' SALEEM AKHTAR, J.---This appeal is directed against the judgment of the High Court of Sindh dated 13-5-1987 passed in F.RA. No,724 of 1984.
2. The appellant filed application for ejectment against the respondent on the ground of default in payment of rent from March, 1979 to February, 1981. The respondent had taken on rent room No,605, Mohammadi House, I.I. Chundrigar Road, Karachi, in 1977 from M/s. Pakistan Shipping Corporation
(PSC) who were the owners at the relevant time. In March, 1979, Ordinance was promulgated known as Pakistan National Shipping Corporation Ordinance, 1979 (Ordinance XX of 1979) by which the Pakistan Shipping Corporation and National Shipping Corporation were dissolved and amalgamated into a new Corporation known as Pakistan Shipping Corporation. Under section 7 of the Ordinance the undertakings and all assets, liabilities and properties of the two amalgamated Corporation were transferred to Pakistan National Shipping Corporations with effect from 1-1-1979.
The Pakistan National Shipping Corporation served a notice of atonement dated 7-6-1979 on all the tenants of Mohammadi House including the respondent. The respondent neglected to pay rent in spite of the notice and acknowledgment of amalgamation. The respondent had pleaded that there is no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties as the premises was let out by National Shipping Corporation and not by the appellant. It was further pleaded that no notice as required by section. 13-A of the repealed West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance or under section 18 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance was served upon the respondent. It was further pleaded that National Shipping Corporation used to collect the rent periodically but since March, 1979, National Shipping Corporation refused to accept the rent stating that it was not the owner and landlord and as such the rent was not paid by the respondent since March, 1979. As no demand was made as required by section 18 the respondent could not be ejected. The learned Controller granted the ejectment application against which the respondent filed appeal before the High Court which was allowed. The learned Single Judge referring to section 18 observed as follows:-- "Mr. Rehmat Elahi has contended that the appellant (respondent herein) admitted about receiving intimation of transfer of ownership. This contention has not impressed me because the mode of service of a notice under section 18 is clearly prescribed there, to be through registered post. The language of the section clearly contemplates an express notice and that implied notice or information aligned cannot be sufficient compliance with the section. The provisions of the section were required to be observed very strictly and an express notice addressed to the person in possession of the premises in dispute was to be issued. Thus, no notice as required by section 13-A or 18 of the Ordinance was served upon the appellants and, therefore, the application under section 15(2) (ii) of the Ordinance itself was not maintainable."
Leave was granted to consider whether the intimation received otherwise than by the manner expressly provided by section 18 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, will not be a sufficient compliance of the aforesaid provision of law.
3. Section 18 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance reads as follows:-- "18. Change in ownership. --Where the ownership of a premises in possession of the tenant has been transferred by sale, gift, inheritance or by such other mode, the new owner shall send an intimation of such transfer in writing by registered post to the tenant and the tenant shall not be deemed to have defaulted in payment of the rent for the purposes of clause (ii) of subsection (2) of section 15, if the rent due is paid within thirty days from the date when the intimation should, in normal course, have reached the tenant."
' Mr. Yousuf Raft, the learned AOR for the appellant, contended that the notice was duly issued which was received by the respondent and, therefore, it was sufficient compliance of section 18. On the other hand, Mrs. Majida Rizvi, the learned AOR for the respondent, contended that strict compliance of section 18 should be made before a new landlord claims ejectment on the basis of default in payment of rent. The object of section 18 is to intimate the tenant about the transfer of property or the name of the new landlord who is entitled to recover rent. The new owner is required to intimate the tenant about the transfer or vesting of the property in him. In this way the tenant knows to whom he has attorned. Reference can be made to Khuda Buksh v. Muhammad Yaqoob 1981 SCM R 179 and Mrs. Kazmi v. Syed. Kamaluddin Shah 1982 SCM R 576. Section 18 is remedial in nature and provides a procedure for a particular situation. It has, therefore, not to be strictly construed particularly issuance of the notice by registered post if the tenant has positive knowledge of transfer by a simple notice or otherwise as the case may be. Service of notice is relevant only for the purposes of filing ejectment application by the new landlord on ground of default. Refer to Sabu Mal v. Kika Ram alias Heman Das 1973 SCM R 185. The tenancy is in no way dependent upon the service of notice under section 18 of the Ordinance. Section 18 which is equivalent to section 13-A of the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance has been considered in several judgments of this Court. In 1983 SCM R 282, Messrs Everyday Pictures Limited v. Chamman Begum, as the factum of transfer of property was admitted and rent was paid for several months it was held that notice was not necessary.
4. A wider interpretation has been given to provision of section 13-A which is similar to section 18 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance. Institution of ejectment application and receipt of copy of the said application by which the tenant comes to know about the transfer of the disputed premises has been constituted as amounting to due notice and treated as substantial compliance with the provisions of section 13-A. Reference can be made to Maj. (Retd.) Muhammad Yousuf v.
Mehrajuddin 1986 SCM R 751 where it was observed as follows:-- "On the first question proper evidence leading to presumption was adduced that a notice under section 13-A was sent to the respondents who refused to receive the same. Instead of raising rebuttable proper presumptions under the law regarding delivery of such notice, it has been found that the appellant failed to establish delivery of notice by production of the postman. We would leave this question at that because rent has not been tendered or paid even after the institution of the application which for the present purpose amounts to service of notice. See Syed Azhar Imam Rizvi v. Mst. Salama Khatoon 1985 SCM R 24 and Muhammad Siddique v. Mst. Sharifan and another Law Notes 1969 SC 78." These judgments and the principles enunciated by this Court have not been considered or even referred in the impugned judgment. During arguments reference was made to section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act in which service of notice by registered post A/D was held to be a mandatory requirement. The Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act was completely different in nature and object from Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, or the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance of 1959. The former intended to transfer the property and its section 30 created statutory tenancy by serving a notice by registered post A/D and, therefore, in such circumstances compliance of the provision of section 30 was held to be mandatory. As is obvious the object of section 18 is merely to intimate the tenant of the transfer of property for a limited purpose of filing ejectment application on ground of default.
Therefore, principles of the judgment in the Even's case PLD 1963 SC 536 will not be attracted to cases falling under section 18. In Maj. (Retd.) Muhammad Yousuf s case (supra) it was observed:- ' On the second question also the respondents have no case: It is neither supported by statute nor any principle of law that if a notice under section 13-A of the Ordinance is not served that would amount to absence of relationship of landlord and tenant. The analogy of case-law under section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, is not attracted here.
Thus, the finding on issue of relationship has to be reversed and we do accordingly'.
5. The respondent admits service of notice though it was not by registered post. It also alleges to have tendered rent and, therefore, in such circumstances it was not necessary that a notice by registered post should have been sent. In the facts and circumstances of the case the respondent was aware of the transfer of property and had defaulted in payment of rent within the specified period. Even if it had any doubt about the transfer to the appellant it could have deposited the rent in Court but such step was not taken by it for about two years. In these circumstances we set aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge and allow the appeal. By consent six months' time is allowed to the respondent to hand over vacant possession to the appellant provided the respondent pays the entire arrears and continues to pay rent till he vacates the premises. In case the premises is not vacated as specified above the Controller shall issue writ of ejectment without any notice to the respondent.