' By this common judgment I propose to dispose of these two appeals as common questions are involved therein and the respondents in the said appeals are also the same. In both the appeals the respective orders passed by the learned Fourth Senior Civil Judge and Rent Controller, Karachi West dated 24-11-1987 and 19-1-1989 respectively have been impugned.
' The facts of the case are that the respondents who are joint owners of the building known as "Masood Mansion" situated in Block-G, North Nazimabad, Karachi filed two separate applications seeking eviction of the appellants on the ground of default in payment of rent and personal bona fide requirement of the premises respectively in their possession. It has been alleged that the appellants had committed default in payment of rent from October, 1985 to January, 1987. The premises, according to the respondents, were also required by them for their personal need as the respondents who were husband and wife were sharing quarter No,77-D situated in Pakistan Quarters with the sister of respondent No,1. The accommodation in the said quarter was insufficient, and therefore, the respondents had been requested by their said sister to arrange for their own accommodation. Thereafter, the respondents requested the appellants to vacate the premises respectively in their possession who promised to vacate the same but subsequently went back on their promise. The family of the respondents, according to them, consisted of four school and college-going daughters, one son and an aged mother who was dependant on respondent No,1, besides the said respondents. It was further contended that the children of the respondents required separate study rooms and therefore, the need of the respondents was genuine. In the affidavitin-evidence by the respondent No,1 before the learned Controller, it was further clarified that the two flats each consisting of two rooms and three rooms respectively in possession of the appellants were adjacent to each other. The respondents examined Dr. Saeed Akhtar and Muhammad Moosa, nephew of respondent No,1 and the respondents' rent collector respectively who fully supported their case in respect of both the grounds urged in the eviction applications.
3. The appellants, on the other hand, filed their respective affidavits-in-evidence and also cross- examined the respondent No,1 and his witnesses. The case of the appellants, according to their respective pleadings, was that the accommodation already in possession of the said respondents was more than that available in the demised premises, and therefore, their need was not bona fide or in good faith. According to them, the premises in question, were also A not suitably located for shifting of the respondents and their family therein. As regards the allegation in respect of default, the case of the appellants was that they had been depositing rent in the Court through the miscellaneous rent cases respectively filed by them after the money orders respectively sent by them had been refused by the respondents. The said money orders covered rent up to the period ending June, 1987.
4. I have heard Mr. Naim-ur-Rehman and Mr. Ibrahim Pishori learned counsel appearing in F.R As.
Nos,14/88 and 22/89 respectively and Mr. Ali Muhammad Memon, learned counsel for the respondents in the two cases.
5. So far as the first ground in regard to the alleged default is concerned, admittedly, rent was deposited by the appellants in the Court after the said money orders had been refused which had been sent in the name of one Masood who was the son of the respondents. The explanation subsequently offered by the appellants was that they were not aware of the real name of the landlords since after the respondents had purchased the property in November, 1971, no intimation in this regard was sent by them to the appellants. The appellants were, therefore, misled by the name of the building and consequently they started depositing rent in the name of the appellants' son Masood, assuming that he was the landlord of the building. However, thereafter, the mistake was rectified after an order was passed by the learned Controller in this regard. Although, the learned Controller was not impressed by the said plea raised on behalf of the appellants and consequently, he has held that the appellants had committed wilful default but as is evident from the judgment, the learned Controller was influenced by the fact that the appellants had been paying rent regularly to the respondents since 1971. Consequently, he found it difficult to believe that the respondents had no knowledge in regard to the name of the landlord. Although the learned Contorller does not appear to be wholly incorrect in this regard but considering the fact that the appellants had actually parted with the rent the probability that they were misled by the name of the building cannot be ruled out. Admittedly, the respondents had failed to send an intimation in writing to the appellants in regard to the purchase of the property from its original owner. There also appears to be no controversy in regard to the fact that the rent was being collected from the appellants and other tenants through the respondents' rent collector and not by any of the respondents personally. Consequently, the mere fact that the appellants were paying rent to the respondents through the latter's rent collector since the purchase of the property in question since 1971 cannot render their plea doubtful. There being no definite evidence on the point, the appellant's plea in this regard should have been accepted by the learned Controller. Now, admittedly, if the deposit of rent by the appellants in the name of the said Masood is accepted as valid there would be no default in the payment of rent. Consequently, I find myself inclined to agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that no wilful default was committed by the appellants in payment of rent.
6. Turning now to the next plea in regard to personal bona fide need of the respondents, it has been vehemently argued by the learned counsel for the appellants that the evidence adduced on behalf of the respondents in this regard is not reliable. My attention was invited to the admissions made by respondent No,1 during his cross-examination as the respondents, in the first instance, had admitted to have purchased the building in 1971. He also admitted that after purchase of the building some new tenants had been accepted by him. The learned counsel also referred to an admission made by the said respondents' nephew Dr. Saeed Akhtar during his cross-examination that before the respondents had shifted to Quarter No,77-D in Pakistan Quarters they were residing in another house which they owned in Federal 'B' Area of Nazimabad. In the light of the aforesaid admission, it has been vehemently argued that the need of the respondents was not bona fide.
Reliance was also placed in this regard on the case of Associated Sales Agencies, Karachi v. The Standard Insurance Company Ltd. (1985 CLC 2419). In this case, the landlord had purchased the rented premises for its own occupation. However, a notice for ejectment was sent to the tenant after a lapse of three years from the date of the purchase of the building and ejectment application was filed after one year thereafter. It was held by a learned Single Judge of this Court that if the intention of the landlord was to occupy the premises immediately on purchase, it would not have waited for four years to take steps for ejectment of the tenant and consequently, it was held that the landlord had failed to establish its bona fides.
7. In my view, the facts of the case relied upon by the learned counsel are distinguishable. In the present case, the respondents had successfully established that they were residing with the sister of respondent No,1 in a quarter situated in Pakistan QurteRs, The accommodation there was not sufficient not only for the respondents and their family but also for the said respondents' sister who was a widow. It was further shown by the respondentsthat they had grown up school and college- going children who required sufficient accommodation not only for residential purposes but also for their studies. There is also no controversy on the point that the two flats in question are adjacent to each other and jointly they consisted of five rooms. As against this evidence, the stand taken by the respondents in their written statement was that the accommodation already in possession of the respondents was sufficient for their needs. No doubt, the respondent No,1 and his witness Dr. Saeed Akhtar made certain admissions in the cross-examination reference to which has earlier been made in this judgment but the said admissions even if they are regarded as admissions in favour of the appellants are hardly sufficient to rebut the case of the respondents, which has otherwise been established through the affidavit-in-evidence filed on their behalf. No doubt, it was admitted by the respondent No,1 that some new tenants had been inducted in the building after purchase of the same by the respondents but the same, in my opinion, can hardly render the respondents' bona fide doubtful because it is possible that the tenement at the time of the induction of the new tenant was not required by the respondents. It is not even clear from the evidence when such new tenant was inducted in the premises. No doubt, respondent No,1 had stated during the cross-examination that the building had been purchased by them for their personal need but again it cannot be said with certainty that such need had arisen to the respondents at the time of the purchase of the building. Respondent No,1 was sharing accommodation with his sister and it is quite possible that although the building was purchased by the respondents for their personal need but the need may not be urged at the time of the purchase of the building requiring taking of immediate steps for ejectment of the tenants therein.
The admission made by the respondents' witness Dr. Saeed Akhtar that the respondents had some other property in Federal 'B' Area or Nazimabad also does not appear to be sufficient to render the respondents' bona fides doubtful because neither it was the case of the appellants in their respective pleadings nor respondent No,1 himself was cross-examined on the point. Consequently. a mere statement made in this regard by the respondents' witness during his cross-examination cannot militate against the respondents' bona fides which otherwise appears to have been sufficiently established. The case relied upon by the appellants' counsel, reference to which has been earlier made in this judgment, is also distinguishable for the aforesaid reasons.
8. In the result, although, I am unable to agree with the learned Controller's findings on the question of default as pointed out earlier yet the findings of the learned Controller on the issue of personal requirement are clearly sustainable, therefore, these appeals are dismissed. However, by consent, four months' time is allowed to the appellants to vacate the demised premises. The parties are, however, left to bear their own costs.