1. ' I had heard the above-listed applications on 19-7-1992 in the presence of the learned counsel of both the parties and could have then dictated orders but for the fact that the definition clause in section 2(f) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 (herein also referred to as the Ordinance), covering the word "landlord", required a greater and more serious examination in the light of applicable authorities. The case, therefore, was adjourned for today viz. 20-7-1992. Now that it has been rken up the respondent has appeared in person and has submitted an application, signed by himself, seeking recall of ad interim stay granted on 6-7-1992. The application is virtually a reiteration of what his learned counsel had urged at the Bar during the hearing yesterdai except that several additional precedents have also been cited therein, which also have been noted. On the other hand, Mr. M. Waqar Hussain for the appellant relies upon Muhammad Kashif Kemal Siddique v. Farooq Baig, 1990 M LD 1009, which in turn is based on the judgment of Ibadatyar, Khan, J reported as Moin v. Junaid 1985 CLC 882.
2. ' The short question on which this appeal was admitted to regular hearing by my learned brother G.H. Malik, J., is whether the respondent-landlord is competent to execute the order of eviction against the appellant-tenant in respect of property bearing No,E/11, Shah Faisal Colony No,4, Karachi (belonging to the respondent's son) as well when the tenant-hold, as described in the eviction application was shown to have been situated on Plot No,E/10 alone.
3. ' Out of the above-listed applications the first is one submitted by the respondent-landlord for urgent hearing and recall of the order of ad interim stay dated 6-7-1992 whereas the second is the stay application itself on which hearing is sought augmented by the above-referred further application filed by the respondent in person in Court today for recall of the same order as aforementioned. Since the proceedings in this F.R.A. Pertain to the execution stage in a rent case, which has gone up to the level of the Supreme Court on no less than two occasions request for urgency is genuine and, therefore, CMA 740/92 stands allowed. Correspondingly, the remaining two applications have been heard and decided in terms appearing below:- ' As already hinted this appeal emanates from an order passed on execution, eviction having been allowed on the ground of personal use covered by section 14 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance. Through the impugned order the learned Controller, has overruled the tenant's objection that he could be evicted from such shop alone as was covered by plot No,E/10, belonging to the respondent-landlord and not the one comprised in adjoining Plot No,E/11, owned by the landlord's son.
4. ' At the outset Mr. Rehanul Hasan Farooqui had contended that the property in dispute was described in para. 1 of the rent application as under:- "Shop No,2 on Commercial Plot No,E/10 situated in Block No,4 of Drigh Colony, Karachi."
5. ' Learned counsel as a corollary pointed out that the question whether such tenement discribed as Shop No,2 also extended to an adjoining plot viz. E/11 was raised by the appellant-tenant at the stage of the Supreme Court but was emphatically turned down as, according to counsel, the following passage from the Supreme Court order dated 14-4-1992 in Civil Petition No,159-K of 1992 would show:-- "The learned counsel contended that as the respondent is in occupation of two rooms over and above Shops Nos.1 and 2 on Plot No,E/10 (where the disputed shop is situated) the respondent is not entitled to ejectment under section 14. The finding of both the Courts below is that the respondent is not in occupation of a commercial premises owned by him in any locality. Therefore, merely because the petitioner is in occupation of two residential rooms above the disputed shop does not disqualify him from invoking section 14 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance."
6. (underlining of words appearing within brackets is added here)
7. ' Learned counsel for the respondent-landlord then urged that the Controller was, therefore, right in refusing to go into this controversy of overlapping properties, having been precluded by a conclusive finding of the Supreme Court of Pakistan as quoted.
8. ' I am afraid these are serious questions and the order of stay concurrent with these proceedings cannot be recalled unless the appeal is fully and finally heard. On the contrary, as will be seen the appellant-tenant appears to have a strong arguable case for confirmation of stay granted by this Court concomitant to the admission of the appeal.
9. ' In the first instance, if a question as to the overlapping of properties of father and son was raised in the Supreme Court it was open to that Hon'ble Court not to be go into the question, such nertaining to the dimensions and extent of the tenant-hold and even relerable to the execution stage of the proceedings. On the other hand, there was nothing to preclude the-Court at the apex from going into that question in order to determine the parameters of the tenant-hold even at that level. In other words, either course was open to the Supreme Court of Pakistan. In my view, however, it is a moot question whether that matter was taken up and decided in the Supreme Court. In the first place, no specific dissertation may have been made on the plea of the appellant-tenant because no pointed mention of such plea finds place in the order (as quoted). If so, it may have been open to raise the relevant objection in execution before the Controller and learned Controller would not be precluded to examine and determine it, as he seems to have opined in the impugned order, saying that the issue was foreclosed in the Supreme Court. Correspondingly, it is equally likely, in contradistinction to what has been urged from the side of the respondent-landlord, that the Supreme Court, choosing to describe the plot (as E/10) upon which the disputed shop was situated, may have implicitly intended to restrict the tenant-hold to that property alone. This would be logical as the landlord himself maintained the premises to be on Plot No,E/10 only. If so, the issue may have been foreclosed but in favour of the appellant-tenant. In either alternative the approach of the learned Controller could have been erroneous. Be that as it may, final determination of the point would rest at the stage of regular hearing of this appeal.
10. ' Next is the connected question about the status of the parties as landlord and tenant. While the contention from the side of the appellant-tenant is that his commercial establishment is not a single entity comprising, in fact, of two shops, one belonging to the respondent (situated at Plot No,E/10) and the other to the respondent's son (standing on Plot No,E/11) joined by removal of a common wall, it is an admitted position that the property carries a single rent and receipts are issued by the respondent to the tenant for both the allegedly, independent tenements. However, the last may not make any difference to the controversy because it is admitted from the side of the respondent-landlord that Plots Nos.E/10 and E/11 are differently owned between father and son, respondent being the father. It is here that the definition of the word "landlord" under section 2(1) as read with that of "personal use" in section 2(g) of the Ordinance becomes of relevance. Such provisions are in these terms:- "2. Definitions.--In this Ordinance, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context,--
(a) "building".............
(b) "Controller" ............
(c) "fair rent" ............
(d) "Government".............
(e) "land".............
(1) "landlord" means the owner of the premises and includes a person who is for the time being authorized or entitled to receive rent in respect of such premises;
(g) "personal use" means the use of the premises by the owner thereof or his wife (or husband), son or daughter;
(h) "premises" ..............
(i) "rent" .............
(j) "tenant"..............
(k) "urban area"............
11. In addition, other relevant postulates pertaining to personal use of d landlord occur in sections 14 and 15 (2)(vii) and, in turn, run as below:- "S.14. Delivery of vacant possession.--(I) Not with standing anything contained in this Ordinance or any other law for the time being in force, the landlord of a building who is a widow, or a minor whose both parents are dead or a salaried employed due to retire within the next six months or has retired or a person who is due to attain the age of sixty years within the next she months or has attained the age of sixty years, may, by notice in writing inform the tenant that he or she needs the building for personal use and require him to deliver vacant possession of the building within such time as may be specified in the notice, not being earlier than two months from the receipt thereof: ' Provided that nothing in this subsection shall apply where the landlord has rented out the building after he has retired or attained the age of sixty years or, as the case may be, has become widow or orphan.
(2) The landlord shall not be entitled to avail the benefit of subsection (1) if he is in occupation of a building owned by him in any locality.
(3) Where the tenant has failed to deliver the possession of the building under subsection (1), the Controller shall, on application by the landlord in this behalf, order eviction of the tenant from the building in a summary manner, by using such force as may be necessary.
12. S.15. Application to Controller.--(1).........................................................................
(2) The Controller shall, make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the premises within such period as may be specified in the order, if he is satisfied that:- (ii)
(iii) ............................................
(iv) ............................................
(v) ............................................
(vi) ..............................................
(vii) the landlord requires the premises in good faith for his own occupation or use or for the occupation or use of his spouse or any of his children.
13. (3)
14. (4)
15. ' Now, there can be no cavil with the argument that, on principle, the term landlord as it occurs in the Ordinance of 1979 is wide enough to include all persons authorised or entitled to receive rent of a premises covered by the Ordinance and to that extent I respectfully subscribe to the case-law cited from the side of the respondent namely, Kalimullah v. Amin Hazin, 1976 SCMR 77, Dr. Burjor Anklesaria v. Mrs. Zenobia, 1982 SCM R 98, Muhammad Yakoob v. Ch. Barkat All 1982 CLC 500, Rehmatullah v. Ali Muhammad 1983 SCM R 1064, Abdur Rab Shaji v. Allah Ahmad 1983 CLC 2666, Saleh Muhammad v. Mst. Halima 1984 CLC 916, Yousuf v. Muhammad Zubair Khan 1986 CLC 1985, Yousuf v. Muhammad Zubair, PLD 1986 SC 154 and S.- Amjad Ali v. Muhammad Afzal, PLD 1987 Lah.
16. 280.
17. However, the question further is whether there is anything in the subject or context of sections 14 and 15(2)(vii) which carries an idea that the word "landlord" in those provisions is employed in a restricted manner. In this behalf reference has been made to the decisions of Ibadatyar Khan, J., in Moin v. Junaid, 1985 CLC 882 and Mazhar Ali, J., in Muhammad Kashif Kemal Siddiqui v. Farooq Baig 1990 M LD 1009. In both these cases it has been found that the broader definition of the word "landlord", as it occurs in sections 14 and 15(2)(vii) is inapplicable to the personal requirement of a landlord. With these judgments I respectfully agree but on my own would like to add that a definition clause whether it occurs in a statute covering a particular subject or even in an enactment of general or complementary character such as the General Clauses Act is normally subordinate to subject or context. Put differently, if the subject or context otherwise requires or dictates the meanings, as defined, of a particular term or word shall have to be adjusted in the relevant context.
18. ' In the instant statute not merely the word landlord" is defined but the phrase "personal use" is also defined. As per definition, the pristine meaning of the word "landlord" is "the owner of the premises" but the definition goes on to embrace and "include" persons authorised or entitled to receive rent.
19. However, when it comes to "personal use" the legislature becomes emphatic and exclusively certifies "the use of the premises by the owner thereof or his wife (or husband), son or daughter"
20. [section 2(g)]. Thus wherever the statute confers a right on a landlord to seek eviction on the ground of "personal use" the word "landlord" is used in its elementary or basic sense of the owner of property alone as distinguished from "landlords" in the extended version of those "authorised" or "entitled" to receive rents.
21. ' The position as regards section 14 in the Ordinance becomes clearer when it is observed that only "personal use" is the subject of that provision.
22. ' Besides, that section spells an express preclusion for a landlord even falling within the section to apply under that provision if he or she occupies another such building "owned" by him or her in any locality. Manifestly, therefore, there is an absolute nexus of ownership with the right to evict under discussion. Here, I refer to section 14(2), which has already been reproduced.
23. Finally, both sections 14 and 15(2)(vii) pertain to the personal requirements of landlords. If a mere collector of rents could apply under these c provisions the whole scheme could stand stultified by a landlord conferring rights to collect rents on a suitable person capable of obtaining benefits under either or both such provisions. The legislative intent cannot be this. The rent statutes are calculated to protect tenants against unjustified demands of landlords as well as to ensure corresponding fairplay to landlords. Personal need has to be the need of the owner of the property and of none else as has E been held in the cited case-law.
24. In addition and while this question does not appear to have been raised, it seems now settled as a legal proposition that a landlord even if falling and entitled under section 14 of the Ordinance can get but one premises. Razia Khatoon v. Roshan H. Nanji, 1991 SCM R 840. He can get no more even if undisputably owned by himself unless there be also a common tenancy. Here, almost admittedly, part of the property not only belongs to another but such part may be another independent unit which, if so, only the owner may due to a common tenancy obtain in furtherance of an entitlement under section 14 ibid. That section is the precise provision on which the eviction order is based.
25. Being a question of law the appellant-tenant may also seek to urge it in due course.
26. ' The appellant-tenant, however, cannot retain such part of the property as be covered by Plot No,E/10 aforesaid. To that extent no relief can either be granted on these applications or in the appeal itself.
27. ' While emphasising that the foregoing observations are of a tentative nature not binding on anybody at the regular hearing, I consider these of sufficient importance to accord confirmation of stay granted earlier on 6-7-1992. More so because balance of convenience also lies in protecting the tonant of eviction from any part of the property which falls within the ambit of Plot No,E/11. In the result, ad interim stay is confirmed but to the extent of such part of the property alone as be found to be covered by Plot No,E/11, said to be owned by the respondent's son. The Controller would, correspondingly, be free to execute the order for that portion of the property which is clearly comprised in Plot No,E/10 aforesaid leaving the appellant the balance area and allowing him to put up a make-shift separating wall to be dealt with in accordance with the final disposal of this matter. In the ordinary course. In such terms the applications are disposed of.