DECISION I propose to dispose of these 14 appeals by a common order as the points urged are common in all these appeals.
2. These appeals are directed against an order of the learned Presiding Officer of Sind Labour Court No. II, Karachi, dated 9th October 1973. The learned Labour Court had disposed of all the 14 cases, by consent of the parties, by the said order as the facts involved were common to all the applications filed under section 34 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 (hereinafter called the Ordinance).
3. Mr. M. A. Shahani for the appellant raised three legal points, namely : (1) that the application under section 34 of the Ordinance was not maintainable, as no right was guranteed under any law; (2) that the application was belated ; and
(3) that at any rate as the respondents were drawing about Rs. 200 as their wages, they could not make an application under section 34 of the Ordinance.
4. I propose to dispose of these points separately. The learned Presiding Officer did not accept any of the contentions of the appellant's Advocate. He came to the conclusion, on the first issue, that section 9 of the Payment of Wages Act and section 47 of the Factories Act gave a right to recover wages for overtime work at the rate of double the wages. The leamed Labour Court interpreted the word "Court*'' to mean only "civil Court", relying on a decision of Dacca High Court, reported in 1969 PLC 353. On the point, the Presiding Officer came to the conclusion, as no limitation is prescribed under section 34 of the Ordinance, that the application did not suffer from delay. Admittedly, the application was filed more than after a year. Anything that has been done must be done within a reasonable time. It is true that section 34 of the Ordinance does not prescribe any time-limit for making an application therein, but anything that has to be done under any statute must be done within a reasonable time. Whether a thing was done within a reasonable time or not is a question^ of fact depending upon the circumstances of each case. In this case, the learned Labour Court explained this long delay by accepting the statement of the respondents that they were pursuing their remedy before the Labour Directorate. In this connection, the cross-examination of Ghulam Husain is noteworthy.
He stated as under :-- "I had not made any representation against the termination of my services because my case was pending before the Labour Directorate. I have not got the copy of my application to the Labour Directorate. May be with the Secretary of our Union. The cases of all the applicants were pending before the Labour Directorate. The dispute was with respect to the payment of overtime."
5. All the respondents were dismissed sometime in 1971. The cause of action, if any, arose ia 1971, when their services were terminated and the overtime became due. The learned Presiding Officer accepted the word of the respondent, Ghulam Husain, too easily witnout examining it carefully. Mere statement by a litigant is not sufficient to accept its veracity or truth. It appears from the cross-examination of Ghulam Husain that he did not have the copy of the application that was made to the Labour Directorate. It was for the respondent's representative to have asked a question, with the permission of the Court no doubt, if Ghulam Husain could produce a copy of the application moved before the Labour Directorate. The witness may have replied in the affirmative and then a date may have been given to produce the same. I have come to the conclusion that the respondents have failed to explain the long delay of over one year in making the applications. The appeals are allowed and the order of the learned Presiding Officer is set aside on the ground that the applications under section 34 of the Ordinance suffer from long delay.
Appeals allowed.