitioners prove that they have actionable right and interest in the property which has been adversely effected in praesenti, as a result of the said memo, no such adverse order or effect being there against the petitioners who have neither any cause nor locus standi to file the suit, the same has been rightly dismissed on this score as well. Judgments of the Courts below in this behalf are unexceptionable.
8. The petitioners Nos.3 and 4 cannot be allowed to challenge the impugned judgment and decree at this revisional stage inasmuch as they have never agitated their rights earlier, and the lease in question stands expired. it appeared that they have joined hands with the petitioners Nos.1 and 3 lately just to continue the illegal possession over the State land, in a mala fide manner without any lawful entitlement. It is clearly mala fide suit and mala fide proceedings. In exercise of revisional jurisdiction, which is discretionary in nature, no relief can be granted in aid of injustice and in favour of retention of ill-gotton gain, as held in case of Ghulam Rasul and others v. Muhammad Anwar and others 1969 SCMR 254 as under:--- "The next argument is that since both the petitioners and the respondents were in pari deli:to their unlawful possession should have been taken into account for granting them the relief. We arc unable to agree with this contention. The principle is that where the parties arc in pari delicto it is the defendant who can take advantage and not the plaintiff. In the present case, therefore, if the petitioners have stuck to their illegal possession and the respondents had filed a suit for evicting them, this principle may have been invoked in aid by the petitioners but they cannot do so in a suit in which they arc themselves plaintiffs."
' See also case of M/s. Ghulam Farid, Muhammad Latif and others v. The Central Bank of India Limited, Lahore PLD 1954 Lah.
575.
9. Resultantly, I see no force in this civil revision. The same is, therefore dismissed in limine.
10. Before parting with this judgment I may observe that in case the respondents in their own discretion still feel that the petitioners can be given or granted the land in question under any instructions or scheme, they shall be at liberty to deal with the matter in accordance with law.