MUHAMMAD AFZAL LONE, J.---In these four petitions (Nos.109, 110, 111 and 112, all of 1992), leave to appeal is sought from the High Court's order dated i1-12-1991, which arose out of proceedings commenced by the State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan, under Article 22(I)(g) of the Life Insurance (Nationalization) Order; 1972 against the respondents on the plea that in violation of the provisions of Insurance Act, 1978, they misused the assets and income of the life insurance business of the Cooperative Insurance Society of Pakistan Limited, petitioner No.l herein.
2. The respondents objected to the maintainability-of these proceedings on the ground that requirements of section 70 of the Cooperative Societies Act, 1925 had not been complied with. This section ordains:- "No suit shall be instituted against a society or any of its officers in respect of any act touching the business of the society until the expiration of two months next after notice in writing has been delivered to the Registrar, or left at his office, stating the cause of action, the name, description and place of residence of the plaintiff and the relief which he claims; and the plaint shall contain a statement that such notice has been so delivered or left."
The Tribunal seized of the proceedings, as defined in section 2(h) of the Order was the one set up under section 110 of the Insurance Act, 1938. The contention of the respondents before the Tribunal was that an application under Article 22 fulfils the requisites of a suit, which term is not defined in the Order or the General Clauses Act, and even in the Civil Procedure Code; section 26 whereof lays down; every suit shall be instituted, by the presentation of a plaint or in such other manner as may be prescribed'. For connotation of the words `in such other manner as may be prescribed' appearing in section aforesaid, reliance was placed on Bulram Singh v. Dudh Nath and others AIR 1949 All.
100. In that case it was maintained that a restricted meaning should not be given to the word "suit" and accordingly an application under Article 12 of the U.P. Agriculturists Relief Act for the purposes of applicability of section 21 of the Arbitration Act was treated as a suit. Rule 21 of the Insurance Appellate Tribunal Rules, 1973 was also pressed into service, which lays down that in hearing of an application under Article 22 as closely as possible, the procedure laid down for suit in C.rP.C. Shall be followed by the Tribunal. These arguments prevailed with the Tribunal and have been repeated before us and are further supported by some case-law on the subject. The Tribunal held that the provisions of section 70 ibid were applicable to an application under Article 22, and as these provisions were not complied with, the applications were not maintainable.
3. In appeal the High Court reversed these findings. It held that the Tribunal is a Court but noticed that sub-para. (3) of Article 22 makes mention of application and in sub-para. (4) the term `suit' figures; under the latter provision, the Stale Life Insurance Corporation is empowered to file a suit under section 106 of the Insurance Act, 1938. Seemingly, the user in the same section of two different expressions i.e. Application and suit, susceptible of different meaning, in no small measure, led the High Court to hold that the applications filed by the Corporation could not be treated as a suit. The Tribunal's order was thus set aside. It is interesting to note that the proceedings before the Court envisaged by section 106, described as a suit under Article 22(4) arc not initiated by presenting a plaint but through an application.
4. Since the question as to whether or not section 70 of the CooperativeSocieties Act, 1925, is attracted to an application moved under Article 22 ibid,l is of first impression and there is no reported case-law on this point, the leave prayed for is granted. Security Rs.5,000 in each case. .