The facts leading to the filing of this criminal appeal by the State are that one Muhammad Siddique, Patwari, was tried by Special Judge Anti-- Corruption, Gujranwala, for an offence under section 161, P.P.C. Read with sections 5(2) and 5-C of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. The trial Court after recording the statements of five witnesses, vide its orders, dated 15-5-1988 acquitted the accused on the sole ground that sanction for prosecution of the accused was accorded by the Anti-Corruption Committee, whereas it should have been given by the appointing/dismissing authority. While coming to the conclusion, he had relied upon Tazeem Hussain v. The State 1988 P Cr. L J 331. Learned Assistant Advocate-General submitted that the reason given by the trial Court could not be supported in law because in the year 1962, according to the Rules, sanction for prosecution was to be accorded by an authority competent to appoint/dismiss. Thereafter, on 24th of September, 1980, an amendment was made in the Rules of 1962 framed under Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1958 which was to the effect that the sanction for prosecution was to be accorded by the Anti-Corruption, Committees. Argued, that thereafter there was an amendment made in the Rules of 1984. According to Rule 22, the proceedings which were pending wherein sanction for prosecution was required to be obtained, shall be obtained in accordance with the amended Rules with effect from the date of amendment, i.e. 1980. Submitted that in the instant case, sanction for prosecution was accorded on 25-6-1984 which was accorded by the Chairman, Anti-Corruption Committee No.III, Gujranwala. Learned counsel for the respondent, when confronted with the situation, could not refute the proposition.
2. I have heard the learned counsel and gone through the relevant law with his assistance. Prior to 1980, sanction for prosecution was to be accorded by the Government or an authority competent to appoint/dismiss. Thereafter, the change in the law was made and Anti-Corruption Committees were constituted in 1980. In the instant case, sanction for prosecution was granted on 25-6-1984 under the amended law. Learned trial Court while passing the impugned, order did not consider this aspect of the matter nor the amended law was brought to its notice. After going through the sanction order, I do not think that exception to it can be taken. Therefore, while relying upon Imdad Ali v. The State 1989 SCMR 249, I accept the appeal, set aside the order impugned, dated 15-5- 1988. The case shall be remanded to the trial Court for trial.
SA./S-1011/L