1. ' SARDAR SAID MUHAMMAD KHAN, C.J.---This appeal has been directed against the judgment and decree of the High Court dated 18-1-1990 whereby the appeal filed by the respondent, herein, was accepted and the suit for pre-emption was decreed in toto.
2. ' Brief facts leading to the present appeal are that one Muhammad Zaman, the predecessor-in- interest of proforma respondents, transferred the suit land vide a registered sale-deed executed on 28-8-1978 in favour of the appellant, for an ostensible consideration of Rs,2,50,000. Fateh Muhammad, respondent herein, and his son, Abdul Karim, filed a joint suit exercising the right of pre-emption against the said sale-deed on the basis of superior right of pre-emption.
3. Subsequently, at the time of hearing the final arguments, the name of Abdul Karim was struck off from the line of the plaintiffs on the ground that he was a stranger and had No right of pre-emption against the vendee. So far as the plaintiff-respondent was concerned, his suit was dismissed on the ground that it was hit by the principle of partial pre-emption as, according to the plaint, Fateh Muhammad and Abdul Karim, plaintiffs, prayed for a decree in equal shares, i,e. 1/2 each. On appeal to the District Judge, the findings of the trial Court were confirmed. However, on second appeal to the High Court, the appeal filed by Fateh Muhammad, respondent, was accepted and a decree on the basis of right of prior purchase of the entire suit land was passed in his favour on the ground that after striking off the name of the plaintiff, Abdul Karim, the plaintiff-respondent, Fateh Muhammad, was entitled to whole of the suit land, despite the fact that he had claimed the decree only to the tune of half of the suit land.
4. ' We have heard the arguments advanced at the Bar. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the appellants, Raja Muhammad Siddique Khan, Advocate, that the High Court has committed error in decreeing the entire land on the basis of right of prior purchase in favour of Fateh Muhammad. The learned counsel has contended that in view of the prayer made by Fateh Muhammad, plaintiff-respondent, in the plaint, which was Not amended at any stage, he exercised the right of prior purchase only to the extent of half of the suit land and as such his suit is hit by the principle of partial pre-emption. The learned counsel for the appellants has further contended that the authorities relied upon by the High Court are distinguishable and have No bearing on the facts of the case in hand. The case reported as Muhammad Ashraf v. Muhammad Khan PLD 1983 SC (AJ&K) 181, according to the learned counsel, has No application to the case in hand because in that case, two plaintiffs-pre-emptors sought a joint decree without specifying fractional shares; and that in the High Court an application was submitted on behalf of a co-plaintiff, Muhammad Din, that his name might be deleted from the line of the appellants and the matter might be decided between the other plaintiff and the vendee. The learned counsel maintained that in the instant case both, Fateh Muhammad and Abdul Karim, plaintiffs, had appealed before the District Judge and contended that they were entitled to the decree to 1/2 each. After the dismissal of the appeal by the District Judge, Abdul Karim did Not file any appeal to the High Court. In case reported as Murad Bakhsh v. Abdul Ghafoor (1980 CLC 1274), one of the plaintiffs-pre-emptors who claimed the property to the tune of 1/4th of the total area of the land sold was found to be a stranger. In the plaint, the aforesaid plaintiffs sought decree to the extent of 1/4th share while the remaining 4/5th share was claimed by the other co-plaintiffs. The name of the plaintiff who sought decree of possession on the basis of pre-emption to the tune of 1/4 was deleted as being stranger. A decree on the basis of right of pre-emption was passed in favour of remaining plaintiffs-pre-emptors for entire land sold, i,e. Including the 1/4th share of the plaintiff whose name was deleted as being stranger, on the ground that in the plaint, the plaintiffs had prayed that they might be allowed such other relief as in the interest of justice might be granted to them. The learned counsel for the appellants has contended that this authority is also distinguishable because in the plaint filed in the said case, it was clearly prayed that any other relief to which the plaintiffs might be found entitled to, might be given to them but No such prayer was made in the plaint filed in the case in hand.
5. ' In reply, Ch. Muhammad Taj, the learned counsel for the respondent, has argued that the principle enunciated in the authorities relied upon by the High Court is fully applicable to the case in hand and the impugned judgment does Not call for any interference.
6. ' We have given our due consideration to the arguments advanced at the Bar. It may be stated at the very outset that the learned counsel for the appellants, Raja Muhammad Siddique, has conceded that Abdul Karim, whose name was struck off, was also entitled to the decree in alternative because so far as the vendee was concerned he had also superior right of pre- emption. It may be stated here that under section 12 of the Right of Prior Purchase Act (which is corresponding provision to section 13 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act,) when the right of prior purchase vests in several persons, the right may be exercised by all such persons jointly or severally. It means that Fateh Muhammad and his son Abdul Karim could bring a joint suit for asserting their right of prior purchase in view of the provisions contained in section 12 of the Right of Prior Purchase Act, as was done in this case. However, as has already been pointed out, instead of claiming an alternative decree they claimed suit land to the tune of 1/2 share each. Thus, the name of Abdul Karim was struck off from the line of the plaintiffs as being stranger; it was Not in consonance with the provisions contained in section 12 of the Right of Prior Purchase Act. Although Abdul Karim assailed the finding of the trial Court before the District Judge but he did Not appeal against the judgment and decree of the District Judge to the High Court. Had his name Not been struck off from the line of plaintiffs, he might have got a decree of half of the suit land or, at least, a decree for entire suit land in alternative. So far as the authority reported as Muhammad Ashraf v.
7. Muhammad Khan [PLD 1983 SC (AJ&K) 181] is concerned, it is Not clear from the facts reported as to whether the plaintiffs had sought joint decree in that case or for specific shares. However, the fact remains that in that case the decree passed in favour of Muhammad Din, co-plaintiff, was set aside by the High Court Not on the ground that the counsel for the appellant had prayed that his name should be deleted from the line of the plaintiffs but because he had failed to prove the right of prior purchase against the vendee. The moot point in that case was as to whether after striking off the name of one of the plaintiffs as stranger, the remaining plaintiffs were entitled to a decree in exercise of right of pre-emption. There was No question of partial pre-emption involved in that case. Therefore, the same is Not helpful so far as the present case is concerned. The other authority, Murad Bakhsh v. Abdul Ghafoor 1980 CLC 1274, is applicable to the facts of this case, except that in that case it was prayed in the plaint that "any other relief might be given to the plaintiffs to which they may be found entitled", whereas No such prayer has been made in the instant case.
8. ' The question which falls for determination is as to whether in the instant case the High Court was justified in passing the decree for entire suit land in favour of Fateh Muhammad, plaintiff- respondent, despite the fact that he had prayed only for 1/2 share of the suit land on the basis of pre mption; and after the deletion of the name of co-plaintiff, Abdul Karim, his son, the suit was hit by the principle of partial pre-emption, specially so because he did Not amend the plaint.
9. ' It may be observed that ratio decidendi in the case, referred to above, and reported as Murad Bakhsh v. Abdul Ghafoor (1980 CLC 1274) is identical to the case in hand except that in the said case, in prayer clause, the plaintiffs had prayed that they might be given relief to which they might be found entitled. It may be pointed out here that the High Court, while deciding the aforesaid case, did Not require the plaintiffs in that case to amend the plaint in view of the fact that one of the plaintiffs' name was struck off from the record. It is settled principle of law that the Court, while deciding a case, may take into consideration the subsequent events which might have come into existence after the institution of the suit or at the appellate stage. Ordinarily, it is desirable that in such a case the Court should require the party concerned to amend its pleadings but if the facts needed to be introduced by amendment do Not necessitate investigation or the same are admitted by the opposite-party or can be easily resolved by the material on the record, the Court need Not require the amendment of plaint; the Court can give the relief to the party concerned without any amendment. A reference may be made to some authorities which testify our view: ' In case reported as Ramcharan Tulsiram v. Murlidhar Ramchandra (AIR 1954 M.B. 193), it has been observed that it is well-established principle of law that although ordinarily the Court has to determine rights and obligations between the parties as they exist on the date of institution of the suit yet in proper cases it may be obligatory upon it to take into account the subsequent events including changes in law and to mould the relief according to the changed circumstances.
10. ' Identical view was expressed in cases reported as Lachmeshwar Prasad Shukul v. Keshwar Lal Chaudhuri (AIR 1941 F.C. 5) and Lakshmi Ammal v. Narayanaswami Naicker (AIR 1950 Mad. 321). In the latter case it has been observed that if the cause of action was Not available to the plaintiff on the date when the suit was filed, the Court has discretion to grant an amendment of the plaint to enable the plaintiff to include the fresh cause of action. It was further held that where the facts are Not in dispute, the Court can give the relief to the plaintiff without seeking the formal amendment of the plaint.
11. ' In Khisro Nawaz v. Khanimullah (PLD 1962 Pesh. 124), it was held that the fact that the suit is Not properly framed, does Not disentitle the plaintiff to relief which is otherwise clearly admissible to him in the interest of justice.
12. ' In Mst. Salam Abbasi v. Ahmed Suleman (1981 CLC 462) it was observed that the relief admissible to a plaintiff should Not be denied on the ground that the suit was Not properly framed or the same was Not specifically prayed in the plaint. If the relief is claimed upon a specific ground, the Court has power to give the relief upon a ground different from that on which the same was claimed provided it gives No element of surprise to the other party.
13. In the instant case the name of Abdul Karim, co-plaintiff, was struck off by the trial Court; and he had also appealed before the District Judge which was dismissed. The fact that the respondent- plaintiff did Not seek amendment of the plaint to claim whole of the suit land in exercise of right of prior purchase would Not disentitle him to get a decree of the entire land; especially so when he has specifically mentioned in the memorandum of appeal filed in the High Court that a decree for entire suit land may be passed in his favour. It may be observed here that initially the respondent- plaintiff sought half of the suit land only because Abdul Karim was also co-plaintiff who sought decree to the extent of one-half of the suit land. Obviously, when Abdul Karim's name was struck off under the impression that he was a stranger, there is No bar in law to decree the entire suit land in favour of the plaintiff-respondent as has been done in the instant case by the High Court.
14. In the circumstances, listed above, the contention that as the respondent-plaintiff did Not amend the plaint to seek the entire land in exercise of right of prior purchase, his suit would be hit by partial pre-emption is Not tenable, especially so when the respondent-plaintiff has clearly mentioned in para. 10 of the memorandum of appeal filed in the High Court that the suit land should be decreed in his favour as well as in favour of Abdul Karim, pro forma respondent, in equal shares; in alternative, he has prayed that if the same canNot be done and any amendment is necessary, he should be allowed to amend his plaint or a decree for entire suit land may be passed in his favour.
15. The High Court did Not feel the necessity of getting the plaint amended and gave the relief to the respondent-plaintiff, Fateh Muhammad, in terms that the whole of the suit land has been decreed in his favour.
16. ' In the light of what has been stated above, finding No force in this appeal, it is hereby dismissed.
17. No order is made as to the costs.