DECISION This appeal arises out of an award of the learned Presiding Officer of Labour Court No. 1, Karachi, dated 8th February 1974. The award has been challenged only in respect of three persons, namely, (1) Mr. Asadullah, (2) Mr. Muhammad Anwar and (3) Ramjee. Monnoo Motors v. Employees* Union (Inamullah Khan, Appellate Tribunal)
2. It was contended by Mr. Mahmood' A. Ghani, the learned Representative for the appellant, that the learned Labour Court having accepted the principle that once a worker has received the payment in satisfaction of his claim, if without protest, the relationship of master and servant does not exist. There were in all 87 workers, who were retrenched. The learned Labour Court accepted this principle in the case of 84 persons, but distinguished the principle in the case of Mr. Asadullah, General Secretary, Mr. Muhammad Anwar and Mr. Ramjee, on the ground that they were senior to people retained in service and, therefore, the principle in their case was not attracted. The relevant finding of the learned Labour Court runs as under :-- "Of course, General Secretary has admitted that all the workers have accepted the dues but stated that it was under protest. No letter of protest is produced. The contention, therefore, of the workers cannot create relationship of Master and Servant any more but as regards the workers whose retrenchment has taken place contrary to the principle of retrenchment where the junior man is to go, in that case Mr. Asadullah, Muhammad Anwar and Ramjee can be re-instated if they stood senior to those who are retained."
3. Apparently, there is a fallacy in the reasoning of the learned Labour Court. If the learned Labour Court accepts the principle that receipt of the dues terminates the relationship of master and servant then Mr. Asadullah, Mr. Muhammad Anwar and Mr. Ramjee, are covered by that principle, as they have also received their dues and on the finding of the learned Labour Court without any protest. A person in order to apply under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 (hereinafter called the Ordinance), must be an aggrieved person. These three persons, in view of the fact that they had accepted their dues, were not aggrieved persons and, therefore, they could not make applications under section 25-A of the Ordinance. The essential ingredient of section 25-A of the Oxdi nance is that the applicant must be an aggrieved person and if he is not an aggrieved person, he cannot apply under section 25-A of the Ordinance. I would hold that the principle accepted by the learned Labour Court in the case of 84 persons would apply to these 3 persons as their case stands on the same footing as that of 84 persons and, therefore, these 3 persons cannot be said to be aggrieved persons within the meaning of section 25-A of the Ordinance. The next point that requires consideration is the interpretation of Standing Order 13 of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 (hereinafter called the Standing Orders Ordinance), which runs as under :-- "Where any workman is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of workmen, the employer shall retrench the workman who is the last person employed in that category."
5. The word "category" is not defined in the Standing Orders Ordinance. We all know what it means. Its Dictionary meaning is : "One of a possibly exhaustive set of classes among which all things might be distributed;".
6. On the date that Mr. Asadullah was retrenched, he was a Supervisor, while the other two persons were admittedly, Junior Executives. Mr. Asdullah as a Supervisor was a workman, on the facts of the present case, but in the case of Mr. Hanif and Mr. Sadiq Masih it is not possible to^ hold, in the absence of any evidence as to the nature of the duties that they were performing, that ttiey were also workmen. The mere fact that they were drawing more salary than Mr. Asadullah is not sufficient to hold that they were not workmen. The designation, no doubt, suggests that they were performing such duties that will take them out from the definition of workmen.
7. It is not permissible to read any statement only in part to come to a conclusion. Mr. Javaid A. D. Qureshi, Supply Manager of the appellant- company, stated as under : -- "For the purposes of retrenchment the date of appointment has been taken as the basis of seniority by our company. (Voluntary). The date of appointment was category-wise). I see the last para, of Exh. R-3, which says that a person may be transferred or promoted during his tenure of the service but for the purposes of seniority his appointment date will be considered. Mr. Anwar Khan was a typist. It is not correct that he was senior to Muzaffar Hussain."
8. The witness is correct in stating that for the purposes of retrenchment the date of appointment has to be taken as the basis of seniority in the company, but this is not sufficient. It has to be in the category and, therefore, the witness was quite right to add in his statement in the same breath by saying that the date of appointment was category-wise. So far as Exh. R-3, is concerned, it is a letter addressed to one Mr. S. A. Karim by the appellant-company. One does not know in what context the Manager stated as under : -- "Your contention that consideration of seniority was not maintained is not correct. The case which you have referred in comparison to your own case is that of Mr. Muzaffar Hussain. You have stated that Mr. Muzaffar Hussain's date of entry in cadre of Typist was 1-3-1970, but you should be aware that his actual date of appointment is not 1-3-1970 but 25-11-1969, whereas your date of appointment is 4-2-1970. The consideration at the time of retrenchment, is cadre-wise and the date of appointment within the Company. A person may be transferred or promoted during his tenure with the Company but for retrenchment purposes the date of appointment is to be considered. Since Mr. Muzaffar Hussain is senior to you by approximately 3 months, we feel that there has been no injustice done on our part."
9. Unless the writer of this letter had been summoned and asked to explain what he meant by the above statement, it is not possible to hold that the date of appointment alone is material and though a person promoted may have ceased to be a workman. If he has ceased to be a workman and the question of retrenchment of the workman and the officers though appointed later, then he cannot be retrenched under Standing Order 13 of the Standing Orders Ordinance as he is not a workman.
10. The leamed Labour Court relied on Exh.
R-4, in support of his conclusion that the only category of service was that which is mentioned therein. It seems to me from the statement of Mr. Quieshi that this list was put to him and he stated as under "I would not like to commit myself that the list I produce as Exh. R-4 be valid in the Company at the time of retrenchment. I cannot say anything about the evidence of Mr. Asif Ali Shah about the existence of these grades mentioned in Exh. R-4."
11. Mere production of Exh. R-4, by the Union through Mr. Qureshi, does not establish the. fact that this is the exhaustive list of category of servants employed by the appellant-company. In fact, as the Heading would disclose, it is only a list of the grades. There are in all 8 grades in the appellant-company. The grade is quite distinguishable from the category of workman.
12. Mr. Ali Amjad, the learned Advocate for the respondents drew my attention to Exh. R-), which reads as under: "We confirm that we have 52 Units (fifty-two) Toyota Trucks to be assembled as of 30-8-72. Also note that 2 (two) Units Toyota Trucks are crippled for want of spare parts."
13. Mr. Ali Amjad referred to the above Exh. R-l, to support his contention that the retrenchment was mala fide, as on 30th August 1972, 52 trucks were to be assembled. In the first place, the respondents having not filed any cross-appeal, they cannot be allowed to challenge the finding of the learned Labour Court. In the second place as 52 Toyota Trucks were to be ready, the question of mala fide did not arise. The Commission visited on the lst of September 1972, they obviously could not find the trucks, which must have been delivered by that time.
14. It is suggested by Mr. Ali Amjad that the Acknowledgement Receipts having not been filed as deposed to in Paragraph 19 of the affidavit of Mr. Qureshi, the claim about acknowledgement of the workers was not established. It is true Mr. Qureshi admitted that he had not filed the Acknowledgement Receipts, as stated to have been filed alongwith the affidavit. If the members of the Union had not given Acknowledgement Receipts they should have called upon Mr^Qureshi or the Company to produce the same. It is now too late to allege that the workers had not drawn their dues and had not given any Acknowledgement Receipts. Moreover, it is too late to agitate this point in the absence of any cross-appeal.
15. The appeal, for the reasons given above, is allowed and modified in respect of Mr. Asadullah and Mr. Ramjee.