' SHAFIUR RAHMAN, J.--- Leave to appeal was granted under Article 212(3) of the Constitution to examine whether a civil servant in the Police Department had under Rule 12 of the Punjab Police (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1975 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules) a vested right to A prefer a revision petition, to have it entertained by the Inspector-General of Police and whether the suggestions made by the Service Tribunal for the amendmend of the Rules is justified and called for on the facts of the case.
2. The facts of the case disclose that the respondent was serving as an Assistant Sub-Inspector when he was proceeded against under the Rules. A dismissal order was passed against him. He appealed against it and the dismissal order was converted into compulsory retirement on 14-10- 1985. The respondent thereafter addressed a revision petition to the Inspector-General of Police who took it to be a second appeal and informed the respondent that it was not competent. This was done on 9-2-1987, whereupon respondent brought his grievane to the Service Tribunal. The Service Tribunal after examination of the facts came to the conclusion that the power of revision was possessed by the Inspector-General, Police, that a revision petition was in fact filed by the respondent, that its treatment as second appeal was not in accord with the terms and conditions of the employee and that it had to be disposed of or entertained as a revision.
3. It appears that the Tribunal was seized of a number of cases and with reference to those cases an observation an hereunder, suggesting an amendment in the Rules, was made by the Tribunal:-- "It is desirable that Rule 18-A may be added after Rule 18 of the E&D Rules making a provision to the effect that if Departmental appeal/representation or petition is addressed to a wrong authority then the same shall be returned within 30 days to the appellant/petitioner for presentation of appeal/petition before the proper authority within seven days. This amendment if made will proves onducive to the needs of justice."
4. Mr. Abdul Maajid Sheikh, Advocate, the learned counsel for the appellant contended that Rule 12 of the Rules does confer a power of revision on the Inspector-General of Police but there is nothing to confer a right on a subordinate to move for its exercise nor does it form a term and condition of service. The appellate order was the final order and the respondent had to approach the Service Tribunal whithin the prescribed period of limitation for the purpose.
5. Rule 15 of the Rules reads: "Any Disciplinary Rules previously applicable to Police Officers to whom these rules apply are hereby repealed but the repeal thereof shall not affect any action taken or anything already done or suffered thereunder". Rule 12 of the Rules reads as hereunder:-- "12. Revision.---(i) The Inspector-General, Additional Inspector-General, a Deputy Inspector- General of Police or a Suprintendent of Police may call for the records of, awards made by their subordinates and confirm, enhance, modify or annul the same, or make further investigation or direct such to be made before passing orders.
(ii) If an award of dismissal is annulled, the officer annulling it shall state whether it is to be regarded as suspension followed by re-instatement, or not. The order should also state whether service prior to dismissal should count for pension or not.
(iii) In all cases in which officers propose to enhance an award they shall, before passing final orders, give the defaulter concerned an opportunity showing cause, either personally or in writing, why his punishment should not be enhanced."
6. The rule quoted above has the title 'Revision'. It implies the correction of an order already in existence. The wording of the empowering clause is such as to suggest that this power can be exercised without any party moving or having a right in its exercise. However, when a power is conferred on a public functionary and it is exercisable for the benefit of any affected party then that party gets an implied right to move for the exercise of such a power. This principle has been enunciated in sufficient detail by House of Lords in Frederic Guilder Julius v. The Right Rev. The Lord Bishop of Oxford; the Rev. Thomas Thel-Lusson Carter [(1880) 5 Law Reports (House of Lords) page 214] in the following words:-- "The words 'it shall be lawful' are not equivocal. They are plain and unambiguous. They are words merely making that legal and possible which there would otherwise be no right or authority to do.
They confer a faculty or power, and they do not of themselves do more than confer a faculty or power. But there may be something in the nature of the thing empowered to be done, something in the object for which it is to be done, something in the conditions under which it is to be done, something in the title of the person or persons for whose benefit the power is to be exercised, which may couple the power with a duty, and make it the duty of the person in whom the power is reposed, to exercise that power when called upon to do so. Whether the power is one coupled with a duty such as I have described is a question which, according to our system of law, speaking generally, it falls to the Court of Queen's Bench to decide on an application for a mandamus. And the words 'it shall be lawful' being according to their natural meaning permissive or enabling words only, it lies upon those, as it seems to me who contend that an obligation exists to exercise this power, to show in the circumstances of the case something which, according to the principles I have mentioned, creates this obligation. My Lords, the cases to which I have referred appear to decide nothing more than this: that where a power is deposited with a public officer for the purpose of being used for the benefit of persons who are specifically pointed out, and with regard to whom a definition is supplied by the legislature of the conditions upon which they are entitled to call for its exercise, that power ought to be exercised, and the Court will require it to be exercised."
' In Reg. v. Tithe Commissioners (14 Q.B. 474), the following observations were made with regard to such a provision:- "The words undoubtedly are only empowering; but it has been so often decided as to have become an axiom that in public statutes words only directory, permissory, or enabling, may have a compulsory force where the thing to be done is for the public benefit or in advancement of public justice."
7. In view of the case-law cited and the principles of interpretation holding the field, the revision petition filed by the respondent would be quite competent and had to be entertained and dealt with on its own merits.
8. As regards the amendment of the rule, that question does not arise in this particular case. The Tribunal has in a number of cases concerning this issue held that where an appeal or a representation or a revision is addressed to a wrong officer in the same hierarchy, then it is for that officer to forward it to the competent authority for disposal. The amendment in the rule suggested by the Tribunal now of returning the memo. Of appeal to the concerned officer/official for presentation before the competent authority is not quite in conformity with those decisions and may also involve the question of limitation. However, as this amendment question does not arise in the case in hand, the matter is left open for the Department to deal with it appropriately.
9. The result is that the appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs. The departmental authority shall entertain the revision petition and dispose it of on its own merits.