1. ' This appeal has been preferred against the decision of the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Peshawar dated 19-9-1990 whereby the grievance petition of the respondent filed under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance was accepted and consequently the order of his dismissal from service was set aside and he was reinstated in service with all back benefits and wages.
2. ' The dispute between the parties as narrated in the grievance petition and amassed from the evidence and documents on record was that the petitioner was employed on 31-10-1988 by the previous contracting company known as M/s. Begrani Brothers. In December, 1988 the period of the contract, of the said company expired and the present appellant succeeded in obtaining the contract. The duties which the petitioner was required to perform included the checking of the vehicles and looking after the same, helping the cook, to operate the electricity generator, water supplying motors and other equipments installed in the premises. It was alleged that the appellant was also a commercial establishment and used to provide security and management services to those needing these services and the respondent was preforming his duties under the appellant in U.S. Consulate at Peshawar. The respondent described his record as unblemished and that nobody either from the previous management or from the appellant had ever complained against him but he expressed the grievance that without issuing of any show-cause notice, charge-sheet or holding any enquiry his services were terminated. In these circumstances the dismissal order was described as violative of the relevant law and without lawful authority. In the written statement the classification of the respondent as a workman was denied and it was averred that the nature of his duties was such that he could not be categorised as a workman under Standing Orders Ordinance, Industrial Relations Ordinance or any labour law. The jurisdiction of the Labour Court in the matter was challenged and it was stated that the appellant organization is not covered by section 2(ix) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance and that the function of the appellant was confined only to provide security services.
3. ' Petitioner-respondent appeared as his own witness, supported the contents of the petition and brought on record copy of his appointment letter Exh. P.W.1/1, Certificate from one Mr. John Kincunnon an officer of the American Consulate showing his service as "irreproachable and satisfactory", copy of the termination order as Exh. P.W.1/3 and grievance notice Exh. P.W.1/4. On the other side the appellant examined Major (Retired) Imtiaz-ulHaq, Executive Vice-President as R.W.-1 who deposed that the appellant establishment was created in 1987 and it is a private security company which provides protection to the life and property of its clients. It was also stated that the respondent was employed as security guard and in view of the nature of his duty he could not be called as a workman.
4. ' The learned Labour Court held the respondent as a workman on the strength of the rule laid down in two judgments of the Supreme Court reported as PLD 1988 SC 180 and PLD 1986 SC 103 and it also declared the appellant establishment as industry covered by the definition as given in section 2
(ix) read with section 2(xiv) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance.
5. ' The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the respondent being employed as security guard was not a workman either in terms of the Industrial Relations Ordinance or Standing Orders Ordinance and that the reliance by the Labour Court on the mentioned Supreme Court judgments was misplaced. This argument is devoid of substance even if it is presumed that the respondent's duty was limited to check the vehicles and guard the premises as the rule laid down in PLD 1988 SC 180 is to the effect "S.2(i) & S.0.12(3)-- Security Guard of an establishment whether covered by S.2(i)--Test for determining the question whether an employee was a workman within the meaning of S.2(i)."
6. ' It is difficult to give a fixed connotation to the duties performed by a person employed as a Security Guard by an establishment. Obviously different employers may assign particular types of security duties to their Security Guards. No general rule can, therefore, be laid down in this behalf. In any case the very idea of a Security Guard involves the notion that the person entrusted with this work is employed principally to protect the staff, installations and buildings of an establishment, so that if an intruder or an unauthorised person enters upon the premises or does an illegal act, the Security Guard is required to intercept such a person and prevent him from doing mischief even by use of force if the occasion so demands. This being the principal duties in view for the appointment of such a person, the fact that no occasion has arisen or such occasions do occur rarely will be no ground to change the nature of his work".
7. ' It is thus clear that if a trespasser, intruder attempts to forcibly either enter himself in the premises or drives in without permission any vehicle in the area under the watch of a guard then naturally he is to physically resist such interference as otherwise it cannot be done by mere verbal entreaty/request unless manual labour is employed or hands are used.It has been repeatedly held in many judicial pronouncements that the nature of work to be performed by a workman is to be kept in view and not his designation of the post/job while determining as to whether a particular employee is a workman or otherwise.
8. ' It was next submitted that even if the respondent is held to be a workman even then the termination order having been passed in terms of section 12(iii) of Standing Orders Ordinance was legally correct. This statement will also hold no good as the termination order reads: "This Company provides Security Coverage to diplomats and foreign nationals in Pakistan which makes this job of great responsibility and sensitive in nature. Your services during the last few months have been reported to be unsatisfactory. Since safety of life and property of our clients is of supreme importance to us we, therefore, cannot take chances with guards of unsatisfactory performance".
9. This clearly shows that removal of the respondent from service was with stigma and disgrace and as such the case would be covered by Standing Order 15(iv) of Standing Orders Ordinance. In that case the procedure provided for in the later provision was to be adopted and as it has not been done in this case, therefore, the dismissal order is bad in law. It was lastly submitted that the appellant had no place to accommodate the respondent and, therefore, he cannot be trusted on them. This argument overlooks the reason for dismissal as it is not on this reason that the dismissal from service of the respondent has been ordered.
10. ' For the above reasons there is no merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed with costs.