IMAM ALI G. KAZI, J.- Abu Bakar Khan, the Respondent herein, filed an application under Section 14 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 on 8.5.1984 seeking ejectment of his tenant Qamaruddin from Shop Nos. l2 & 13, situated in Chand Cloth Market, Liaquatabad, Karachi. According to the averments made by the Respondent in his application he claimed that he was born on 22.6.1924 and shall attain the age of 60 years on 21.6.1984. On 1.2.1984 he served the tenant with a notice under Section 14 of Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, that he needed the shops for his personal use and required him to deliver vacant possession thereof upto 20.4.1984. Since the tenant did not comply with his requisition, Respondent filed the ejectment application in the Court of VI Senior Civil Judge and Rent Controller Karachi. The tenant generally denied the averments made in the application and further claimed that Respondent had 19 shops in Chand Cloth Market in addition to 20 shops in Mustafa Cloth Market. He further stated that the Respondent was an Advocate and he would not need the premises in question for his personal use but he wants arbitrary increase in the amount of rent.
2. The Rent Controller formulated the following points for determination of the dispute:- "(1) Whether the Applicant is entitled to the benefit of Section 14 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979?
(2) What should the order be?"
3. Both the parties led evidence and the Rent Controller by his judgment passed on 3.12.1984 dismissed the Rent Application.. The Respondent then filed an Appeal before this Court and the order of the Rent Controller was set-aside and the case was remanded to the Trial Court to decide the case afresh after hearing the parties and after production of PT-I by the tenant, PT-I was produced by the tenant to show that the Respondent was- in fact in occupation of Shop No.10 and Shop No.9 was vacant in Mustafa Market. The Rent Controller, however, did not permit the tenant to summon Assistant Director Lands, K.M.C, to produce the title deeds of Chand Cloth Market. He, however, allowed the application. The tenant then filed an appeal before this court and the case was remanded to the Rent Controller to decide it afresh recording evidence of the Assistant Director Lands. The Assistant Director Lands, K.M.C. Mohammad Saleem Ahmed was examined after the case was remanded second time. The III Senior Civil Judge and Rent Controller Karachi (Central), by her judgment passed on 26.2.1991 allowed the ejectment application. It is against such judgment that the present Appeal has been filed.
4. Qamaruddin, the tenant of the premises in question, expired and his legal heirs have filed this Appeal.
5. It has been strenuously argued by Mr. Dewan Bashir Ahmed, Advocate for the Appellants, that the lease of the plot of the disputed premises has not been transferred or mutated in the name of Respondent and, therefore, he cannot be said to be the "owner" of the premises in question.
According to him, a landlord who is to attain age of 60 years can seek the delivery of vacant possession of a premises let out by him to a tenant for personal use only. The term "personal use" has been defined under Section 2(g) of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 which means the use of premises by the owner thereof or his were (or husband)' son or daughter. The Respondent in the present case not being the owner is not entitled to eviction of the Appellants under Section 14 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979. He has relied on the cases reported in 1990 M LD 1009; 1985 CLC 882; PLD 1983 S.C. 1064. He further contended that the landlord for the purpose of ejectment of his tenant under Section 14 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 has to establish his need. On stich point he has referred to cases reported in 1986 CLC 681; PLD 1988 Karachi 619; PLD 1985 S. C.l and 1983 CLC 568.
6. Mr. Khalilur Rehman's, appearing for the Respondent, contended that Appellants did not at any stage of the proceedings deny that the Respondent was the owner of the premises in question and it is for the first time that such a plea has been raised in the Appeal. According to him if such a plea is not raised in the pleadings or evidence, it cannot be taken at the appellate Stage. He has relied on the case reported in 1983 CLC 317. He further referred to the evidence recorded in the case to show that Respondent had established his need for the premises in question.
7. According to the evidence brought on record before the Rent Controller, the plot over which Chand Cloth Market is constructed was originally allotted to one Saeedullah. The Respondent had purchased it with the building and applied for its transfer to the K.M.C. Assistant Director Lands, K.M.C., was examined on behalf of the Appellants, who has admitted these facts. It is true that it is the owner of a premises who alone can seek ejectment of a tenant on the grounds mentioned therein under Section 14 of the Sind Tenancy Ordinance, 1979.
8. "Owner" had not been defined in the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979. According to the meaning given in Legal Thesaurus "to own" means to be in possession of, be in receipt of, to have rights to etc. A person can own a premises without having a legal title over the, plot over which such premises are constructed. Ownership of the premises in this case are not disputed by the Appellants at any stage of the case. All that they have said is that the Respondent has not got the lease of the plot transferred in his name. Under the circumstance the respondent will be treated to be theiessue of the rented premises although strictly speaking to the over the plot is not transferred legally. Besides no such objection was taken by the Appellants who had admitted the Status of the Applicant as the owner of the property in dispute. Under such circumstances Appellants will be debarred from raising such plea to that effect at the appellate stage. By taking such a view I am fortified with the decision reported in 1983 CLC 317.
9. The facts of the cases referred to by the Advocate for the Appellants, are distinguishable and not applicable to the facts of the present case
10. 1 had by my short order passed on 21.11.1991 for the foregoing reasons dismissed the appeal.