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1975 SCMR 74

Mistri AHMED DIN vs MUHAMMAD MUNIR

Citation1975 SCMR 74
CourtSupreme Court of Pakistan
Case No.Civil Petition for Special Leave to Appeal No, 457 of 1973
Date1974-06-12
Judge(s)Hamoodur Rahman, Muhammad Gul
ResultPetition dismissed

1. ' MUHAMMAD GUL, J.-This leave petition is from the order of a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court, dated 8-10-1973 and raises the question whether a landlord who is a transferee of the property under Act XXVIII of 1958 can charge rent on the basis of the latest assessment by a Municipal Committee or a local authority without having recourse to the provisions of section 9 of West Pakistan Ordinance VI of 1959. The learned Judge answered the question in the affirmative, against which the tenant now seeks leave to appeal.

2. ' Muhammad Munir, the respondent herein and two others were transferred by the Settlement Authorities, the premises in dispute. A joint P.T.O. Was issued in their favour and they gave notice to the petitioner, who admittedly was in possession of the shop prior to its transfer in their favour.

3. Later the other two co-transferees, transferred their respective shares in the premises to Muhammad Munir respondent. Subsequent to the transfer in his favour by the other two transferees, the respondent gave a fresh notice under ' section 30 of 1958 Act to the appellant, claiming rent at the rate of Rs, 150 p.m. In accordance with the latest assessment. On appeal by the appellant, the assessed rent was reduced to Rs, 80 p.m. On the petitioner's failure to make the payment, the respondent applied under section 13 of the 1959 Ordinance for the ejectment of the petitioner. The petitioner raised a number of preliminary objections about the competency of the application of ejectment. These were overruled by order dated 4-6-1972 and the petitioner was directed to deposit arrears of rent from 4-10-1968 to 13-6-1972 at the rate of Rs, 80 p.m.

4. ' An appeal by the petitioner against the order requiring him to deposit the arrears of rent as aforesaid was dismissed by the District Judge on 13-12-1972. It appears that the only point agitated before the learned District Judge was that no valid notice under section 30 of the 1958 Act was issued to the petitioner. The learned District Judge found that the last notice dated 6-7-1968 (Exh.

5. D. 1) issued by the respondent was perfectly valid.

6. ' In the High Court the petitioner raised a new point namely that the respondent-landlord cannot charge rent on the basis of the latest assessment, unless the requirement of section 9 of Ordinance VI of 1959 is satisfied. The section provides inter alia that a landlord can increase the rent "subject to the approval of the Controller" even if such increase be in consequence of a fresh rate, cess or tax levied in respect of a rented premises, provided that the increase in the rent shall in no case exceed one-half of the existing rate of rent. The learned Single Judge repelled the objection taken by the petitioner on the ground that the relationship between the parties is entirely governed by section 30 of 1968 Act, which, by virtue of section 36 ibid shall have overriding effect notwithstanding any other law to the contrary. The first proviso to subsection (1) of section 30 expressly makes it lawful for the transferee of the property to charge rent on the basis of the "latest assess ment carried out by a Municipality or a local authority". The provisions of the section are not hedged by any further condition that the increase in rent should also have the approval of the Rent Controller before it becomes chargeable by the landlord. In reaching that conclusion, the learned Singl Judge relied upon a judgment of this Court in Ahmad Khan v. Sakina Bibi (1). The view taken by the learned Single Judge is unexceptionable.

7. ' Accordingly, there is no merit in this petition which is hereby dismissed.

(1) 1969 SCMR 435

Cited by 2 cases

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