1. ' SAEEDUZZAMAN SIDDIQUI, J.---The respondent filed an application under section 20 of the Arbitration Act with the prayer that the appellant be directed to file the arbitration agreement in Court and thereafter arbitrators be appointed in accordance with the arbitration agreement. The application was resisted by the appellant but the Civil Judge, 1st Class, Lahore allowed the application by order dated 3-1-1988. The order of the Civil Judge, Lahore was challenged in FAO No,28 of 1988, before the Lahore High Court, and a learned Judge in Chamber dismissed the appeal on the short ground that Mr. Abdul Majid Sheikh, Advocate, who had signed the memo. Of appeal on behalf of the appellant had no authority to sign the same.
2. Leave was granted in this case to consider the question whether Sheikh Abdul Majid, Advocate, could be considered as a Government Pleader within the meaning of Order 27, C.P.C. And whether the appeal presented by him on behalf of Government could be rejected on the ground that it was not signed by an authorised person.
3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and are of the view that the learned Judge in Chamber while dismissing the appeal of the appellant has taken a too technical view in the matter.
4. It is not disputed that Sheikh Abdul Majid was asked by the Advocate-General, Punjab to file the appeal on behalf of the appellant. Apart from it the defect pointed out by the learned Judge in Chamber that the memo of appeal was not signed by the Advocate-General, Punjab or by any person authorised to sign memo. Of appeal was only a technical objection which could be rectified by allowing an opportunity to the Government Pleader to call the Advocate-General or any authorised person on behalf of Government to sign the memo of appeal.
5. ' In Ismail and another v. Mst. Razia Begum and 3 others (1981 SCM R 687), this Court held that where plaintiffs had all along prosecuted their suit with diligence, non-signing of the plaints by them at the proper stage was a mere irregularity which could be rectified and repelled the contention that the signatures of plaintiffs on the plaints having been obtained on the plaint after the expiry of one year, the suits became time-barred. Similarly, in Liaqat Hayat and 5 others v. Muhammad Sarwar - (1985 SCM R 1386) the power of attorney executed by the plaintiff/respondent in that case in favour of his counsel who presented the memo. Of appeal before the 1st Appellate Court was not signed though it contained the acceptance of the counsel. The counsel who filed the memo. Of appeal subsequenity died and the lawyer who suceeded him in the case had a proper power of attorney in his favour from plaintiff/respondent. It was contended before this Court that the memo. Of appeal before the 1st Appellate Court was not properly presented. The contention was repelled as follows:- - "6. We find that in granting the relief to the plaintiffs/respondents who were appellants before the first appellate Court certain findings of fact had been recorded and they formed the basis of the decision. For example, the fmding that the appeal had been filed by Mr. MA. Rehman under instructions from the appellant and the defect was only in not properly completing the power-of- attorney. On such a finding the decisions of this Court in Toor Gul v. Mst. Mumtaz Begum PLD 1972 SC 9; Ghulam Qadir and others .v. Abbul Sattar and others PLD 1984 SC 12 and Ismail and others v.
6. Mst. Razia Begum 1981 SCM R 687, would be attracted and justify the treatment afforded by the Letters Patent Bench of the High Court. We do not find any merit in the petition and leave to appeal is refused."
7. ' Again in Ghulam Qadir y. Abdul Sattar (PLD 1984 SC 12) this Court held that omission to file power of attorney by the AOR at the time of filing of the petition is mere irregularity which stood cured by subsequent filing of the same.
8. ' In case of Nabi Bakhsh & Sons v. Pakistan (PLD 1969 Kar. 210), relied by the learned counsel for the appellant the objections against the award were signed on behalf of Government by one of the Advocates appearing for the Government. The plaintiff in the above case took objection that the Advocate who had signed the objections to the award was not authorised by the Government to appear and act in the case in terms of Order III, Rules 1 and 4, C.P.C. A learned Single Judge overruled the objection and held that it was merely an irregularity and not an illegality, which can be cured. The decision in the above case was challenged before a Division Bench of the same Court reported as M/s. Nabi Bakhsh & Sons v. Pakistan (PLD 1969 Kar 566). Muhammad Afzal Zullah, J. (as he then was), who wrote the judgment on behalf of the Bench in the above case, considered the scope of Orders XXVII and III, C.P.C. At length and made the following observations:-- "11. The question whether or not the appointment of Mr. Muhammad Akram by the respondent to act in the matter in the High Court falls under Order XXVII, C.P.C. Does not present any difficulty. Rule 1 of Order XXVII provides that the Government can, by general or special order, appoint any person to sign the pleadings. Rule 2 of the said Order provides that persons who are ex officio or otherwise authorised to act for the Government in respect of any judicial proceeding, shall be deemed to be recognised agents by whom appearances, acts and applications under the Code may be made or done on behalf of the Government. Clause (a) of rule 8-B of Order XXVII, C.P.C. Provides that the Government pleader means the Pleader whom the Government may appoint, whether generally or specially, for the purpose of this Order. The combined reading of these provisions leaves no doubt that the appointment of Mr. Muhammad Akram, which is constituted and is proved to be complete by the various communications referred to above, was lawful and with competence and falls under Order XXVII of the Civil Procedure Code. It is particularly pointed out that rule 2 provides for not only an ex officio appointment but also an authorisation otherwise to act for the Government in respect of any judicial proceeding. When such an authorisation is made (as is proved to have been done in this case), the person so authorised becomes a recognised agent for the purpose of appearances, acts and applications under the Civil Procedure Code. This view of the meaning of rule 2 is further supported by the words "Government may appoint, whether generally or specially, for the purpose of this Order" used in clause (a) of rule 8-B of Order XXVII, C.P.C. And which shows that the Government can make a general or special appointment for the purpose of Order XXVII, C.P.C. And the appointment of Mr. Muhammad Akram in this case would certainly also fall under this provision. In reaching the above conclusions, we have been conscious of the fact that the Government has throughout contended that Mr. Muhammad Akram was properly appointed person to act in this case. The general presumption that, all official acts must be presumed to have been done according to procedure, must be raised in this case; and in that view also the appointment of Mr. Muhammad Akram cannot be viewed but as legal. This view is supported by an unreported judgment of the Supreme Court cited before us by the appellant himself in another connection, i.e, Thal Development Authority v. Mr. Nisar Ahmed Qureshi (Civil Appeal No,85 of 1965), wherein it was observed as follows:-- ' During the hearing of the appeal it was ascertained by us that the Authority had by a letter written on the 11th January 1961 instructed Sh. Shaukat Ali to appear in the Court of the Senior Civil Judge, Lahore, and file objections to the award on its behalf. The letter in our view constituted a proper document in writing "signed by an agent of the Authority appointing Sh. Shaukat Ali a pleader to act on its behalf in the matter of filing objections to the award. No other formal document was necessary to comply with the requirements of Order III, rule 4, C.P.C. The letter dated 11th January, 1961,which from the office of "the Chairman was signed by the administrative officer and it would be reasonable to presume that the said officer was competent to act and sign on behalf of the Chairman as a delegate under section 19 of the Act.
12. The contention of the appellant that the failure to file a Vakalatnama by Mr. Muhammad Akram at the time of and alongwith the filing of the objections is fatal, has no force. According to him, even in relation to persons authorised to act on behalf of Government under Order XXVII, C.P.C. Is mandatory. Proceeding on this assumption, he has cited Thal Development Authority v. Nisar Ahmed Qureshi 1 in support of his contention. That judgment proceeded on the assumption that the provisions of Order III, C.P.C. Were applicable to the particular case which was being dealt with by the learned Judge. The learned Single Judge in the instant case has considered the effect of the above-cited case. And we have no reason to differ with him on this question. The cited judgment, however, was set aside by the Supreme Court in Thal Development Authority v. Mr. Nisar Ahmad Qureshi (Civil Appeal No,85 of 1965), the effect of which has also been noted by the learned Single Judge and we need not repeat it. However, we may add that if the provisions of Order III and Order XXVII, C.P.C. Are compared and read together, the contention that the provisions of rule 4 of Order III, C.P.C. Are to be read in Order XXVII loses all force. Order XXVII, is to be considered as a special provision dealing with the suits by or against the Government or Public Officers in their official capacity, while Order III is a general provision relating to recognised agents and pleaders. In Order XXVII, a departure has been made from the provisions of Order III in various respects. A parallel provision to rule 4 of Order III, C.P.C. Is found in only rule 8 of Order XXVII, C.P.C. The latter rule provides that when the Government undertakes the defence of a suit against a Public Officer the Government pleader, upon being furnished with authority to appear and answer the plaint, shall apply to the Court, and upon such application the Court shall cause a note of his authority to be entered in the register. In this rule which applies to suits making of a note by the Court, of the authority of the Pleader to act on behalf of the Public Officer, there is no mention of the placing of the letter of authority on the file of the Court. In respect of the other suits, i.e, those by or against the Government, there is no binding requirement of the Court noting the authority or the pleader's placing the letter of authority on the file. Had it been intended by the framers of the rules to make it mandatory that the Government Pleaders should also file the Vakalatnama or other letters of authority, such a provision could have been made in Order XXVII. Absence of this provision in this behalf is very significant."
9. ' Similarly, in Toor Gul v. Mst. Mumtaz Begum (PLD 1972 SC 9), this Court held, that omission of the name of Advocate from the body of Vakalatnama is mere irregularity and it would be too technical to hold that on that account the Vakalatnama was not valid. This Court further observed in that case that the rules framed in the Code of Civil Procedure are for advancement of justice and as such, they should not be, as far as possible, allowed to operate so as to defeat the ends of justice.
10. In the case before us it was contended before the learned Judge in Chamber by Mr. Abdul Majid Sheikh, who was appearing for the Government, that he was authorised by the Advocate-General to file the appeal but the learned Judge did not allow'him the opportunity to produce the authority or to rectify the defect. We are, therefore, of the view that if learned Judge was of the opinion that Mr. Abdul Majid Sheikh had not been authorised to sign memo. Of appeal on behalf of the appellant, he should have allowed him an opportunity to get the memo. Of appeal signed by the appropriate officer instead of non-suiting the appellant on such technical ground.
11. ' We accordinlgy accept this appeal, set aside the impugned order and remand the case to Lahore High Court with the direction that the appellant may be allowed opportunity to produce the authorisation in favour of Abdul Majid Sheikh, Advocate to get the memo. Of appeal signed by the Advocate-General, Punjab or any other authorised officer of the appellant, if necessary, and thereafter, the appeal may be heard and disposed of in accordance with the law.