It is desirable to state briefly the facts leading to this litigation.
2. A direct complaint was filed by respondent No.1 against the applicants in the Court of A.C.M. VIII
(East) Karachi, for the offence under section 147/148/448/452/427/506(B), P.P.C., which was brought on regular file by the learned Magistrate and process was issued against the applicants, who moved an application under section 249-A, Cr.P.C. Seeking their acquittal. This application was heard by the learned Magistrate who dismissed the same vide order, dated 20-3-1990. The applicants challenged this order in Criminal Revision No.18 of 1990, which was heard by learned VIth Additional Sessions Judge (East), Karachi, who dismissed it vide judgment, dated 4-6-1990. It is in these circumstances that the applicants have invoked the inherent jurisdiction of this Court with a prayer that the proceedings pending against them in the Court of A.C.M. VIIIth (East) Karachi, be quashed.
3. I have heard Mr. Syed Ali Rahbar Rizvi, learned counsel for applicants, Mr. Shaikh Ehsan Illahi, learned counsel for respondent No.1, and Mr. Vakeel Ahmed Qureshi, learned counsel for State. Mr. Qureshi has challenged the competency of this application filed under section 561-A, Cr.P.C., by stating that the applicants have already invoked the revisional jurisdiction and consequently the present application for quashment of proceedings is not maintainable in law. He has placed reliance upon the case of Zafar Hussain v. Muhammad Amin and others reported in 1990 P Cr. L J 1928. The inherent powers under section 561-A, Cr.P.C. Are available to High Court to prevent the abuse of the process of any Court or with a view to secure A the ends of justice. Therefore, in suitable cases these powers are available qua a revisional order passed by the Sessions Judge under section 439-A, Cr.P.C.
4. Mr. Syed Ali Rahbar Rizvi, learned counsel for applicants has questioned the legality of the proceedings pending against the applicants mainly on the ground that the dispute between the parties is of civil nature and the civil suit touching the same subject-matter is pending decision before the Civil Court. He has placed reliance upon the cases reported as The State v. Muhammad Saleh and another PLD 1980 Kar. 131, Loung Khan and others v. Muhammad Juman and 2 others, 1982 P Cr. L J 1039, Shahim Nasir Khan v. Ghalib Imam and 4 others 1984 P Cr. L J 2872 and Mst.
Shahab Akhtar v. The State 1986 P Cr. L J 2179 in an attempt to show that the complaint by its nature is intended to exercise pressure upon the applicants and .Is thus an abuse of the process of law.
The complaint which is on record makes out a prima facie case. The extent to which the witnesses cited by respondent No.1 could be believed can only be determined after the case proceeds before the 8 trial Court. The mere pendency of a civil suit is not a bar to the continuation of a criminal proceedings. It was so held in the case of Akhtar Hussain Zaidi v. The State reported in PLD 1985 Lah. 662.
5. The scope of section 561-A, Cr.P.C. Was examined by the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of M.S. Khawaja v. The State reported in PLD 1965 SC 287 and it was observed:-- "Every prosecution for a criminal offence is to be deemed to have been commenced and continued in the public interest, as a duty of the State. It can only be in a very rare case that a superior Court acting under its inherent power `to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice,' would deem it appropriate to act so as to place an alleged offence outside the operation of the criminal law, on incidental grounds, such as that of delay, or for any reasons other than reasons going to the question whether the allegation is sufficient to constitute an accusation of an offence in law."
At page 291, it was remarked:-- "To quash a judicial proceeding in order to `secure the ends of justice' would involve a finding that if permitted to continue, that proceeding would defeat the ends of justice, or in other words, would either operate or perpetuate an injustice. To end an `abuse' it would be necessary to see in the proceeding a perversion of the purpose of the law such as to cause harassment to an innocent party, to bring about delay, or where the machinery of justice is engaged in an operation from which no result in furtherance of justice can accrue and similar perverse results."
6. The case of Ghullam Muhammad v. Muzammil Khan and 4 others reported in PLD 1967 SC 317, is again relevant in a situation like the one under consideration. Following the dictum as laid down in M.S. Khawaja v. The State the Honourable Supreme Court held as under:-- "The inherent jurisdiction given by section 561-A, Cr.P.C. Is not an alternative jurisdiction or an additional jurisdiction but it is a jurisdiction preserved in the interest of justice to redress grievances for which no other procedure is available or has been provided by the Code itself. The power given by this section can certainly not be so utilised as to interrupt or divert the ordinary course of criminal procedure as laid down in the procedural statute. The High Court, as has repeatedly been pointed out in a number of decisions, should be extremely relunctant to interfere in a case where a competent Court has, after examining the evidence adduced before it, come to the view that a prima facie case is disclosed and has framed charges or summoned the accused to appear, unless it can be said that the charge on its face or the evidence, even if believed, does not disclose any offence."
7. The cases reported as Mohsin Ali and another v. The State 1972 SCMR 229, Abdul Rehman v.
Muhammad Hayat Khan etc. 1980 SCMR 311, Marghoob Alam and another v. Shams Din and another 1986 SCMR 303 and Manzoor Hussain Shah v. The State 1988 SCMR 265, are also relevant in this behalf.
8. No case for interference is made out and the application filed under section 561-A, Cr.P.C. Is accordingly dismissed.