' MAMOON KAZI, J.---The petitioners are seeking elections to the Executive Committee of respondent No,1 which are scheduled for 25-9-1991. The grievance of the petitioners is that the elections of respondent No,1 are not being conducted strictly in accordance with law as the change of representatives has been indiscriminately allowed and even multiple representation has been permitted so as to enable a member to obtain large number of proxies. It has been pointed out that one person is representing 45 members out of which 16 are limited companies while another person has accorded his own representation to another but he himself secured representation of 20 members. A third person who is out of the country for over a year has been fraudulently shown as altered representation. Apart from that, according to the petitioners, no election/retirement of Town Committee has been notified thus leading to impermissible perpetuation. The Secrutiny Committee is also said to include the Vice-President who suffers from inherent disability. The petitioners have further pointed out that respondent No,2 i.e, the Director, Trade Organisations, Ministry of Commerce has not been vested with jurisdiction to interfere in any pre-election anomalies or grievances in terms of section 9 of West Pakistan Ordinance (XLV of 1961) as its jursidiction is available for rectifying elective in congruity or illegal and corrupt practices connected therewith after the completion of the election process.
2. We have heard the learned counsel for the petitioners at length and after hearing his contentions have come to a conclusion that this petition is not maintainable against the respondents. It may be pointed out neither of the respondents can be said to be persons performing functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation, a Province or a Local Authority. This question was considered by the Supreme Court in the case of Salahuddin v. Frontier Sugar Mills PLD 1975 SC 244.
The observations of the Supreme Court which appear at page 257 of the report are reproduced as follows:--- "However private organizations or persons, as distinguished from Government or semi- Government agencies and functionaries cannot be regarded as persons performing functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation or a Province simply for the reason that their activities happen to he regulated by laws made by the State. Accordingly, a joint-stock company, incorporated under the Companies Act, for the purpose of carrying on commercial or industrial activity for the benefit of its shareholders, cannot be regarded as a person performing State functions, just for the reason that its functioning is regulated by law or that the distribution of its manufactured products is subject to Government control in the public interest. The primary test must always be whether the functions entrusted to the organization or person concerned are indeed functions of the State involving some exercise of sovereign or public power; whether the control of the organization vests in a substantial manner in the hands of Government; and whether the bulk of the funds is provided by the State. If these conditions are fulfilled, then the person, including a body politic or body corporate may indeed be regarded as a person performing functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation or a Province; otherwise not."
' This case was noticed by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of A. Ghani Sayeed v. National Bank of Pakistan 1983 PLC (C.S.) 41 and it was held that National Bank of Pakistan was not amenable to the writ jurisdiction conferred upon this Court under Article 199 of the Constitution, although it was observed that the Government could lay down policies for the National Bank of Pakistan and appoint Directors but notwithstanding the same it was held that the said Bank did not exercise any sovereign or public power and none of the tests laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgment could be satisfied. Such a question also arose before another Division Bench of this Court in the case of Muhammad Rafiq Moti v. Pakistan and another PLD 1983 Karachi 589 and incidentally the respondent No,1 in the present case was also a respondent in the said case. In the said case also the elections proposed to be held by the Chamber of Commerce and Industry had been called in question. It is pertinent to point out that although the notice issued by the said respondent in regard to the holding of extraordinary general meeting to introduce certain amendments in the Articles of Association was held to be invalid yet no relief was granted to the petitioners against the said respondent as it was held that it was not performing functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation a Province or a Local Authority while amending the Articles of Association. The petitioners, were, therefore left to seek their remedy against the said respondent elsewhere.
3. Mr. NA. Farooqui has, however, invited our attention to another case reported as Maher Alvi v.
Pakistan and 5 others PLD 1980 Karachi 609. In this case the order passed by the Director, Trade Organization, Ministry of Commerce under section 9 of West Pakistan Ordinance (XLV of 1%1) had been challenged before a Full Bench of this Court and the petition was ultimately allowed by the majority of the learned Judges constituting the Bench. However, we find that this case is distinguishable because as is evident from the provisions of section 9 itself, the action impugned was taken by the said respondent with approval of the Federal Government, therefore, the said Government had also been joined as a party to the said petition. In the present case, the action that is being impugned has been attributed by the petitioners only to respondent No,1 which is a body corporate and which, as pointed out, is not amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court.
4. Mr. Farooqui has also contended that there is no alternate remedy available to the petitioners as filing of a suit is expressly barred under section 12 of West Pakistan Ordinance (XLV of 1961) and consequently, the only remedy which is available to the petitioners is by way of a constitutional petition. We also find no merit in his argument because apart from the fact that section 9 of the said Ordinance provides a remedy by filing of petition for annulment of the elections within thirty days of the announcement of the result thereof, the main question still would be whether the respondents in this case are amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court. As we have already held that the said respondents are not amenable to such jurisdiction, we are unable to accept Mr. Farooqui's argument.
5. In the result, we find no force in this petition and the same is dismissed in limine and so are the applications fixed today for orders.