' MAMOON KAZI, J.---The petitioners in these petitions who are members of the Agricultural Produce Market Committees have called in question the Notification dated 23-9-1990 whereby the Government of Sindh in the exercise of the powers vesting in it under section 33 of the Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1939 dissolved all the Market Committees in the Province of Sindh with immediate effect and specified the Assistant Directors, Bureau of Supply and Prices in the Province of Sindh as the Authorities for the purpose of subsection (2) of the said section in respect of the Market Committees in their respective Districts dissolved as aforesaid.
2. The main contention of the petitioners in both the said petitions is that the impugned action was taken by the Government without serving prior notice upon the petitioners in this regard and hence the action is violative of law and against the principles of natural justice.
3. The relevant provisions of the Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1939 are embodied in sections 7, 8, 10, 13 and 33 thereof which are as follows:-- "7. Establishment of Market Committees.---The Government shall by notification establish a market committee for every notified market area.
8. Constitution of the Committee.---(1) A market committee shall consist of ten or eighteen members as Government may in each case determine.
(2) Of these members some may be appointed by Government, from amongst the salaried servants of the State by virtue of his office.
(3) The remaining members shall be appointed by Government in the manner provided hereunder, that is to say--
(a) if the committee is to consist of 10 members, there shall be appointed---
(i) five members from growers of the notified market area,
(ii) three members from persons carrying on business in agricultural produce including the business as broker, weighman, measurer or surveyor, and
2. (iii) one member from amongst the consumers to be nominated by the Deputy Commissioner from amongst the members of the council or councils constituted under the Sindh Local Government Ordinance, 1979, having jurisdiction in the notified market areas," and
3. (b) If the committee is to consist of eighteen members, there shall be appointed---
4. (i) nine members from growers of the notified market area.
5. (ii) six members from persons carrying on business in agricultural produce including the business as broker, weighman, measurer or surveyor, and
6. (iii) two members from amongst the consumers to be nominated by the Deputy Commissioner preferably from amongst the members of the council or councils constituted under the Sindh Local Government Ordinance, 1979, having jurisdiction in the notified market area."
(4) Omitted.
(5) Omitted.
(6) No act done by the committee shall be called into question on the ground merely of the existence of any vacancy in, or any defect in the constitution of the committee.
10. Period of office of members.---Subject to the provisions of section 13, every member shall hold office for a period of three years from the date of his appointment and if, when such period expires, no person has been appointed to succeed him, such member shall, unless the Government otherwise directs, continue to hold office until his successor is appointed.
13. Filling of vacancies.---If through death, resignation, transfer, residence outside the province, inability to act as a member of the committee or removal in accordance with the provisions of section 11 any vacancy occurs, Governor may appoint a member to fill such vacancy in accordance with the provisions of section 8: ' Provided that the term of office of the members so appointed shall expire on the same date as the term of office of the vacating member would have expired had the latter held office for the full period allowed under section 10 unless there be delay in appointing a new member to succeed the member first mentioned above, in which case it shall expire on the date on which his successor is appointed by the Government.
33.Dissolution.---(1) Government may, after inviting objections from public dissolve by notification in the official Gazette any market committee from such date as may be specified in the Notification.
(2) From the said date all properties, funds and dues which were immediately before the said date vested in or realizable by the Market Committee shall vest in and be realizable by Government or such authority as may be specified in the said notification, and all liabilities which immediately before the said date were enforceable against the market committee shall be assumed by, and be enforceable against, Government or the aforesaid authority, as the case may be."
' So far as C.P. No.D-385/91 is concerned, learned counsel for the respondents and the learned Additional Advocate-General have invited our attention to the order of this Court, dated 22-5-1991 which shows that the status quo order earlier passed in favour of the petitioners was modified to the extent that permission was granted to the Sindh Government to proceed in accordance with the provisions of section 10 of the Act during the pendency of the said petition. As is evident from the provisions of section 10 just reproduced by us in this judgment, it provides for a fixed term of three years during which a member of a Market Committee can hold office. The said section authorises the Government to appoint his successor after the expiry of the said term unless the Government otherwise directs, in which case he may continue to hold office until his successor is appointed. Section 10, as is evident, from the said section, is subject to the provisions of section 13 of the aforesaid Act which refers to filling of vacancies which may occur on account of death, resignation, transfer etc. of a member. Learned counsel have invited our attention to a Notification dated 2-11-1991 issued by the Government of Sindh while purporting to act under sections 7, 8 and 10 of the aforesaid Act which prima faice appears to have been issued after the said order was passed by the Division Bench of this Court dated 22-5-1991. Admittedly, this Notification has neither been impugned by the petitioners nor any effort was made to seek amendment of the present Constitutional Petition by the petitioners. Mr. Jhamat Jethanand has raised an objection that this Notification violates the order passed by the Division Bench dated 22-5-1991 as even a new Chairman has been appointed by the Market Committee. We would like to point out that on the face of the Notification nothing can be spelt out therefrom to indicate that the order of this Court was violated. As is evident from the said order, permission was granted to the Government to proceed in accordance with the provisions of section 10 of the said Act and apparently the Notification appears to have been issued under the said provision of law. Admittedly, the term of office for the members, according to section 10, is three years and thereafter, the Government has power to appoint new. members. As we have just pointed out the Notification ex facie does not appear to be violative of the order of this Court and the same shows that new members have been appointed by the Government. In our opinion, C.P.C. No.D-385/91 has therefore, become infructuous. When Mr. Jhamat Jethanand was confronted with this position, although, he tried to advance some irrelvant arguments but we are satisfied that the learned counsel has no satisfactory explanation to offer.
4. So far as the merits of the case are concerned, section 33 of the said Act empowers the Government to dissolve by Notification in the official Gazette any market committee from such date as may be specified in the Notification. No doubt, section 33 provides for invitation of objections from public before a notification dissolving any market committee is issued by the Government and Mr. Jhamat Jethanand has argued that no proper notice was published in any newspaper by the Government inviting objections from the public as contemplated by section 33.
Although the learned counsel is correct because it is not the case of the respondents that such a notification had been published in any newspaper but nevertheless a copy of the Notification has been filed by the petitioners themselves alongwith the petition which shows that such objections had been invited by the Government by a Notification published in the official Gazette. Mr. Jhamat Jethanand has argued that publication of Notification in the official Gazette cannot constitute sufficient compliance with the requirements of section 33 but we would like to point out that no specific method for invitation of objections from the public has been provided for in section 33. The section simply requires inviting of objections from the public before dissolution of a market committee and when no method is provided for in the said section or in the said Act then, in our opinion, it is left to the Government to itself choose the method by which objections are to be invited from the public. Since objections were invited through a Notification in the official Gazette, the same, in our opinion, constitutes sufficient compliance with the provisions of section 33.
Consequently, the impugned Notification cannot be struck down simply on the ground that it had failed to comply with the requirements of section 33 of the said Act.
5. The next contention raised in the petition is that no notice was served upon the petitioners before issuance of the said Notification and therefore, the action was violative of the principles of natural justice. No doubt, the principle embodied in the maxim of audi alteram partem has been recognized by our Courts and no action can be taken to the deteriment of any person without first giving him a show-cause notice but in the present case, admittedly, the petitioners were not holding any office of profit. The scheme of the said Act also indicates that no such notice has been provided for as a condition precedent before taking of action by the Government under section 33 of the said Act. Furthermore, the appointment of the petitioners as members of the Market Committee was for such period as provided for in section 10 of the said Act. Consequently, if such period as provided in section 10 had expired, the petitioners did not have any vested right in the said office so as to demand their continuance as members of the Committees even after the expiry of such term. It is, therefore, clear that neither the respondents were bound to allow the petitioners to continue in office even after the expiry of their term of office nor the action taken by the respondents appears to be in violation of any law, the reasons for which have just been enumerated by us in this judgment.
6. In the result, we find no force in these petitions and the same are dismissed. The parties are left to bear their own costs.