' MUHAMMAD HUSSAIN ADIL KHATRI, J.---Briefly the facts are that the appellant was inducted as tenant in respect of Flat No,17, Habib Centre, Liaquat Colony, Hyderabad on monthly rent of Rs,450 excluding electricity charges, by one Haji Razzaq Janoo. The rent application was filed by the said owner against the appellant on 1-3-1979 for his eviction under section 15 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance (XVII of 1979) on the ground that the appellant had failed to pay rent from March, 1978 and a sum of Rs,550 was due and payable on account of electric charges till November, 1978.
2, In the written statement filed by the respondent it was denied that the rent was Rs,450 per month. According to the appellant the rent was Rs,125 per month. It was further pleaded by him that he had paid Rs,6,900 to the original landlord when he was inducted as tenant, out of which Rs,500 was fixed deposit, Rs,400 was deposited towards Sui Gas burner and Rs,6,000 was paid as advance rent for four years at the rate of Rs,125 per month from February, 1978. It is further alleged that the previous owner had demanded the enhanced rent and on refusal of the appellant to accede to such unjustifed demand, the rent proceedings were commenced to coerce the appellant to enhance the rent. With regard to electricity charges it was stated that the previous landlord did not send bill of electricity consumed so that the said charges could be paid according to sub-meter reading. On 23-104979, the learned Rent Controller passed order directing the appellant to deposit arrears of rent from March, 1978 to October, 1979 at the rate of Rs,125 per month and future rent at the said rate on or before 15th of each succeeding month.
3. During pendency of the aforesaid rent application the property was purchased by the present respondents, who are the son and daughters of the said Haji Razaq Janoo, under the registered sale-deed. After purchase of the property, the respondents served notice under section 18 of the said Ordinance, on --appellant and then filed application for substitution of their names in the rent application, as applicants in place of the said owner. The Rent Controller by his order, dated 13-3- 1980 dismissed the said application of the respondents on the ground that after sale of the property by the previous owner the rent application filed by him had become infructuous. The respondent filed F.RA. No,419 of 1980 in this Court which was allowed by judgment dated 10-8-1983.
4. On 15-3-1983, the respondents filed an application under section 16(2) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, praying that the defence of the appellant be struck off, as he had failed to comply with the order passed by the learned Rent Controller. The learned Rent Controller called for report of the Nazir which disclosed that the appellant had deposited a sum of Rs,3. 300 from 13- 12-1979 to 9-3-1980 and no rent was deposited thereafter. The learned Rent Controller after hearing the parties struck off the defence of the appellant by order dated 30-3-1988, which has been assailed in this appeal.
5. I have heard Mr. Hakim Ali Siddiqui, learned Advocate for the appellant and Mr. Abdul Sattar Kazi, for the respondents.
6. The learned Advocate for the appellant has contended that order, dated 23-10-1979, directing the appellant to deposit rent in favour of previous owner, had ceased to be operative with effect from 13-3-1980 when the Rent Application No,120 of 1979 filed by the previous owner was dismissed on sale of the property by him and that his defence could not be struck off for non compliance of such order. It was further submitted by him that in any event the respondent cannot take advantage of the order, dated 23-10-1979 as it was passed on the application of the previous owner and the present respondent had not filed any application, seeking direction for deposit of rent. Learned counsel relied upon (i) Riazul Hassan v. Muhammad Khaleeq Siddiqui 1986 CLC 1554,
(ii) Mst. Shamim Akhtar v. Mst. Insha Allah Begum 1981 CLC. 1072, (iii) Muhammad Ilyas v. Hafiz Abdul Malik 1988 M LD 1027 and (iv) Abdul Ghafoor v. Ahmed Kunhi PLD 1969 SC 424.
7. In the first case it was observed by the learned Judge of this Court that in the application filed under section 16(2) of the said Ordinance, it was alleged that the tenant had failed to deposit the monthly rent, but the particulars of arrears were neither given in the application, nor in the affidavit filed in support thereof. The report of the Nazir did not show the date of arrears of the deposit and moreover, the Rent Controller had allowed the appellant/tenant adjustment of the rent deposited by him but the final order, whereby the defence was struck off, was silent in this regard. For above reasons the order passed by the learned Rent Controller striking off the defence of the tenant/appellant was set aside. In so far as the present case is concerned, it is admitted fact that no rent was deposited after 9-3-1980 till the date of impugned order. As it appears, no rent has been deposited till the date of hearing of this appeal, in spite of order passed by this Court on 27- 2-1989. The above authority does not in any manner advance the case of the appellant who has continuously avoided to deposit future rent. The last three cases cited by the learned counsel for the appellant are on the proposition that the rent order containing directions for deposit of rent, is in the nature of interlocutory order which on termination of the case merges in the final order.
9. It is settled law that interlocutory order merges in the final order, whereby the rent case is terminated either on decision on merits or default, and in such eventuality the tentative or interlocutory order does not continue to be operative. In so far as the case in hand is concerned, no doubt the rent case was dismissed on 13-3-1980, but the order of dismissal of the rent case was set aside by this Court and the rent proceedings were resurrected. With the revival of the proceedings, the interlocutory order, dated 23-10-1979 also became operative. The default committed from 13-3- 1980 when the rent application was dismissed, till 12-10-1983 when the order of dismissal was reversed by this Court, may not invite punitive consequences envisaged under section 16(2) of the Ordinance, but after revival of the said order the appellant was under an obligation to deposit the rent of the said period also and his failure to deposit the said rent on revival of the proceedings, for the said period or future rent in terms of the order under section 16(1) of the Ordinance, will make him liable to have his defence struck off.
10. In Muhammad Saleh v. Muhammad Shafi 1982 SCM R 33 their Lordships have laid down the law in very clear terms that when the ejectment proceedings were restored by the learned Rent Controller, the order for depositing monthly rent, also stood revived with retrospective effect and as such non-compliance with the same rendered petitioners' defence liable to be struck off.
' Reference in this regard may also be made to Annis Ahmed Rushdi v. Zulekha Begum and 9 others 1984 CLC 748.
' The learned counsel for the appellant did not cite any authority or rule of law to the contrary.
' In this case it seems that no rent has been deposited by the appellant after 9-3-1980 as no receipts were produced. Neither it has been averred in the memo. of appeal that the appellant had been depositing rent in Court, nor it was so contended by the learned counsel of the appellant at the time of hearing of this appeal.
11. It may be noted that the rent was claimed at the rate of Rs,450 per month, by the previous landlord, but the appellant contended that the rate of rent was Rs,125 per month and the learned Rent Controller passed the tentative rent order in consonance with appellant's plea. He even then persisted in committing default.
12. I, therefore, find no merit in this appeal and the same is dismissed hereby. The appellant is allowed two months' time to hand over the vacant possession of the premises in question to the respondent, subject to the condition that he deposits all the arrears of rent in this Court within seven days from the date of announcement of this judgment.