DECISION This is an appeal against an award of the learned Presiding Officer of Sind Labour Court No. V, Karachi, dated February 28, 1973, whereby the learned Labour Court accepted 15 of the demands with some modifications, out of 33 demands, raised by the Zelin Limited Employees* Union (hereinafter called the Union). The facts necessary for the disposal of the appeal are these. 2.
On 5th October 1972, the Union served a charter of demands under section 26(1) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, (hereinafter called the Ordinance). Thereafter, the Union gave a strike notice on 31st October 1972, to Messrs Zelin Limited (hereinafter called the appellant). Conciliation proceedings failed. The Union filed an application under section 32(1-A) of the Ordinance for adjudication on 32 demands.
3. In reply to the application under section 32(1-A) of the Ordinance, the appellant contended in the first place that the Union was not the Collective Bargaining Agent within the meaning of the Ordinance* In the 1 *75 433second place, it was contended that the General Secretary of the Union was not a workman and, therefore, he could not be a member of the Union. On merit of the demands, it was stated by the appellant that their financial position was not such because of the loss of their assets from two Branch Offices situated in Bangla Desh to bear the burden of the demands raised by the Union. It was also stated that the employees of their concern were enjoying all the benefits, amenities and facilities conferred by law. Lastly, it was stated that the Union having realised the unreasonableness of their demands, did not press the same. It is only a disgruntled officer of the Company, who is now trying to exploit the Trade Union for his own benefit 3. On behalf of the Union, Mr. Nasir Mirza, General Secretary of the Union, filed an affidavit, who was also cross-examined. The appellant being of the view that the respondent-Union having not given any evidence in justification of their demands, it was not necessary for them to lead any evidence that the demands were unreasonable.
4. The learned Labour Court granted, with some modifications, 15 of the demands raised by the respondent-Union. The Court did not give any reason for rejecting the rest of the demands.
5. Mr. M. A. Khan, the learned Representative for the appellant, raised two preliminary objections. In the first place, the learned Representative contended that the Union was not the Collective Bargaining Agent. In the second place, he contended that the General Secretary of the Union was not a workman.
6. So far as the first contention is concerned, namely, that the Union was not the Collective Bargaining Agent, Mr. Khan contended that there had been no proof that the Trade Union has as its members not less than one- third of the total number of workmen employed in the establishment. It is true, if there is only one Trade Union, it would be the Collective Bargaining Agent only if it has as its members not less than one-third of the total number of workmen employed in the establishment. It is, however, a question of fact as to whether the members of the Union were one-third of the total number of workmen employed or not. This point should have been raised not at the stage of arguments, but in the written statement filed by the Management. I have gone through the written statement of the Management. It has not raised this question specifically. In that view of the matter, the Union was not bound to lead evidence that its members were not less than one-third of the total number of workmen employed in the establishment. I would hold that the Union is the Collective Bargaining Agent.
7. Mr. M. A. Khan, the leamed Representative for the appellant, did not press his contention as to whether the General Secretary was a workmen or not. I therefore, need not consider it.
8. In order to appreciate the contention of Mr. M. A. Khan, the leamed Representative for the appellant that the award is based on no evidence, it would be useful to reproduce the conclusions of the leamed Labour Court, while accepting 15 of the demands with some modifications. The relevant portion of the award runs as under: "The perusal of the charter of demands shows that some of the demands are reasonable. The respondent has been denying the simple legal facilities to the workmen to their disadvantage to fill in only their coffers. They have a vast business scattered all over the country, and they enjoy the profits all alone, without sharing the same wit their own workers, by whose efforts they have been carrying on their business. The respondent's objection that the Union has not proved their demands does not hold any water. The applicants* Union has filed the charter of demands and given affidavit to that effect. The facts show that the respondent-Company was not prepared to hold talks or accede to anything. It was thus due to stubborn attitude of the Management that no conciliation could be made. For the above reasons the application of the Union is accepted with regard to the following reasonable demands and the Management should make efforts to implement the same."
9. On the face of it the reasons leading to the grant of the demands are based on mere surmise and conjecture. The learned Labour Court has not given any reason, which may lead one to the conclusion that the Management was denying simple legal facilities to the workmen to fill in their own coffers. There is also no evidence for the conclusion that the Management has vast business scattered all over the country and enjoying profits all alone. 10.
Mr. Nasir Mirza, the General Secretary of the Union has filed his affidavit in support of the charter of demands. Oie affidavit runs in nine paragraphs. Paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4, deal with the rebuttal of the contention of the Management that Mr. Nasir Mirza is not a workman, paragraphs 5, 6, 7 and 8, are of general nature. These paragraphs do not touch the merit of the demands raised by the Union. It would be useful to reproduce these four paragraphs. They run as under: (5) That the respondents did not suffer any serious set-back because of unstable and uncertain conditions.
Moreover, such conditions prevailed throughout the country and yet many industrial and commercial establishments paid bonus and afforded other amenities to workmen. (6) That! the losses respondents claimed to have suffered in Muslim Bengal are imaginary. The respondents representative in East Pakistan anticipated the trouble, and returned to Karachi much before the trouble but after he had disposed of all assets. The respondents have rewarded him by appointing him as Branch Manager of their Lahore Office. (7) That Companies which have suffered much more losses in Muslim Bengal than the imaginary losses of the respondents have paid bonus and afforded other facilities to workmen. (8) That in the 25 years they have been in existence, the respondents have never paid bonus or afforded facilities to workmen in spite of continuous profits.
The respondents arbitrarily discontinued a Provident Fund Scheme which they had initially introduced."
11. On proper analysis of the above parapraphs, it appears that paragraphs 5, 7 and 8, relate to the payment of bonus, while paragraph 6, relates to the loss that the Management may have suffered in East Pakistan. It may be mentioned at once that no bonus except incentive bonus was the subject-matter of the charter of demands. At best paragraph 6, therefore, would only establish that the Management did not suffer any loss in East Pakistan. This, however, can be no basis for grant of various demands.
12. It would be appropriate, having reproduced the reasons of the learned Labour Court and the affidavit of the General Secretary of the Union. 435 to reproduce the observations of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, in the case of Sul Gas Transmission Company Limited (1). It runs as under: "The above analysis of the findings shows that the Tribunal did not deal with the matter before it in the manner expected of a functionary exercising judicial power. Its approach to questions covered by the demands 8, 18, 24 and 49 was that of a benevolent despot, while in respect of Khurshid Ahmad (Demand No. 4) jurisdiction was clutched and a conclusion was reached on some vague impressions and not on the evidence. It is true that a Tribunal dealing with an industrial dispute is not a Court in the sense that it is strictly bound by the rules of evidence but that does not mean that it can act on mere conjecture and its own peculiar ideas of social justice. It is obligatory on its part to act within the jurisdiction and according to the law applicable to the matter in dispute."
13. Mr. Shahani, the learned Representative for the respondent-Union, put forward an astounding proposition that the Union was not required under the Industrial Relations Ordinance to do anything more than to put forward its demands. The burden lay on the Management to prove that the Union was not entitled to the demands that it had raised.
14. Under clause (a) of subsection (5) of section 35 of the Ordinance a Labour Court has to adjudicate and determine an industrial dispute which has been brought before it. The very concept of adjudication and deter* mination of a dispute implies that the Court has to decide the matter in issue on evidence led before it. Though a Labour Court may not be bound to follow strictly the rule of evidence, but it has got to follow the generally principles on which the dispute has to be determined. It cannot ignore the fact that it is for the party, who wants to change the contract of service, to lead evidence, to make out a case as to why the Court should change the contract of service and grant better conditions of service. It was for the Union to name any comparable concern where the facilities and the demands which it had raised were being granted.
15. It has been the practice of Labour Courts based on sound principle of administration of justice that a Union which has raised demands must lead B evidence to justify the same. In this connection, Mr. M. A. Khan cited some of the cases of the Labour Courts, which is not necessary to mention. I6.
Some of the demands that have been granted by the learned Labour Court are fantastic. In this connection, I may mention a few of the demands granted by the learned Labour Court. The learned Labour Court granted the following demand: "Annual increments should be automatic and without any ceiling and should not be less than 20% of the total emoluments." I do not know of any concern which allows increments at the rate of 20 % of the total emoluments and without any ceiling. If the demand granted by the Court was given effect, however, prosperous the concern may be it will fall in two to three years* time. Similarly, if the various leave granted by the leamed Labour Court was given effect to the workers of the Company would be on leave for 256 days in a year and would work only for 3 months and 19 days. The Court has ordered the Company to give financial loans to its employees to construct their houses on furnishing security. This was done (1) 1960PLC80 without any evidence of comparable concerns where such loans were granted. Similarly, the Court ordered the company to allow the employees to purchase goods imported or manufactured by the company at substantially concessional prices. '
17. The basic role of the Labour Court is not to have a bias for capitalist or for labour, but to dispense justice according to law and its own conscience in the light of the evidence and the circumstances made out by the parties. The purpose of Industrial law and the object of Industrial justice can at best be said to establish a balance between the interests of the workers and those of the owners of the industry, so that harmony of the relations may be achieved. The Court, however, cannot help to achieve this object without evidence. Any conclusion arrived at without evidence is likely to do more harm than good to the workers. A relief granted to the workers without any evidence may raise certain hopes which may be ultimately frustrated by appeals or through writ.
18. For the reasons given above, I would set aside the award of the leamed Presiding Officer of the Labour Court, dated 28th February 1973.