1. ' Four Applications Nos.8/78, 4/79, 23/79 and 27/79 were filed by appellants under Article 22 of the Life Insurance (Nationalization) Order, 1972, (hereinafter referred to as "LINO") before the Insurance Appellate Tribunal at Karachi. These applications have been disposed of by the Tribunal by common judgment dated 6-8-1983. Since common questions of law and facts are involved, in all the appeals, the same are being disposed of by one judgment.
2. ' The facts in brief as given by the appellants are that it is a Statutory Corporation constituted under Article 11(1) of the "LINO" 1972 and the Respondent No,1 is a Cooperative Insurance Society, registered under the Cooperative Societies Act, under Insurance Act, 1938 and is a composite insurer within the meaning of clause (c) of Article 2 of Order.
3. ' As from 1-11-1972 all assets and liabilities of respondent No,1, pertaining to Life Insurance business, were transferred to and vested in Government of Pakistan by virtue of Article 15 of the Order. On taking over such business, the appellant carried out examination and inspection of records maintained by respondent No,1. It was discovered that all the respondents were guilty of violation of section 34 of Cooperative Societies Act and section 29 of Insurance Act, 1938, inasmuch as huge advances were made to various respondents from Life Insurance business fund against law and were onerous in nature. As, such appellant filed applications under Article 22 of 'LINO' before the Tribunal, claiming from the respondents who were Directors/Officers of respondent No,1 the amount so advanced, with interest, past as well as future. Amount claimed in each case is different, and details of various advances were given.
4. ' Written statement was filed by respondent No,1 and adopted by other respondents, denying the allegations and also raised legal pleas with regard to maintainability of application under Article 22 of 'LINO'. Issues were settle( by Tribunal and one of the common issues in all the cases was with regard as the non-maintainability of applications for non-compliance of section 70 of the Cooperative Societies Act, 1925. This section provides that the suit against Cooperative Society registered under the said Act, shall not be instituted ire respect of any act, touching the business of Society, without serving a notice ire writing on the Registrar of the Society. The Tribunal decided to treat this as preliminary issue and heard learned Advocates and passed a consolidate ( judgment, holding that the applications were not maintainable for want of notice under section 70 of the Act and dismissed the same. In these circumstances appeals have been filed in each of the four cases separately.
5. ' Before dilating upon various contentions raised by the learned Advocates, it would be proper to refer to Article 4 of 'LINO' which provides:- "As from the specified date the management of all insurers transacting life insurance business in so far as the management relates to such business shall vest in the Central Government and all persons vested with such management immediately before the specific date shall be divested of such management."
6. ' The insurance business carried out by Respondent No,1 was nationalized and vested in Central Government with effect from 20-3-1972. The appellant corporation was created under Article 11 of the Order.
7. ' The claims were filed by appellants before the Tribunal under Article 22 of Order, which reads as under:- "22. Right of Corporation to seek relief in respect of certain transactions of the insurer.--Where an insurer whose life insurance business has been transferred to and vested in a corporation under this Order, has at any time within 15 years preceding the appointed date:-
(a) ....................................................
(b) ....................................................
(c) ....................................................
(d) ....................................................
(e) ....................................................
8. (0 ..........................................
(g) acted, or omitted to act, in violation of any provision of the Act an has thereby caused a loss to, or imposed a liability, on the insurer; ' and the payment, sale, disposal, acquisition, agreement or variation thereof or other transaction or transfer was not reasonably necessary for the purpose of the life insurance business of the insurer or was made without reasonable care and prudence on the part of the insurer, regard being had in either case to the circumstances at the time, the Corporation may apply for relief to the Tribunal in respect of such transaction, and all parties to the transaction shall, unless the Tribunal otherwise directs, be made parties to the application."
9. ' Respondent No,1 claimed that being a registered Society, a suit could not be filed against it until the expiration of two months next after notice in writing has been delivered or served and that such a suit is barred by section 70 of the Cooperative Societies Act. It will be relevant to reproduce section 70 of the said Act:- Section 70. Notice necessary in suits.--No suit shall be instituted against a Society or any of its officers in respect of any act touching the business of the Society until the expiration of two months next after notice in writing has been delivered to the registrar, or left at his office, stating the cause of action, the name, description and place of residence of the plaintiff aid the relief which he claims, and the plaint shall contain a statement that such notice has been so delivered or left.
10. ' Mr. Makhdoom Ali Khan, the learned Advocate for the appellant has contended that the Tribunal erred in law to hold that applications under section 22 of 'LINO' were suits and barred by section 70 of the Cooperative Societies Act, in that the required notice was not served before filing the claim.
11. The appellants were given right to apply to Tribunal in respect of such transaction, and accordingly, in exercise of their such power, the appellants applied for the relief which is denied on the sole ground that it was a suit and barred by section 70 of Cooperative Societies Act. This right to apply is over and above, and in addition to the right of Corporation to bring a suit under section 106 of the Act as provided in sub-Article (4) of Article 22.
12. ' It is also contended that in section 2(6) of the Insurance Act, word `Court' has been defined and 'LINO' vested additional jurisdiction in the Tribunal to try an application, as this was in addition to the powers of Corporation to bring suit under section 106 of the Act. The word 'application' has been used in Article 22 of 'LINO' and claims were commenced by application and not by suits. The claim could have been declined if it were a uit, Applications under Article 22(1) would be tribal by the Insurance appellate Tribunal created tinder section 110 of Insurance Act, whereas a suit under sub- Article (4) of Article 22 is tribal by a Court under section 106 of Insurance Act. The legislature having chosen two different words have laid down two different forums.
13. ' The learned Advocate referred to Govt. Of Pakistan and others v. Wali Muhammad Habib and others PLD 1961 SC 215, where at page 220 it is observed:- "The provisions of the Cooperative Societies Act seek to impose restriction upon rights vested under the General Law to have recourse to ordinary Civil Courts in the adjudication of dispute, as such, the provisions of such an Act, should, according to the accepted principle of construction of statute be construed strictly, and unless person or category of persons sought to be so restricted, come within the specified word of statute either expressly or by necessary intendment, they should not include, within their scope. In construing a statute, we, should always avoid, if possible creating any repugnancy between its provisions and give meaning and effect to every portion thereof."
14. ' The learned Advocate then contended that there is difference between the word 'application' and 'suit'. These words are neither synonymous, nor convey the same meanings. He referred to Vankata Candrappa Nananivaru v. Vankatarama Reddi and others ILR 1898 Mad. (22) 256, where it was observed:- "a suit, according to section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure, must commence with a plaint and a proceeding which is capable of terminating in decree, cannot on that ground alone, be deemed to be a suit within the meaning of the Code if it has not commenced with a plaint. Such a proceeding is, in strictness only a proceeding in the suit."
15. ' He also referred to Rajagopala Chittiar v. H.R.E. Board, Madras 1933 (57) Mad. 271 where at page 280 it is observed:- "Of course a proceeding commenced by an application would also fall within the meaning of the term 'suit' if such a proceeding has been specially declared to be a 'suit' under the Code by the specific provision of any special enactment, for instance, a contentious probate proceeding. A decision given in such a proceeding would a decree." In Hansaj Gupta v. Official Liquidator and others 60 Indian Appeals, 1 it is observed:- "that there is no definition of suit in the Act, and the provision, contained in section 2, that unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context 'suit' does not include appeal or application.
16. The word 'suit' ordinarily means, and apart from some context must be taken to mean a civil proceeding instituted by the presentation of a plaint. The application of the liquidator would not be a suit within section 3, if that section stood alone unaccompanied by the explanation."
17. ' The learned Advocate contended, that in these circumstances, the application under Article 22 of 'LINO' could not be treated as suit.
18. ' On the point whether the Tribunal is a Court or not, the learned Advocate referred to Bhagwatsing v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1964 SC 444 where it is observed:- "that proceeding which does not commence with a plaint or petition, in the nature of plaint or whether the claim is not in respect of dispute or not ordinarily triable in a Civil Court would prima facie not, be regarded as falling within section 86 of Code of Civil Procedure. The proceedings for adjudication under the Industrial Disputes Act is founded in a reference made by the Local Government under section 10 the allied sections under the Industrial Disputes Act and is not commenced by a plaint or petition. An Industrial Tribunal is again not a Court within the meaning of section 86; it is a Tribunal constituted for adjudicating industrial disputes. Section 86 of the Code excludes the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts and must be strictly construed. It does not debar the commencement of proceedings for adjudication of an Industrial Dispute for two reasons; neither party to the proceedings is sued by the initiation of the proceedings, and the Tribunal is not a Court."
19. ' It is next contended that the claims were filed under sub-Article (1) (g) of Article 22 of 'LINO' as the insurer had acted in contravention of the provisions of Insurance Act. Suits would be barred under section 70 of the Cooperative Societies Act, only in respect of the acts, which are touching the business of the Society and acts which are in flagrant violation of the provisions of Insurances Act or Cooperative Societies Act, cannot be said to be acts touching the business of Society, nor a claim by way of application under section 22 of 'LINO' would be said to be a suit and barred by section 70 of the Cooperative Societies Act. In this respect, the learned Advocate referred to AIR 1969 SC 1320, AIR 1958 Cal. 373, AIR 1961 Madia Pardesh 217 and AIR 1970 SC 245.
20. ' Mr. Amir Malik, the learned Advocate for the respondent No,1 has contended that the Tribunal regulates its own procedure as provided in subsection (6) of section 110 of the Insurance Act, 1938.
21. By virtue of this provision, Tribunal made Rules to regulate its procedure which are known as the Insruance Appellate Tribunal Rules, 1973, and the same are in force w,e,f. 22-12-1973. Rule 10 of the Rules, lays down the procedure for entertaining an application and as to the contents of such application. Rule 5 of the said Rules is equivalent to Orders 5 and 8 of C.P.C., while Rules 22 and 23 are identical to the provisions of Order 9, rule 8 and Order 9 rule 9 of C.P.C.. As such, the procedure followed by the Tribunal in disposing of applications of appellants is the same which is provided for deciding. Suits. The learned Advocate referred to Bulram Singh v. Dudh Nath AIR 1949 All. 100 where it is observed:- "that the proceedings under section 12, Urban Punjab Agriculturist Relief Act is a proceeding in a suit before Civil Court within the meaning of section 21 of the Arbitration Act and the Arbitration Act applies to such proceedings. When the word 'suit' has not been defined in the General Clauses Act, a restricted meaning should not be given to that word so as to take away the rights of the parties to have their dispute settled by a Tribunal of their own choice."
22. ' Reference is also made to Ghulam Mustafa and others v. Mst. Zaitoon and others PLD 1986 SC (AJ&K) 100, that objection to exclude jurisdiction of Civil Court could only be sustained if it was positively established that land was acquired strictly in accordance with the provisions of the Ordinance." He also referred to Premnath v. Premnath AIR 1963 (Punjab) 62 and following observation is reproduced:- "Broadly a suit is a proceeding in a Court of justice for the enforcement of right denoting a legal proceeding of civil kind. It is a proceeding in a Court according to form of law to enforce the remedy to which a party deems itself entitled. The term 'suit' in its comprehensive sense may be treated as applying to any original proceedings in a Court of justice by which a party pursues the remedy which the law grants him. The modes of proceedings may be various depending upon the different stages in the litigation, that is, proceedings in the original Court, Court of Appeal, proceedings in the nature of review or revision and execution proceedings. The term has also a much narrower meaning when it is examined in the procedural sense. Every judicial proceedings cannot be termed a suit."
23. ' The learned Advocate contended that the Tribunal is a Court and it was competent to adjudicate upon the applications moved by the appellant, but procedure to be followed by the Tribunal was the same as that followed by the Civil Court.
24. ' In Article 22 of `LINO' the legislature has used the words 'may apply to the Tribunal' and in sub- Article (3) of the said Article the word 'application' is used and 'suit'. In sub-Article (4) of the said Article, the provision of a suit has specifically been mentioned and it is in the following terms:- "(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Article or anything in the Act, the Corporation may bring suit under section 106 of the Act against any person to whom subsection (1) of that section is applicable.
25. The Corporation has been empowered to either make application for relief or file a suit. The Corporation commenced proceedings against respondents by way of an application and not by way of a suit as mentioned in sub-Article (4) of Article 22 of 'LINO'. The Tribunal, in order to regulate its business framed rules of 1973. Some of the rules are synonymous to the orders and rules of C.P.C.
26. But that does not mean that an application moved by the Corporation would be deemed to be a suit, and therefore, barred by section 70 of Cooperative Societies Act. The proceedings in a suit commenced with presentation of a 'plaint', which is not the case here. For the disposal of such application, the Tribunal may apply a procedure laid down in C.P.C., but it cannot be said to be a suit.
27. ' The learned Tribunal observed in the impugned judgment that the proceedings under Article 22 of 'LINO' resemble in every respect to a suit. Mere resemblance would not mean that the same was a suit. To that extent, the findings of the Tribunal are not sustainable.
28. The Tribunal is a Court in view of the observations in PLD 1958 Lah. 163 as the person or persons constituting the. Tribunal are entrusted with judicial functions i,e. Of deciding litigated questions according to law and they are empowered to pronounce a definitive judgment which is binding and authoritative.
29. The provisions of section 70 of Cooperative Societies Act are not applicable to the proceedings commenced with an application under Article 22 of the Order. The proceedings if commenced with a suit, as is provided in sub-Article (4) of said Article, the applicability of section 70 of Cooperative Societies Act would certainly have been attracted. Flagrant violation of Insurance Act and Cooperative Societies Act in advancing loans, can also not be said to be acts touching business of Society. However, till such time, as the claim of appellants is properly adjudicated upon, it cannot be held that the respondent No,1 acted in an unlawful manner or in violation of the provisions of Insurance Act a Cooperative Society in advancing huge sums to other respondents. This is left to be decided by the Tribunal.
30. ' In the result, the appeals are allowed, impugned judgment is set aside and the cases are remitted to the Insurance Appellate Tribunal, Karachi for fresh decision on merits in each case. In the circumstances there will be no order as to costs.