1. ' This appeal is filed against the order of the Company Judge dated 27-. 1-1991 passed under Section 247 of the Companies Act, 1913.
2. ' When this appeal came-up before us on 29-4-1991 we enquired from the learned Counsel for the appellant as to how this appeal could be maintained by the appellant who is not only stranger to the proceedings but he is also not adversely affected by the impugned order in any manner.
3. Learned counsel in reply contended that her client has been adversely affected by the impugned order in the sense that a suit was filed for specific performance of a contract of sale of immovable property by the respondent-Company which could not be decreed against the appellant on account of striking off the name of respondent from the Register of the Companies by the Registrar of Joint Stock Companies. However, as a result of restoration of name of the company by the impugned order, the respondent has become entitled to continue the case. After hearing the learned counsel for the appellant at length we are of the view that the appeal is not maintainable.
4. It is an admitted position in the case that the suit for specific performance of contract of sale against the appellant was instituted by the respondent-Company in the year 1973, while the name of the company was struck off from the register of the company by the Registrar in the year 1981. It is, therefore, quite clear that at the time of institution of the suit the defence that the company has ceased to exist was not available to the appellant. The learned counsel also admitted before us that such defence has not been taken by the appellant in the suit filed by the respondent but contended that the appellant was not aware of the order of striking off the name of -respondent- Company by the Registrar. Learned counsel, for the appellant relied on the following passage from the case reported as PLD 1981 Supreme Court 565 (Custodian of Evacuee Property, Lahore v. Syed Saifuddin Shah) in support of her contention that the appeal filed by the appellant is maintainable.
5. "A stranger to a suit or a proceedings is not prohibited by the Code of Civil Procedure from filing an appeal from an order passed therein. It is true that there is no express provision permitting such party to prefer an appeal against such an order. This omission, however, cannot be understood to amount to prohibition. The Court ought not to act on the principle that every procedure is to be taken as prohibited unless it is expressly provided for. To give such a meaning to the omission would result in grave injustice. The facts of this case are clear example in point. The Court should proceed on the principle that every procedure which furthers administration of justice, is permissible even .If there is not express provision permitting the same. Section 96 of the Civil Procedure Code deals with appeals from orders These provisions do not in terms say who is entitled to prefer an appeal. The Code, however, lays down that it is the decree or the order that has to be appealed against. If the decree or the order appealed from adversely affects a person he should be permitted to challenge the same in appeal even if he was not made a party to the original suit or proceedings."
6. ' There can be no cavil with the proposition that a person adversely affected by an order is entitled to challenge the same. But as earlier pointed out by us the appellant could not be treated as a person aggrieved by the order' dated 27-1-1991. The name of respondent was struck off from the Register of Company by the Registrar during the pendency of the suit and it has now been restored. Even otherwise, on the merits, no illegality has been committed by the learned Single Judge in ordering restoration of the name of the company in Company's Register. No case for interference is made out. The appeal is dismissed in limine.