DECISION I propose to dispose of these two appeals by a common order as similar point is involved in both the appeals. The question for consideration is as to whether an appeal would lie against an order passed under section 47 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 (hereinafter called the Ordinance), granting permission to the respondent to dismiss the appellants. I have come to the conclusion that the orders passed under section 47 of the Ordinance are only decisions and not awards. 2. lt is important to consider the intention of the Legislature as to whether an order passed under section 47 of the Ordinance was appealable or not. In this connection, a reference may be made to section 37 of the West Pakistan Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1968 (hereinafter called the Ordinance of 1968). Section 47 of the Ordinance is almost similar to the provisions of section 37 of the Ordinance of 1968. The Legislature specifically provided under section 16(1) (c) of the Ordinance of 1968 that an order passed Under section 37 of the Ordinance of 1968 was appealable. Section 16(1) (c) of the Ordinance of 1968, runs as under:-- "(1) An appeal shall lie to the Tribunal-- (*)............................................ ........... (h) ...... (c) against a decision of the Court under section 26 or section 37, within thirty days of the announcement of the decision under clause {b) of subsection (1) of section 15, or its publication under subsection (3) of that section, as the case may be;
3. The Legislature being aware that an order under section 37 of the Ordinance of 1968, would be only a decision and not an award, specifically provided that an appeal would lie against such a decision.
On the other hand, subsection (3) of section 37 of the Ordinance does not provide any appeal against any decision of the Labour Court. Section 37(3) of the Ordinance runs as under:-- "Any party aggrieved by an award given under subsection (1) . . . may prefer an appeal to Labour Appellate Tribunal within 30 days of the delivery thereof and the decision of the Tribunal in such appeal shall be final." There is no provision in the above subsection that an appeal would lie against a decision of the Labour Court to the Tribunal. On the other hand, under section 37(4) of the Ordinance, all decisions of the Labour Court, other than awards, referred to in subsection (3) of section 37 of the Ordinance, shall be final and shall not be called in question in any manner by or before any Court or other authority.
4. The question, however, is as to whether an order refusing to grant permission to dismiss a workman can be said to be an award. An award is determination of an industrial dispute. Industrial dispute means, "any dispute or difference between employers and employers or between emloyers and workmen or between workmen and workmen, which is concerned with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or the conditions! of work of any person." Mere permission or refusal to dismiss a workman can-L not be said to be a dispute relating to employment or non-employment or thef terms of employment or the conditions of work of any person. The dispute before the Court was not about the employment or nomemployment, but only whether prima facie circumstances exist that the Court should accord permission to dismiss an office-bearer of the Union. The right of the employer to dismiss an employee on the ground of misconduct has been recognised under the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 (hereinafter called the Standing Orders Ordinance). Standing Orders Ordinance has put certain conditions, which the employer has to fulfil before he can dismiss a workman. A further safeguard has been made by the Legislature in case of office-bearers of Trade Unioa that the employer has to take permission before terminating their services. The intention of the Legislature appears to be that in case the Court were to refuse permission to dismiss an employee, the latter should not be again harassed by way of appeal.
Similarly, if the safeguard provided by the Legislature in case of office-bearers of the Union, has been fulfilled the employer should not be3 harassed by an appeal. In case, the workman has been dismissed against any provision of law, which safeguards his right there is always a remedy open to him under section 25-A of the Ordinance. I have come to the conclusion that mere permission to dismiss a workman cannot be said to be a dispute regarding employment or non-employment of a person. The dispute in an application under section 47 of the Ordinance can at best be said only this as to whether the employer has been able to make out a prima facie case for C termination of the services of a workman/ who is an office-bearer of the Trade Union. I dismiss these appeals as not maintainable.