1. ' SARDAR SAID MUHAMMAD KHAN, CJ.---This appeal has been directed against the judgment of the High Court dated 11-10-1992, whereby the writ petition filed by the respondents was accepted and the order passed by the Financial Commissioner was set aside ' The brief facts giving rise to the present appeal are that rights of Arakdare as stipulated under rule 10 of 'Ailan' No,17 pertaining to land comprising Survey Nos. 237 and 841 were sanctioned in favour of Bagh Ali, the predecessor-in-interest of the respondents. A mutation on the basis of said sanction of right of `Arakdari' was sanctioned in favour of Bagh All on 19-11-1965. Subsequently an application was moved by the appellants Muhammad Ismail and others, before the Collector for the cancellation of the mutation sanctioned in favour of Bagh Ali on 13-9-1982. The application was marked to Tehsildar Dudyal for proper action. However subsequently, the respondents filed an appeal against the mutation sanctionedin favour of Bagh Ali before the Collector on 27-7-1983.
2. The learned Collector dismissed the appeal of the appellants herein vide his order dated 28-4- 1984, as being time-barred. Feeling dissatisfied with the findings of the Collector, Mirpur, the appellants filed a revision petition before the Additional Commissioner who, vide his judgment dated 28-1-1985, treated the revision petition as appeal and accepted the same by setting aside the Mutation No,967 which was sanctioned in favour of Bagh Ali the predecessor-in-interest of the respondents. Feeling aggrieved by the judgment of the Additional Commissioner the respondents filed an appeal before the Financial Commissioner of Azad Jammu and Kashmir which was dismissed on 4-4-1987. A review petition was filed before the Financial Commissioner against the order passed by him but the same* was also rejected. Thereafter, the respondents filed a writ petition in the High Court which was accepted and the orders passed by the Revenue Authorities cancelling the mutation sanctioned in favour of Bagh Ali the predecessor-in interest of the respondents was restored.
3. ' We hayed heard the arguments and perused the record. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the appellants, Ch. Muhammad Taj, Advocate, that the writ petition was not competent because Fazal Ellahi, one of the persons who was a party before the Revenue Authorities, had died but his legal representatives were not arrayed as respondents in the writ petition. He has contended that the High Court has committed an error in holding that as no right had accrued on Fazal Ellahi, his presence or for that matter the presence of his legal representatives was not necessary for deciding the writ petition. He has argued that as the mutation in question was cancelled at the instance of appellants including Fazal Ellahi, his representatives were necessary party in the writ petition.
4. ' The question which needs determination is as to whether Fazal Ellahi was a necessary party in the writ petition. It may be pointed out that the appellants alongwith Fazal Ellahi challenged the mutation which was set aside by the Revenue Authorities. The orders passed by the Revenue Authorities were challenged through writ petition filed by the respondents. Thus, it cannot be said that Fazal Ellahi was not a necessary party in the writ proceedings. The respondents did not make any application in the High Court or in this Court for the impleadment of the legal representatives of Fazal Ellahi. The learned counsel for the respondents has contended that as Fazal Ellahi was only one of the respondents who had assailed the mutation sanctioned in favour of the appellants non- impleadment of his legal representatives will not make any difference; and that he was not a necessary party.
5. ' Before deciding the question as to whether the legal representatives of Fazal Ellahi were necessary parties or not it would be expedient to survey some case-law on the subject.
6. ' In case reported as Muhammad Ashraf v. Azad Government of the State of Jammu & Kashmir PLD 1985 SC (AJ&K) 102 it was observed that all parties who derive any benefit from an order passed by a competent authority are necessary parties. It was observed that in absence of such a party no effective writ could be issued by the High Court.
7. ' In case reported as Muhammad Jamil v. The Chairman Industrial Court West Pakistan PLD 1964 SC 559, it was held that as the employer who was a necessary party in the case was not impleaded in the appeal, the appeal was incompetent and the same was dismissed on the ground that in absence of necessary party no final adjudication was possible.
8. ' In Abdul Ghani v. Settlement Commissioner 1971 SCM R 98, it was held that the provisions of C.P.C. are applicable to writ proceedings and in the Letters Patent Appeals. One of several respondents in the writ petition during the pendency of Letters Patent Appeal arising out of the order passed in writ jurisdiction died and his legal representatives were brought on the record after the expiry of the limitation. The legal heirs of the deceased contended that the order of their substitution must be set aside and the writ must be held to have abated. It was contended in defence that in writ proceedings only the authority or Tribunal which passed the order is necessary party and, thus, the writ is not adversely affected by the non-impleadment of the heirs of deceased-respondent within tWimitation. It was held that in absence of the persons who are likely to be adversely affected no effective order could be passed because they were necessary parties. Thus, the petition for leave to appeal was rejected.
9. ' In case reported as Chotusingh v. Onkar Singh AIR 1953 Ajmer 55 it was held that the appellate Court committed error of procedure which might finally affect its order in proceedings to dispose of the appeal without first determining the question whether the appeal was competent without the addition of the parties who were vitally interested in the order appealed against. The case was remanded with the direction that first the Court should decide as to whether the parties who were not arrayed as respondents, were necessary parties or not.
10. ' In case reported as Ram Das Singh v. Ram Anuplal Rai AIR 1949 Patna 90, one of the plaintiffs in whose favour decree was passed was not arrayed as respondent. It was held that the appeal was not properly constituted and thus the decree passed by the Court below was held to be without jurisdiction.
11. ' In case reported as Shangara Singh v. Imam Din AIR 1940 Lah. 314 the facts were that a necessary party was not impleaded as respondent in the appeal. Subsequently, an application was made under Rule 20 of Order 41 to implead him as party by condoning the delay. It was held that as one of the necessary parties was not impleaded within limitation the appeal was incompetent; and it was dismissed.
12. ' In Jogesh Chandra Chakrabutty v. Bama Sundari Debi AIR 1917 Cal. 647 some of the defendants in a suit for joint possession were not impleaded as party in appeal on the ground that the appellant did not seek relief so far as their proportional share was concerned. It was held that appeal was not maintainable despite the fact that the appellants were prepared to forego their proportionate share, because the share of the parties who were not impleaded in the appeal could not be determined in their absence. The appeal was dismissed as being incompetent.
13. ' In case reported as Velammal v. Lakshmu Ammal AIR 1916 Mad. 828(2), a necessary party in suit for sale under Order 34, Rule I was knowingly omitted. It was held that decree passed in absence of necessary party cannot be allowed to stand and the same was set aside.
14. ' In case Teja Singh v. Kartar Kaur AIR 1937 Lah. 180, a declaration was made jointly in favour of some persons who had claimed the right, title and interest in the dispute but one of them was omitted to be impleaded as party in the appeal. It was held that appeal could not proceed against the other respondents inasmuch as the declaratory decree had become final in favour of the person who was not impleaded.
15. ' In case reported as Dwarikanath Par v. Krishna Barai AIR 1933 Cal. 464, a joint decree was passed in favour of two persons declaring the title of eight annas share as against another. In appeal only one of the joint decree-holders was arrayed as respondent. It was held that as joint decree was passed in favour of two plaintiffs declaring their title proportionally the appellant.
(a) Muhammadan Law--- ----Waqf---Waqf could not only be created by specific dedication, but annot challenge the decree in absence of one of the plaintiffs even only to the extent of four annas share. The appeal was held incompetent and was dismissed.
16. It may be pointed out that the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure fully apply to the writ proceedings. The respondents by filing the writ petition sought the annulment of the order passed by the Revenue Authorities. The order was in form of joint relief in favour of the appellants, herein, and Fazal Ellahi deceased, whose legal representatives were not impleaded in writ petition as respondents. Thus, it cannot be said that as the interest of Fazal Ellahi was identical to the rest of the respondents, his absence would not adversely affect the validity of the writ petition. As has been seen in the case-law cited above, a person who derives any benefit from an order is always a necessary party in the appeal or writ proceedings and in his absence no effective order can be passed or writ can be issued. Thus, we are of the opinion that the High Court has committed error in holding that as no interest had accrued to Fazal Ellahi as a result of the annulment of the mutation in favour of the appellants, he was not necessary party. The fact that he was one of the challengers to the mutation sanctioned in favour of the appellants which was cancelled by the Revenue Authorities, makes his legal representatives necessary parties in the writ proceedings and in their absence no effective writ could be issued.
17. ' Thus we uphold the preliminary objection, set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court as being without lawful authority. As the appeal stands disposed of on the ground indicated above, we need not go into other aspects of the case.