1. ' Sole point for consideration in this petition under Article 199 of the Constitution was whether the appeal from the decision of the trial Court filed in the lower Court was rightly dismissed as barred by limitation on 28-4-1993, by learned Additional District Judge, Faisalabad.
2. ' Facts bearing on the point involved for decision were briefly these:-Respondent No,1 was wife of petitioner. She was married to him on 21-4-1979. En course of her pregnancy she was made to leave his house and gave birth to a laughter in her parents' house in or about December, 1980.
3. Name of the laughter was Mst. Samina Kauser. Petitioner gave divorce to respondent No,1. After birth of the daughter, he withdrew the divorce. Later he filed a suit for restitution of conjugal rights against her in the Family Court at Sahiwal. Correspondingly she instituted a suit for divorce against him in a Family Court at Faisalabad. Her suit was decreed by the Family Court. In consequence, suit for restitution of conjugal rights by the petitioner was dismissed at Sahiwal. Respondent No,1 also instituted a suit for maintenance for herself and the minor child against the petitioner. Petitioner who attended the hearing deposed that the claim for the maintenance of the minor girl was decreed against him at the rate of Rs, 150 per month and he was regularly paying maintenance amount in instalments. Presumably petitioner has taken a second wife. He runs a grocery shop at Sahiwal.
4. ' Respondent No,1 instituted a suit in forma pauperis for recovery of her articles of dowry or in the alternative, claimed Rs,42,000 as their present-day value. The suit was instituted in the Civil Court at Faisalabad, on 29-7-1981. Petitioner resisted the suit and joined issues with respondent No,1.
5. Pleadings gave rise to as many as six issues including that of relief. Upon taking evidence and its analysis the trial Court decreed the suit. for a sum of Rs, 35,000 in favour of respondent No,1 on 30- 9-1992. Petitioner preferrred an appeal from the decree of the trial Court before learned District Judge, Faisalabad, who entrusted it to a learned Additional District Judge Faisalabad. The appeal was dismissed as barred by limitation on 28-41993. Against this decision, a writ petition was filed in this Court. Since the decision was given in ordinary civil jurisdiction, a civil revision lies to this Court.
6. Instead, a writ petition was instituted. However, form of proceedings was immaterial. More material was the substance of the matter and that was whether the appeal filed in the lower Court was really barred by limitation. For decision of this point a few facts are necessary to be stated. The judgment and decree of the trial Court were dated 30-9-1992. An application for their certified copies was submitted to the Copying Agency on 1-10-1992. Copying Agency issued a receipt to the petitioner and gave the date as 7-10-1992 for preparation and delivery of the certified copies.
7. Aforesaid date was noted on the receipt given to the petitioner. However, delivery of certified copies was taken on 20-10-1992. Appeal was filed on 15-11-1992. Period prescribed for filing of appeal from the decree of the trial Court to District Court was thirty days. Time requisite for obtaining certified copies was required to be added to it. By Act XIII of 1991---Limitation (Amendment) Act, 1991, gazetted on 6th July, 1991, subsection (5) was added to section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1908. It runs "(5) For the purposes of subsections (2), (3) and (4), the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence, order, judgment or award shall be deemed to be the time intervening between the day on which an application for the copy is made and the day actually intimated to the applicant to be the day on which the copy will be ready for delivery".
8. Photo copy of the receipt given by the Copying Agency was on file of the lower Appellate Court. It showed that the Copying Agency had given 7-10-1992 as the date for the delivery of certified copies of judgment and decree. Period of limitation prescribed for appeal supplemented by the time requisite for obtaining certified copies of the judgment and decree expired nine days before the filing of the appeal in the lower appellate Court. Petitioner did not submit any application under section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 for condoning the delayed filing of the appeal. He submitted merely an application under section 12 of the Limitation Act. In it, he did not aver that he visited the Copying Agency for taking delivery of the certified copies of judgment and decree on the appointed date and he was put off by the Copying Agency to another date. For the first time a case of the type was narrated in the grounds of writ petition. It was merely a belated thought of the petitioner to overcome the difficulty created by his own act. Every day, the petitioner was required to explain after the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed for filing the appeal. There was no explanation given in this behalf. The receipt given to him spoke against him. Learned counsel submitted that the petitioner was an illiterate person. That was hardly a good ground to condone the delay. Majority of the litigants in our country suffered from this infirmity. Therefore, a rule for condonation of delay cannot be safely based on it. Law requires vigilance and does not countenance negligence or indolence. In the instant case petitioner was guilty of negligence. At the hearing, learned counsel requested for time to file an affidavit of a local counsel at Faisalabad to support the petitioner's averments in the writ petition that he had been visiting the Copying Agency. This course was a temptation for inviting possible falsehood. If the facts were true as stated, the petitioner could have given evidence of it in the lower appellate Court. It was in this view that I did not permit the petitioner an occasion for submitting an affidavit on the disputed subject.
9. It will be noted that even the copy of the receipt issued by the Copying Agency was neither annexed nor shown at the hearing. In absence of an acceptable explanation making out a sufficient cause delay of nine days could not be condoned. Upon this view of the matter, the impugned decision could not be termed as illegal or infirm. In view of the aforesaid, the petition has little substance in it. Consequently , it is dismissed in limine.