Petitioner feeling aggrieved by non-entertainment of his post arrest bail petition by the Magistrate Court as well as the Sessions Court at Faisalabad and turning down of the request by the Special Court for Speedy Trials presided over by Mr. Justice (Retd.) Gul Baz Khan constituted under the Special Courts for Speedy Trials Ordinance, 1991 (Ordinance (XXV of 1991) in the case registered vide F.I.R. No. 408 of 23-8-1991 under section 13 of the Pakistan Arms Ordinance, 1965 read with section 7 of Surrender of Illicit Arms Ordinance, 1991 (Ordinance4XX of 1991) at Police Station Ghulam Muhammadabad, Faisalabad, alleging recovery of .30 bore automatic pistol with three live cartridges vide the impugned order, dated 9-9-1991 observing that the jurisdictional sine quo non i.e. The specific Governmental reference is lacking; resorted to the present petition urging bifold lego-factual contentions, viz., the petitioner having volunatrily surrendered the weapon in question on 20-8-1991 in the company of a former local M.P.A. Is entitled to the indemnity contemplated by section 8 of the Surrender of Illicit Arms Ordinance, 1991 and the exclusive jurisdiction of Special Courts for Speedy Trials constituted under Ordinance XXV of 1991 for the trial of scheduled offences in terms of section 5(3) thereof only extends to cases specifically referred/ transferred by the Government under section 5(1) and (2) of the Ordinance ibid, in the absence whereof Courts of plenary jurisdiction have the competence to try the scheduled offences and likewise are empowered to adjudicate upon bail matters since the bar envisaged by section 11 of the Ordinance ibid is predicated upon the jurisdictional fact, referred to supra.
2. I am afraid, the first contention squarely pertains to the realm of factual controversy for the resolution whereof recording of evidence by the trial Court would be necessary therefore, it need not be dilated upon lest it amounts to usurption of the trial Court's function and causes prejudice to any body's case.
3. However, the second contention on conjunctive reading of sections 5 and 11 ibid seems to be well-founded, relevant text whereof is reproduced below for the sake of convenience of reference:- - "5. Jurisdiction of Special Courts.--- (1) If the Government is of the opinion that a case relating to any offence which has been registered should be tried and decided speedily, it may order that such case shall be tried by -a Special Court.
(2) If the Government is of the opinion that a case pending before any Court should in the public interest be tried and decided speedily, it may, by order in writing, transfer the same for trial to a Special court.
(3) The Special Court shall have the exclusive jurisdiction to try a case in respect of which an order has been made under sub section (1) or subsection (2) and no other Court shall have any jurisdiction or entertain any proceedings in respect thereof.
11. Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 439, 491, 496, 497, 498, 498-A and 561-A of the Code, no Court other than the Special Court shall have the power or jurisdiction to grant bail to any, accused person in a case triable by a Special Court: Provided that the Special Court shall not release the accused on bail, if o there appear reasonable grounds for believing that he has been guilty of the offence for which he has been charged; nor shall an accused person be so released unless the prosecution has been given notice to show cause why he should not be so released."
4. Perusal of the afore-referred underlined statutory provisions unambiguously demonstrates the legislative intendment tending to confer exclusive jurisdiction on special Courts by virtue of section 5(3) ibid for the trial of cases freshly registered or already pending trial before the Courts of ordinary jurisdiction respectively in terms of section 5(1) and (3) as the case may be contingent upon passing of an order in writing by the Government, while section 11 thereof envisages that the Special Court shall also have the exclusive jurisdiction to deal with bail matters in the cases triable by such Court meaning thereby that for the taking of cognizance of any case by the Special Court for Speedy Trials under the Ordinance referred to supra written order of the Government is a necessary condition precedent in the absence whereof it is utterly divested of any legal powers and handling of any proceeding in such an eventuality would patently be a case of coram non judice devoid of any legal sanction; resultantly, Courts of plenary jurisdiction would be competent to deal therewith including the power to consider the bail matters, which view remains uncontroverted by the learned Advocate-General, Punjab and the learned Deputy Attorney- General, who were required to join the proceedings. As a necessary consequence whereof the impugned order is unexceptionable and the petitioner, if so advised, can have a recourse to the Court of ordinary jurisdiction within the Sessions Division concerned for the sought for relief.
Accordingly, the petition stands disposed of.