DECISION This is an appeal against an award of the learned Presiding Officer of Sind Labour Court No. II, Karachi, dated June 14, 1973, whereby the learned Labour Court ordered the respondent to be re-instated and paid six months wages at the rate of the last pay drawn by him. The facts giving rise to the appeal briefly put are these.
2. Abdul Aziz, the respondent, was employed as a Machine Operator by the appellant-company. He was charge-sheeted on 11th May 1972, for misconduct, inasmuch as, he disobeyed the order of his superior and had assaulted the Proprietor, Seth Mohammad Yousuf. The respondent replied to the charge-sheet on 12th May 1972. The Company did not accept the explanation offered by the respondent. An enquiry was held into the charges on 17th May 1973. The respondent was directed to appear before the Enquiry Officer by a letter dated 13th May 1972, but he refused to participate in the enquiry, which was held in the factory premises.
The enquiry was held ex parte. The respondent, however, was again sent another letter dated 18th May 1972, calling upon him to show cause why he should not be dismissed from service. He replied to that letter on 26th May 1972. The respondent, as would appear from the letter dated 29th May 1972, was found guilty after enquiry of the charges levelled against him, but instead of dismissing him from service, the Company terminated his services and sent a cheque for Rs. 941.25, against one month's wage in lieu of notice, gratuity for six years and earned wages.
3. It was contended before the learned Labour Court that the respondent was illegally suspended from service for an indefinite period. The learned Presiding Officer, however, came to the conclusion, on production of a letter Exh. R-8, that he was suspended only for 4 days. In the next place, it was contended before the learned Labour Court that the respondent did not receive the letter calling upon him to appear in the enquiry. The learned Labour Court came to the conclusion that the appellant bad been sent such a letter at the address where admittedly, he had been receiving letters addressed to him. The learned Labour Court, therefore, came to the conclusion that the respondent must have received the letter calling upon him to appear in the enquiry.
4. I find, on the record of the case, that the respondent was served with the charge-sheet and he had also given a reply thereto, which is dated 12th May 1972.
5. The learned Labour Court accepted the contention of the learned Representative of the respondent that the workman found guilty of miscondnct can only be dismissed from service or awarded other punishment mentioned in Clause (2) of Standing Order 15 of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 (hereinafter called the Standing Orders Ordinance), but his services cannot be termintated. The learned Labour Court came to the following conclusion :-- "Therefore, the respondent clearly acted in contravention of the provisions of Standing Order 15 by terminating the services of the applicant under Standing Order l2, when he was found guilty of misconduct. No reason is given either in the Reply Statement of the respondents or the affidavit of Seth Mohammad Yousuf as to why the dismissal of the applicant was converted into termination of services,*'
6. There is no cross-appeal by the respondent in respect of the finding of the learned Labour Court against him. I have, therefore, to primarily consider the question as to whether a person who has been charge-sheeted and found guilty of misconduct can be leniently dealt with, instead of being dismissed from service. Mr. Rashid, the learned Representative for the respondent, contended in the first place, that the Domestic Enquiry was not fair, inasmuch as, the respondent was not given an opportunity to participate in the same. It may be mentioned at the very outset that the respondent had not challenged the finding of the learned Labour Court in respect of the Domestic Enquiry. I am, however, satisfied that the respondent was given the charge-sheet. He was also given an opportunity to participate in the enquiry, but he did not avail of the same. In these circumstances, the Company had no other alternative but to proceed against him ex parte. It is noteworthy that the Company was very fair to the respondent. It gave further show-cause notice, as to why he should not be dismissed, on 18th May 1972. The respondent did submit a reply, which the Company did not find satisfactory, with the result that it had to terminate his services.
7. I will now proceed to examine the contentions of the learned Representatives for the parties, as to whether the Company having complied with the provisions of Standing Order 15 of the Standing Orders Ordinance, was bound only to dismiss a workman and not to pass a lesser sentence. In order to examine the contentions of the learned Representatives of the parties, it would be useful to reproduce Paragraph (4) of Standing Order l2 of the Standing Orders Ordinance. It reads as under : -- "The services of a permanent or temporary workman shall not be terminated on grounds of misconduct otherwise than in the manner prescribed in Standing Order 15.'* 8. The question is as to whether the provisions of Standing Order 15 of the Standing Orders Ordinance had been complied with or not. In this connection, it would be useful to reproduce Paragraph (4) of Standing Order 15. It runs as under :-- "No order of dismissal shall be made unless the workman concerned is informed in writing of the alleged misconduct and is given an opportunity to explain the circumstances alleged against him. The approval of the employer shall be required in every case of dismissal and, when circumstances appear to warrant it, the employer may institute independent inquiries before dealing with charges against a workman.*'
9. All that Paragraph (4) of Standing Order l2, requires is that the procedure prescribed under Standing Order 15 of the Standiag Orders Ordinance must be followed before terminating the services of a permanent workman. It is noteworthy that Standing Order 12(5) of the Standing Orders Ordinance, does not use the word "dismiss". It only employs the word "terminate". In this case, the respondent was charge-sheeted; he received the charge-sheet ; he was also given an opportunity to explain the circumstances against him. He was given an opportunity to participate in the enquiry, but for reasons best known to him he did not avail of the same. Standing Order l2 read with Standing Order 15 of the Standing Orders Ordinance, does not lay down anywhere that the employer cannot A take a lenient and sympathetic view in consideration of the past services of a workman, so as not to dismiss him from service, but only terminate his services. If a workman is dismissed from service for misconduct, it is not only a stigma against him, but it also deprives him of many other emoluments, which he would have been entitled to get, had his services been only terminated. Mr. Rashid, the learned Representative for the respondent, contended that under Standing Order 15 of the Standing Orders Ordinance, if a workman was found guilty of misconduct, the only punishment that an employer could inflict on the workman, under Paragraph (2) of Standing Order 15 of the Standing Orders Ordinance, a fine in the manner prescribed under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, withhold increment or promotion, reduction to a lower post, or dismissal without payment of any compensation in lieu of notice. In the first place, I am of the view that Paragraph (2) of Standing Order 15 of the Standing Orders Ordinance, only enumerates the punishments which the employer may award. It is not exhaustive of the punishments which the employer may award, more so, if he wants to take a lenient and sympathetic view for the misconduct committed by a workman because of his past services. If the contention of Mr. Rashid is accepted, an employer can never temper justice with mercy. He must always deal harshly with his employees. The rule of construction of statutes and enactments is that it must be so interpreted that it is reasonable and beneficial and not in a way that it acts harshly against persons and for whose benefit the enactment has been made. Moreover, if I were to accept the contention of Mr. Rashid, it would penalise the employer for showing leniency to an employee who otherwise deserved to be dismissed from service. The legality of the action of the employer cannot be challenged merely on the ground that the termination of services of the respondent has been a lenient act on his part. 10. allow the appeal and set In the result, the applicationFor the reasons given above, I would aside the award of the learned Labour Court, giving rise to the impugned award is dismissed.