' NASIR ASLAM ZAHID, J.---This High Court Appeal is directed against the judgment dated 25-4-1988 of the learned Single Judge of this Court in Suit No,453/86.
2. We have heard Mr. Ameer Ahmed Khan, learned counsel for the appellants. No one has appeared for the respondents. Appellants Nos.1 and 2 are the parents of deceased Nizamuddin, who died in a traffic accident on 4-7-1985 at the age of 13 years, In the plaint, it was averred that the bus, which caused the accident, bore registration No,801-602 and had belonged to respondents Nos.1 and 3 and was being driven at the time of accident by respondent No,2. It was averred that accident was caused on account of rash and negligent driving of respondent No,2, the driver of the bus. In the suit, a decree for Rs,2,70,000 was sought as damages. Respondent No,2, the driver, did not file any written statement and suit proceeded ex parte against him. Respondents Nos.1 and 3 filed a written statement, in which it was denied that the Bus No,801-602 caused the accident although it was admitted' that the bus belonged to respondent No,3. In the evidence only appellant. No,1, Shahabuddin gave his evidence. His entire evidence is reproduced here:- "Nizamuddin, deceased was my son. At the time of his death, his age was 14 or 15 years, He was working as turner in Nazimabad, Karachi at the time of his death. He used to get Rs,15 per day. He used to give us his full earnings. He was unmarried. My wife is also alive. My wife is aged about 30 or 31 years, He was my second eldest child. On 4-7-1985 at about 10-00 or 10-30 a.m., he met with an accident. At 2-00 or 2-30 p.m. Police came to my house and told me that my son had met with accident. I went to Civil Hospital. I found my son lying dead in the hospital. Muhammad Tarique was driver of the bus, which caused accident. I do not know, who is owner of the bus. I have filed this plaint.
' Cross to the defendant. Nil. None is present."
3. Suit was decreed against respondent No,2 in the sum of Rs,1,08,000 who was ex parte. Suit against respondents Nos.1 and 3 was dismissed.
4. The reasoning of the learned Single Judge is contained in para. 7 of the impugned judgment, which is reproduced here:- "So far as defendants Nos.1 and 3 are concerned they have denied that they were the owners of Bus No,801-062. They have also denied that the said bus was being driven by defendant No,2 or that defendant. No,2 was their driver. They have also denied that the said bus had caused the accident.
All that they have admitted is that defendant No,3 was owner of the said bus. In his evidence the plaintiff has not given the number of the bus. He has not stated that defendant No,2 Muhammad Tariq was driving Bus No,801-062. He has clearly admitted that he did not know who was the owner of the bus which caused the accident. 'Under these circumstances and, on the basis of the evidence led by the plaintiff, defendants Nos.1 and 3 cannot be held vicariously liable for the act of defendant No,2."
5. Mr. Ameer .Ahmad Khan submitted that although, on behalf of the appellants, no evidence was led as to the number of bus, which had caused the accident and it had been denied by respondents 1 and 3 that their bus had caused the accident, under the law, the allegation having been made against respondents Nos.1 and 3 that their bus had caused the accident, the burden was upon respondents 1 and 3 to prove that their bus had not caused the accident. Reliance was placed upon a judgment of a learned Single Judge in the case of Ursulina D'Lima and others v.
Orient Airways Limited and another PLD 1960 Kar.
712.
6. The submission of the learned counsel is misconceived. The burden of proof that the bus of respondent No,1 or 3 had caused the accident, was on the appellants, which was not discharged.
The entire evidence led on behalf of the appellants, which comprised the testimony of appellant No,1 only, has been reproduced above. The burden, cast upon the appellants, had not been discharged. Reliance on PLD 1960 Kar. 712 are also misplaced. In that judgment, it was held that in a case under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855, the general rule. As to the burden of proof in regard to negligence on the tart of Ate defendant, is that it is for the plaintiff to prove negligence and not for the defendant to prove it, but in those cases where the - true cause of the accident lies solely within the knowledge of the defendants this hardship is avoided by invoking the rule of res ipsa loquitur (the thing speaks for itself). The cited judgment is not relevant. We find no merit in this High Court Appeal, which is dismissed, but with no order as to costs